State v. Santana

Citation444 S.W.2d 614
Decision Date23 July 1969
Docket NumberNo. B--1132,B--1132
PartiesSTATE of Texas, Petitioner, v. George Rivera SANTANA, Respondent.
CourtSupreme Court of Texas

Thomas J. Purdom, County Atty., Jack Layne, Asst. County Atty., Lubbock, Crawford C. Martin, Atty. Gen., Monroe Clayton, Asst. Atty. Gen., Austin, for petitioner.

Brock, Wright, Waters & Galey, William T. Kirk, Jr., Lubbock, for respondent.

GREENHILL, Justice.

The problem in this juvenile proceeding is the quantum of proof required. The jury found, from a Preponderance of the evidence, that George Santana, age 14 at the time of the trial, committed rape upon Frone Mintz and that he was a delinquent child. He was committed to the Texas Youth Council. The contention is that the use of 'the preponderance of the evidence' is no longer permissible; and that under the Gault decision of the Supreme Court of the United States, the findings must be beyond a reasonable doubt as in criminal cases. In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 87 S.Ct. 1428, 18 L.Ed.2d 527 (1967). The Court of Civil Appeals agreed with the contention. It reversed in the light of Gault. 431 S.W.2d 558. We granted a writ of error to review that holding. A second point, not reached by the Court of Civil Appeals, is whether the State could amend its petition before trial. We must deal with that contention also.

Counsel for Santana did not object to the wording of the jury issues on the ground that they called for answers based upon a 'preponderance of the evidence.' Nor did counsel ask for or submit requested issues for the jury based upon the quantum of proof 'beyond a reasonable doubt.' The point was raised for the first time on motion for new trial as fundamental error. In the ordinary civil case, the alleged error in the charge to the jury would be considered as waived. But in view of the constitutional importance of this case to the public generally, and in view of the fact that juvenile proceedings are not designed to be conducted as ordinary adversary proceedings, the point raises a question of fundamental error, and it will be so treated. Ramsey v. Dunlop, 146 Tex. 196, 205 S.W.2d 979 (1947); McCauley v. Consolidated Underwriters, 157 Tex. 475, 304 S.W.2d 265 (1957).

The opinion in Gault made a wide and critical analysis of juvenile proceedings. The tone of the opinion is that minors as well as adults are entitled to basic constitutional protection. It dealt with six subjects; and as to the first four, it was held that the minor was entitled to constitutional protection: notice of charges; right to counsel; right to confrontation of witnesses and of cross-examination; and privilege against self-incrimination. It reserved the questions of a right to a transcript of the proceedings, and right to an appellate review. The only one of these elements raised here deals with adequate notice of the charges. This relates to the amendment of the State's petition before trial. Moreover, Santana had a trial by jury, a right still withheld in some states in juvenile cases. In Gault, the minor was committed for a maximum of six years; while for the same offense (obscene phone calls) the punishment for an adult was a fine of $50 and two months in jail. The maximum here for Santana is seven years of detention. For an adult the maximum punishment for the same offense (rape) is death or life imprisonment.

The minor involved in Gault was not tried under the 'beyond a reasonable doubt' rule. The Arizona law called for findings by 'clear and convincing evidence.' When the United States Supreme Court remanded the cause for the equivalent of a new trial, it expressly did not pass upon whether 'beyond a reasonable doubt' was required by the Constitution of the United States. It said, 'We shall not consider other issues which were passed upon by the Supreme Court of Arizona. We emphasize that we indicate no opinion as to whether the decision of that court with respect to such other issues (including 'beyond a reasonable doubt') does or does not conflict with requirements of the Federal Constitution.' The Supreme Court also declined to pass upon the question in In re Whittington, 391 U.S. 341, 88 S.Ct. 1507, 20 L.Ed.2d 625 (1968).

It is strongly urged here and in some contemporaneous writings that the opinion in Gault means that a juvenile proceeding which may end in depriving a person of his liberty is, in reality, a criminal trial; and that to satisfy the due process and equal protection clauses, juvenile proceedings must be accompanied by all of the same measures and protections afforded in criminal trials. We do not so read Gault. The Gault opinion goes out of its way to say it does Not mean to so hold. It quotes from Kent v. United States, 383 U.S. 541, 562, 86 S.Ct. 1045, 1057, 16 L.Ed.2d 84 (1966).

'We do not mean * * * to indicate that the (juvenile) hearing to be held must conform with all of the requirements of a criminal trial or even of the usual administrative hearing; but we do hold that the hearing must measure up to the essentials of due process and fair treatment.'

The Gault opinion then states, 'We reiterate this view. * * *' The Court sets out many of the desirable features of juvenile hearings such as the processing and treatment of juveniles separately from adults and the special juvenile court procedures which avoid classifying the juvenile as a 'criminal.' The conclusion stated in Gault is that 'the features of the juvenile system which its proponents have asserted are of unique benefit will not be impaired by constitutional domestication'; and 'There is no reason why the application of due process requirements should interfere with such provisions.'

The facts in Gault were extreme, and the material reviewed by the Supreme Court of the United States indicated to it that much of the good intended by juvenile proceedings was being poorly carried out at least in some areas including Arizona.

The Court reviewed the history of juvenile treatment and recalled that as the juvenile acts were designed, it was Not the goal of the State to determine whether a child was guilty or innocent, but to determine what is he, how has he become what he is, and what had best be done in his interest and in the interest of the State to save him from a downward career. The child, essentially good, was to be made to feel that he was the object of the State's care and solicitude, not that he was under arrest or on trial. The rigidities, technicalities, and harshness of the criminal law were altogether inapplicable. The idea of crime and punishment was to be abandoned. The child was to be treated and rehabilitated. Moreover, no permanent public record was made of his hearing or trial so that the child would not be branded as a criminal simply because he was subject to the help and discipline of the state.

Under the Texas act, no adjudication of the status of any child may operate to impose any civil disabilities ordinarily imposed by conviction, 'nor shall any child be deemed a criminal * * *, nor shall any child be charged with or convicted of a crime in any court. The disposition of a child or any evidence given in the court shall not be admissible as evidence against the child in any case * * * other than another Juvenile Court, nor shall such disposition or evidence operate to disqualify a child in any future civil service examination appointment, or application.' Art. 2338--1 § 13(3).

The Gault opinion recognized, or at least reserved judgment on, the policy of the juvenile court system. It declined to announce that they were either criminal or civil courts, rather recognizing that they were Sui generis. It did make it plain that the system was being badly abused in some areas so that many children, not properly treated as juveniles, were not given the protection of adults, and got 'the worst of both worlds.' And, on many occasions, instead of getting the kindly father approach from the judge, a child was often whisked away to the equivalent of a prison in what amounted to Star Chamber proceedings. 'His world becomes 'a building of whitewashed walls, regimented routine and institutional laws * * *' Instead of mother and father * * * his world is peopled by guards, custodians, state employees, and 'delinquents' confined with him for anything from waywardness to rape and homicide.' 387 U.S. at 27, 87 S.Ct. at 1443.

At the darkest point in this bleak picture masterfully painted by Mr. Justice Fortas is the thundering statement that 'Under our Constitution, the condition of being a boy does not justify a kangaroo court.'

To correct the kangaroo court approach, the Gault opinion announced basic constitutional guarantees for juvenile proceedings, whether they be civil, criminal, or Sui generis: adequate notice, right to counsel, confrontation and cross-examination of witnesses, and the privilege against self-incrimination.

We ascribe to the Gault court not a desire to abolish the attempt of the state to treat and rehabilitate the child through juvenile proceedings, but a laudable mandate that in juvenile proceedings, the rights of the child be preserved; that the proceedings be conducted with basic fairness. Instead of the Worst of both worlds under the abused juvenile proceedings, the Gault court, it is thought, desired to preserve the Best of both worlds for the minor; i.e., the individual, particularized treatment of the disturbed, rebellious or wayward minor, while at the same time, insuring that the hearings be conducted with dignity and fairness and with the essentials of due process being observed.

We accept this view. This Court originally upheld the validity of the Texas Juvenile Act upon this basis in Dendy v. Wilson, 142 Tex. 460, 179 S.W.2d 269, 151 A.L.R. 1217 (1944). And while recognizing the benefits of the separate treatment of juveniles, this Court there held that the rights of the minors were there violated because they were compelled to give testimony against themselves....

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