Califano v. Westcott Pratt v. Westcott

Decision Date25 June 1979
Docket Number78-689,Nos. 78-437,s. 78-437
Citation99 S.Ct. 2655,61 L.Ed.2d 382,443 U.S. 76
PartiesJoseph A. CALIFANO, Secretary of Health, Education, and Welfare, Appellant, v. Cindy WESTCOTT et al., John D. PRATT, etc., Appellant, v. Cindy WESTCOTT et al
CourtU.S. Supreme Court
Syllabus

Section 407 of the Social Security Act, which governs the Aid to Families with Dependent Children, Unemployed Father (AFDC-UF) program, provides benefits to families whose dependent children have been deprived of parental support because of the unemployment of the father, but does not provide such benefits when the mother becomes unemployed. This class action was instituted in Federal District Court against the Secretary of the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare (Secretary) and the Commissioner of the Massachusetts Department of Public Welfare (Commissioner) by appellees, two couples (each having an infant son) who satisfy all the requirements for AFDC-UF benefits except for the requirement that the parent who is "unemployed" within the meaning of the Act and applicable regulations be the father. Appellees alleged that § 407 and its implementing regulations discriminate on the basis of gender in violation of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments, and sought declaratory and injunctive relief. The District Court declared § 407 unconstitutional insofar as it establishes a classification which discriminates solely on the basis of sex, and determined that extension of the AFDC-UF program to all families with needy children where either parent is unemployed, rather than nullification of the program, was the proper remedial course. Subsequently, the District Court declined to modify its order so as to permit the Commissioner to pay benefits only to those families where needy children have been deprived of parental support by the unemployment of the family's "principal wage-earner." The Secretary challenges only the holding on the constitutionality of § 407, whereas the Commissioner challenges only the relief.

Held :

1. The gender classification of § 407 is not substantially related to the attainment of any important and valid statutory goals; it is, rather part of the "baggage of sexual stereotypes," Orr v. Orr, 440 U.S. 268, 283, 99 S.Ct. 1102, 1113, 59 L.Ed.2d 306, that presumes the father has the "primary responsibility to provide a home and its essentials," Stanton v. Stanton, 421 U.S. 7, 10, 95 S.Ct. 1373, 1375, 43 L.Ed.2d 688 while the mother is the "center of home and family life." Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522, 534 n. 15, 95 S.Ct. 692, 699 n. 15, 42 L.Ed.2d 690. Legislation that rests on such presumptions, without more, cannot survive scrutiny under the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment. Pp. 83-89.

(a) The constitutionality of § 407 cannot be sustained on the theory that although it incorporates a gender distinction, it does not discriminate against women as a class because it affects family units rather than individuals. Pp. 83-85.

(b) Nor can § 407's gender distinction survive constitutional scrutiny as being substantially related to achievement of an important governmental objective. It does not serve the statutory goal of providing aid for needy children, nor is it substantially related to achieving the alleged objective of the AFDC-UF program of reducing the incentive for fathers to desert in order to make their families eligible for assistance. Pp. 85-89.

2. The District Court's remedial order was proper. Pp. 89-93.

(a) Since no party has argued that nullification of the AFDC-UF program is the proper remedial course, this Court would be inclined to consider that issue only if the power to order extension of the program were clearly beyond the constitutional competence of a federal district court. However, this Court's previous decisions, which routinely have affirmed district court judgments ordering extension of federal welfare programs, suggest strongly that no such remedial incapacity exists. Pp. 89-91.

(b) The District Court, in ordering that benefits be paid to families in which either the mother or the father is unemployed within the meaning of the Act, rather than accepting the "principal wage-earner" model suggested by the Commissioner, adopted the simplest and most equitable extension possible. Pp. 91-93.

D.C.Mass., 460 F.Supp. 737, affirmed.

William H. Alsup, Dept of Justice, Washington, D.C., for appellant in No. 78-437.

Paul W. Johnson, Boston, Mass., for appellant in No. 78-689.

Henry A. Freedman, New York City, for appellees in both cases.

Mr. Justice BLACKMUN delivered the opinion of the Court.

Section 407 of the Social Security Act, 75 Stat. 75, as amended, 42 U.S.C. § 607, part of the Aid to Families with Dependent Children program, provides benefits to families whose dependent children have been deprived of parental support because of the unemployment of the father, but does not provide such benefits when the mother becomes unemployed. The United States District Court for the District of Massachusetts held that this distinction violates the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment, and ordered that benefits be paid to families deprived of support because of the unemployment of the mother to the same extent they are paid to families deprived of support because of the unemployment of the father. 460 F.Supp. 737 (1978). In these appeals, the Secretary of the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare (HEW), in No. 78-437, challenges the holding on the constitutionality of § 407, but does not question the relief ordered by the District Court; the Commissioner of the Massa- chusetts Department of Public Welfare (DPW), in No. 78-689, acquiesces in the decision on the merits, but contests the relief.

I

The Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC) program, 49 Stat. 626, as amended, 42 U.S.C. § 601 et seq., provides financial assistance to families with needy dependent children. The program is administered by participating States, in conformity with federal standards, and is financed by the Federal Government and the States on a matching-funds basis. King v. Smith, 392 U.S. 309, 316-317, 88 S.Ct. 2128, 2132-2133, 20 L.Ed.2d 1118 (1968); Shea v. Vialpando, 416 U.S. 251, 253, 94 S.Ct. 1746, 1750, 40 L.Ed.2d 120 (1974).

As originally enacted in 1935, the AFDC program provided benefits to families whose dependent children were needy because of the death, absence, or incapacity of a parent. Batterton v. Francis, 432 U.S. 416, 418, 97 S.Ct. 2399, 2402, 53 L.Ed.2d 448 (1977). This provision, which forms the core of the AFDC program today, is gender neutral: benefits are available to any family so long as one parent of either sex is dead, absent from the home, or incapacitated, and the family otherwise meets the financial requirements of eligibility. 42 U.S.C. § 606.

In 1961, and again in 1962, Congress temporarily extended the AFDC program to provide assistance to families whose dependent children were deprived of support because of a parent's unemployment. Batterton v. Francis, 432 U.S., at 419, 97 S.Ct., at 2403; Philbrook v. Glodgett, 421 U.S. 707, 709-710, 95 S.Ct. 1893, 1896-1897, 44 L.Ed.2d 525 (1975). Again, this provision was gender neutral. A "dependent child," for purposes of determining eligibility for AFDC benefits, was defined to include "a needy child . . . who has been deprived of parental support or care by reason of the unemployment . . . of a parent." 75 Stat. 75 (emphasis added).

In 1968, as part of a general revision of the Social Security Act, Congress made this extension permanent. In so doing, however, it added a gender qualification to the statute. The definition of "dependent child" in § 407 was amended to include a "needy child . . . who has been deprived of parental support or care by reason of the unemployment . . . of his father." 42 U.S.C. § 607(a) (emphasis added). This portion of the AFDC program is known as Aid to Families with Dependent Children, Unemployed Father (AFDC-UF). Although all 50 States have chosen to participate in the basic AFDC program, only 26 States (plus Guam and the District of Columbia) take part in the AFDC-UF program. One of these is the Commonwealth of Massachusetts.

Appellees are two couples who, it is stipulated, satisfy all the requirements for AFDC-UF benefits 1 except for the requirement that the unemployed parent be the father. Cindy and William Westcott are married and have an infant son. They applied to the Massachusetts DPW for public assistance, but were informed that they did not qualify because William, who was unable to find work, had not previously been employed for a sufficient period to qualify as an "unemployed" father under the Act and applicable regulations. Cindy, until her recent unemployment, was the family breadwinner, and would have satisfied the "unemployment" criteria had she been male.

Susan and John Westwood are also married and have an infant son. They applied for Medicaid benefits as a family eligible for, but not receiving, AFDC-UF benefits.2 They, too, were turned down on the ground that John's prior work history was insufficient. Susan, like Cindy Westcott, had been the family breadwinner before losing her job, and would have qualified the family for benefits had she been male.

Appellees instituted this class action in the United States District Court for the District of Massachusetts, naming as defendants the Secretary of HEW and the Commissioner of the DPW. Appellees alleged that § 407 and its implementing regulations discriminate on the basis of gender in violation of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments. They sought declaratory and injunctive relief.

The District Court certified the case as a class action,3 and granted appellees' motion for summary judgment. 460 F.Supp. 737 (1978). The court found that the gender qualification of § 407 was not substantially related to the achievement of any important governmental interests. 460 F.Supp., at 748-751. It was, rather, the product of an ...

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