AIR LINE PILOTS ASS'N INTERN. v. Northwest Airlines, Inc., 4-77-Civil-191.

• Decision Date: 06 June 1977
• Docket Number: No. 4-77-Civil-191.,4-77-Civil-191.
• Citation: 444 F. Supp. 838
• Parties: AIR LINE PILOTS ASSOCIATION, INTERNATIONAL, Plaintiff, v. NORTHWEST AIRLINES, INC., Defendant.
• Court: U.S. District Court — District of Minnesota

444 F. Supp. 838

AIR LINE PILOTS ASSOCIATION, INTERNATIONAL, Plaintiff, v. NORTHWEST AIRLINES, INC., Defendant.

No. 4-77-Civil-191.

United States District Court, D. Minnesota, Fourth Division.

June 6, 1977.

Robert S. Savelson, Cohen, Weiss & Simon, New York City, and J. Michael Dady, Lindquist & Vennum, Minneapolis, Minn., for plaintiff.

David Ranheim, Dorsey, Windhorst, Hannaford, Whitney & Halladay, Minneapolis, Minn., for defendant.

MEMORANDUM & ORDER

DEVITT, Chief Judge.

The principal issue raised by plaintiff's motion for a preliminary injunction is whether the change in maximum pilot duty hours occasioned by defendant's institution of nonstop jet service from Chicago, Illinois to Tokyo, Japan has given rise to a "major" or "minor" dispute within the meaning of the Railway Labor Act, 45 U.S.C. § 151, et seq. (1970). The matter was initially presented on plaintiff's application for a temporary restraining order. However, in the course of the hearing on that application on June 3, 1977, both parties agreed to consolidate the temporary restraining order and preliminary injunction proceedings, thereby establishing the present posture of this case.

The present dispute originated shortly after defendant, in order to meet substantial competitive pressures, decided to initiate four-day-a-week nonstop service from Chicago to Tokyo and return. This decision was made sometime in the winter of 1977 with the first flight scheduled to depart Chicago on June 8, 1977. Plaintiff learned of this situation in March of 1977. Since it felt that the hours which a pilot would be required to fly under this schedule exceeded the duty hour limitations in the current collective bargaining agreement, plaintiff included a proposal to negotiate these duty hours in its notice of contract negotiations served on March 28, 1977. This notice, which in addition to the proposal concerning the nonstop service, included a comprehensive proposal for a new agreement to take effect upon the June 30, 1977 expiration of the current agreement, was served pursuant to Section 28E of the collective bargaining agreement and Section 6 of the Railway Labor Act, 45 U.S.C. § 156 (1970).

Defendant served its notice of negotiation a few days later. It agreed that the duty hour limitation for the nonstop service could be properly discussed for inclusion in the new contract. However, it maintained and continues to contend that under the existing agreement, it has the sole power to determine the number of hours a pilot must fly on the nonstop service as long as it adheres to the minimal, safety-oriented limitations contained in a provision of the Federal Air Regulations (FAR's), 14 C.F.R. § 121.485 (1977). Informal negotiations have not borne fruit, and plaintiff now asks the court to enjoin the flights pending exhaustion of the settlement procedures mandated by the Railway Labor Act.

The legal principles which govern this dispute are clear. The starting point is 45 U.S.C. § 152 First and Second (1970) which obligates the parties to negotiate and attempt to voluntarily settle all disputes arising from the employer-employee relationship. Failing settlement at this stage, one of the two different statutory settlement mechanisms is activated, depending upon whether the dispute is major or minor. Elgin, Joliet, and Eastern Ry. Co. v. Burley, 325 U.S. 711, 723-28, 65 S.Ct. 1282, 1289-92, 89 L.Ed. 1886 (1945). Correspondingly, the ability of a party to secure an injunction of the type applied for here varies according to the classification of the dispute. If the dispute is major, an injunction maintaining the status quo throughout the settlement process is mandatory without any consideration of the relative equities involved. United Transportation Union v. Burlington Northern, Inc., 458 F.2d 354, 357 (8th Cir. 1972). If the dispute is minor, then a court should be guided by the usual equitable considerations attendant upon the grant or denial of an injunction in order to maximize the primary jurisdiction of the contract grievance machinery and the Airline System Board of Adjustment. Order of Railway Conductors v. Pitney, 326 U.S. 561, 567, 66 S.Ct. 322, 325, 90 L.Ed. 318 (1946).

Prior to considering the status of this dispute as major or minor, a preliminary matter must be resolved. Plaintiff contended at oral argument that the existence of Section 6 negotiations at the time a court is asked to invoke its injunctive power somehow alters the analytical framework outlined above. This cannot be the case since a party could make any dispute major (thereby triggering the settlement procedures for that type of dispute enforceable by the special statutory injunction) by merely filing notice of Section 6 negotiations. Plaintiff has cited no authority for this contention and seemingly refutes it at page six of its brief where plaintiff concludes that the major dispute provisions are applicable to all attempts to change or modify existing conditions regardless of the existence or non-existence of negotiations. Therefore, the court holds that characterization of the dispute, at least at this preliminary stage, is a task for the judiciary and is unaffected by the existence of contract negotiations.

The terms of art, major and minor, are somewhat misleading. Classification turns on questions of contract interpretation rather than the degree of impact on the employment relationship. Major disputes are concerned with formation or amendment of a collective bargaining agreement while minor disputes deal with interpretation or application of an existing contract. Elgin, Joliet, and Eastern Ry. Co. v. Burley, supra. Thus, the key issue where an agreement exists is whether its terms provide a resolution to the controversy between the parties. If so, then the dispute is labeled minor, referred to compulsory arbitration, and enjoined only upon plaintiff meeting the normal requirements for an injunction.

However, since the Railway Labor Act is directed toward resolution of disputes through administrative rather than judicial channels, the court's scope of inquiry is narrow. The final characterization of the controversy is left to the appropriate administrative body. The court merely functions as a clearinghouse by preliminarily determining which administrative body should make the final classification. Accordingly, the test is whether the disputed action can be arguably justified by the existing agreement. Railway Express Agency v. Brotherhood of Railway, Airline, and Steamship Clerks, 459 F.2d 226, 231 (5th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 892, 93 S.Ct. 115, 34 L.Ed.2d 149 (1972). Other courts ask whether the contention that the contract permits the disputed action is not obviously insubstantial. Airline Stewards Assn. v. Caribbean Atlantic Airlines, Inc., 412 F.2d 289, 291 (1st Cir. 1969). The tests are effectively equivalent in illustrating the limited judicial role in determining the question at issue.

Defendant's contention that the existing contract arguably resolves this dispute is premised on the fact that it plans to use crews composed of five pilots for the new nonstop service. The normal contingent for international flights is three pilots. In fact, Northwest Airlines has not employed crews of more than three pilots since it began using jets in 1960. However, such crews were utilized in the 1950's for piston aircraft. In support of its argument, defendant relies on an alleged implied contract provision established by a negative inference derived from the current agreement's provision regarding duty hour limitations as clarified by ...