Sebold v. Sebold
| Decision Date | 12 February 1971 |
| Docket Number | No. 23014.,23014. |
| Citation | 444 F.2d 864 |
| Parties | Randall E. SEBOLD, Sr. v. Irene H. SEBOLD, Appellant. |
| Court | U.S. Court of Appeals — District of Columbia Circuit |
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Mr. Harvey Rosenberg, Silver Spring, Md., for appellant.
Before TAMM, LEVENTHAL, and MacKINNON, Circuit Judges.
The issues here revolve around the effect of a divorce in Maryland upon the title to District of Columbia real estate held by the parties during their marriage as tenants by the entirety. We remand the case for additional hearing and disposition in accordance with the principles hereafter set forth.
For a year and one half prior to her marriage, appellant worked as a waitress and turned over her earnings to her husband (appellee) and she continued to do so after their marriage in 1938 until 1943 when she became pregnant with her second child and ceased working. Thereafter, until about 1947, they usually kept a roomer in the house. During the early years of their marriage the couple purchased a residence in the District of Columbia which they sold in 1950 to move to a newly purchased home in Maryland. The purchase price of the Maryland property was partially financed out of the proceeds of the sale of their prior home and the title was placed in the names of the husband and wife as tenants by the entirety. In connection with the sale of the District property the parties took back a second deed of trust and appellant endorsed the note over to appellee, who deposited it in the bank for collection to the credit of his account.
From 1950 through 1960, the parties acquired four other pieces of property in the District of Columbia (the District properties) as follows:
May 16, 1950 425 New Jersey Avenue
S.E
March 23, 1955 114-11th Street, S.E
May 13, 1960 431-7th Street, S.E
March 6, 1961 1208 C Street, N.E
The title to each of these District properties was placed in the names of the parties hereto, as tenants by the entirety, and they were used primarily for income-producing purposes. A fifth District property acquired by appellee in 1955 at 910-12th Street, S.E. for $2,150 was placed in his name alone.
In 1964, the parties separated and in 1965 a consent order was entered in the Circuit Court for Montgomery County, Maryland, providing that appellee would pay appellant $300 per month separate maintenance, would make "house payments" (of principal and interest) on the Maryland property as they became due, would pay for the taxes, insurance, heat, gas, water and electricity on that property and would provide certain other benefits for appellant. The District properties were not referred to in the order of the Maryland court.
In 1967 appellee filed a Bill of Complaint in Maryland for an absolute divorce and appellant responded with a Cross Bill. On September 13, 1967 the Maryland court dismissed appellee's complaint and awarded appellant a divorce a vinculo matrimoni on her Cross Bill on the grounds of constructive desertion. The decree of divorce incorporated that part of the consent order mentioned above with reference to alimony and other benefits but, again, the District properties were not mentioned.
In March of 1968, appellee commenced the instant action in the United States District Court for the District of Columbia seeking to have title to the four District properties placed in his name. Appellant counterclaimed for an accounting of the monies which appellee had received from the rental of the District properties from and after the date of the entry of the Maryland divorce decree.
The District Court after trial without a jury, awarded appellee title to all of the District properties save the one located at 425 New Jersey Avenue, S.E. In its findings of fact and conclusions of law, which were announced orally in court, it was found that appellant had contributed her earnings to appellee during the early years of their marriage and that, during the period in which they had rented rooms in their initial house, the income so received was placed in a joint fund. The court also found that the appellant made various nonmonetary contributions to the household, chiefly through her efforts in maintaining the home and bringing up the children. Dealing with the case on "the theory that the parties own five properties altogether" (the Maryland house and the four income properties in the District) and holding that the appellant should be entitled to "more than just one of the five pieces of property," the court awarded appellee title in fee simple absolute to all the District properties except that on New Jersey Avenue, title to which it left without any declaration as to its status. On appellant's counterclaim, the court awarded her an accounting of the rents received from the District properties since the date of the entry of the decree of absolute divorce, but allowed appellee an offset for the payments he had made on their Maryland home pursuant to the divorce decree.
From this decision and order appellant appeals and raises nine issues which we consolidate into three principal questions:
Appellant's first contention is that the District Court had no jurisdiction to make the award that it did and that it should have considered the instant action to be one for the partition of real property between tenants in common or should have dismissed it. For this proposition appellant cites Scholl v. Scholl, 72 F.Supp. 823 (D.D.C.1947).
Although her brief is not entirely clear on this point, appellant must be arguing that the District Court has no "jurisdiction" to provide any remedy other than partition. Appellee entitles his complaint as one for "Declaratory Judgment to Establish Title to Real Property"; alleges that the action is brought under 28 U.S.C. § 2201,1 D.C. Code § 11-521,2 and other applicable statutes as well as the general equity powers of the court; and prays the court to declare the District properties to be his "sole property" and to order appellant to convey title to him; and for other relief. We have held that the United States District Court in the District of Columbia has jurisdiction under its general equity powers contained in D.C. Code § 11-521 (1967) "to adjudicate and settle a dispute between the parties concerning their respective rights in funds and property which had been acquired by them during marriage, or incident thereto." Reilly v. Reilly, 86 U. S.App.D.C. 345, 182 F.2d 108 (1950); see Hardy v. Hardy, 250 F.Supp. 956 (D.D.C.1966). The Scholl case is not to the contrary, for there the issue was whether D.C. Code § 16-409 (1940) (now § 16-910)3 or D.C. Code § 16-1301 (1940) (now § 16-2901)4 provided the proper remedy. The question of the court's jurisdiction over the subject matter was not discussed, possibly because the Court of Appeals in an earlier proceeding between the same parties had upheld the jurisdiction of the court. See Scholl v. Scholl, 80 U.S.App.D.C. 292, 295, 152 F.2d 672, 675 (1945).
In the instant case it does not seem necessary to resolve the question of whether the District Court could have awarded any remedy other than partition. Although appellant does not say so precisely, she seems to feel that the successful maintenance of a suit for partition necessarily results in an equal division of the properties in issue.5 As will be discussed, this is not necessarily the case, and the disposition of the property made by the District Court is fully compatible with a disposition which could have been made in a suit for partition. In addition, though appellee did not specifically ask for a partitioning of the property, that relief could nonetheless have been granted. Fed.R.Civ.P. 54(c).6 The relief requested, essentially an adjudication of his property rights, was a necessary first step in any partition proceedings.
We conclude, therefore, that we are justified in treating this appeal as one from a lower court decree partitioning real property.
Such treatment disposes of any "jurisdictional" question leaving for resolution the issue of the correctness of the lower court's decision.
Appellant next contends that the Full Faith and Credit clause of the Constitution, U.S.Const. art. IV, § 1, was violated by the District Court when that court, in apportioning the District properties, took into account, as a credit in appellee's favor, the amount of alimony awarded to appellant by the divorce decree in the Maryland court. Appellant cites no cases which lend support to this proposition and we have found none.
We first note that it is far from certain that the District Court took the agreed monetary payments, which the Maryland court continued in the divorce decree, into account in making its division of the District properties.7 But, even if these payments had been taken into account by the District Court, the Full Faith and Credit clause would not be violated under the circumstances of this case. The Maryland decree and the support agreement it incorporated made no mention of the District properties. Only if such silence had the effect of validly binding the parties to some specific disposition of the District properties inter se would that clause be violated by a decree in the District Court dividing the property in a different manner. Compare Varone v. Varone, 359 F. 2d 769, 771 (7th Cir. 1966). While the Maryland court had jurisdiction over the parties in the divorce action, it had no jurisdiction...
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