John Doe v. Metro. Police Dept., Dist. of Columbia

• Decision Date: 25 April 2006
• Docket Number: No. 04-7114.,04-7114.
• Parties: JOHN DOE et al., Appellants v. METROPOLITAN POLICE DEPARTMENT OF THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA et al., Appellees.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — District of Columbia Circuit

445 F.3d 460

JOHN DOE et al., Appellants v. METROPOLITAN POLICE DEPARTMENT OF THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA et al., Appellees.

No. 04-7114.

United States Court of Appeals, District of Columbia Circuit.

Argued September 26, 2005.

Decided April 25, 2006.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of Columbia (No. 03cv02379).

Damon W.D. Wright argued the cause for the appellant. Carol E. Bruce was on brief. Neal Goldfarb entered an appearance.

Mary L. Wilson, Assistant Attorney General, District of Columbia, argued the cause for the appellees. Robert J. Spagnoletti, Attorney General, and Edward E. Schwab, Deputy Attorney General, District of Columbia, were on brief.

Before: HENDERSON and GRIFFITH, Circuit Judges, and SILBERMAN, Senior Circuit Judge.

Opinion for the court filed by Circuit Judge HENDERSON.

KAREN LECRAFT HENDERSON, Circuit Judge.

The Metropolitan Police Department (MPD) of the District of Columbia (District) arrested the appellants, John Doe and Jane Doe I, II, III and IV, for underage possession and/or consumption of alcoholic beverages. The Does appeal the district court's dismissal of their consequent constitutional claims brought against the MPD and various D.C. officials. They argue that, because their arrests and detentions were based on their violation of a civil statute, probable cause to believe a crime had been committed did not exist; accordingly, the MPD's actions violated their Fourth Amendment rights. Because the version of the underage possession/consumption law in effect when John Doe was arrested was not unambiguously a civil offense, we affirm the district court's dismissal albeit on a different ground. The version of the law under which the four Jane Does were arrested, however, described an unambiguously civil offense and we therefore reverse the district court's dismissal of their claims and remand those claims for further proceedings.

I.

A. Factual Background

Between September 2000 and October 2003, MPD officers arrested each of the five Does, all under 21 years of age at the time of arrest, for allegedly violating the District's law prohibiting underage possession and/or consumption of alcoholic beverages.¹ In September 2000 John Doe was walking down H Street N.W. carrying a package of closed containers of beer.² He was approached by a uniformed MPD officer who placed him under arrest. The officer took him to the police station where he was held for seven hours. Before being released, he was issued a citation to appear in court to answer a single charge of violating the underage possession law, D.C.Code § 25-130.³ The MPD arrested the four Jane Does between October 9 and October 11, 2003, pursuant to D.C.Code § 25-1002(a), the 2001 version of the underage possession and/or consumption law.⁴ Jane Doe I was arrested at a pub after undercover MPD officers were told she was consuming an alcoholic beverage belonging to another pub patron. The officers removed her from the pub, arrested and handcuffed her, and transported her to the police station. She was held for more than three hours, issued a citation for underage consumption of alcohol and released. MPD officers arrested the other three Jane Does while they were walking together down Wisconsin Avenue N.W. carrying paper bags of closed containers of alcoholic beverages. The three were arrested, their belongings were searched and they were taken to the police station. Each was held for more than three hours and, before being released, each was issued a citation for underage possession of alcohol.

In November 2003, the five Does filed a six-count complaint, individually and on behalf of a class of similarly situated persons,⁵ against the MPD, the D.C. Office of the Attorney General, Mayor Anthony Williams and D.C. Corporation Counsel Robert Spagnoletti in their official capacities only, Chief of Police Charles H. Ramsey and Lieutenant Patrick Burke in their individual and official capacities, and an unspecified number of unidentified arresting officers in their individual and official capacities (collectively the District). They alleged the District's actions were unconstitutional under both the Fourth and Fifth Amendments to the United States Constitution and they sought equitable relief and money damages under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The Does claimed that an arrest made under D.C.'s underage possession/consumption law was unlawful because the law set forth a civil, not criminal, offense; they were therefore arrested without probable cause in violation of the Fourth Amendment.⁶ The Does asserted federal question jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331 and 1343 and supplemental jurisdiction over various common law tort claims under 28 U.S.C. § 1367.⁷ The Does also sought a temporary restraining order (TRO) and preliminary injunctive relief to prohibit the MPD from making any arrest in the future under the underage possession/consumption law.

The District opposed the TRO petition, arguing that the district court lacked jurisdiction based on our decision in Barwood, Inc. v. District of Columbia, 202 F.3d 290 (D.C.Cir.2000), where we held that an arrest in violation of state law does not in and of itself implicate the Fourth Amendment. We declared that "[m]ere inconsistency with state, or even federal, law will not suffice to create a Fourth Amendment cause of action." Barwood, 202 F.3d at 294. The Barwood holding, the District claimed, meant that the district court was without subject-matter jurisdiction because an arrest in violation of state law failed to allege a constitutional claim. Mem. in Opp'n to Pl.'s Mot. for TRO at 2-4 (Record Document 5).

On January 28, 2004, the district court dismissed the complaint under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1), concluding that "[f]or a Fourth Amendment violation to arise, the arrest must violate the Fourth Amendment of its own accord, for some reason other than the mere fact that the arrest was unauthorized under state law." John Doe v. District of Columbia, No. 03-2379, at 6 (D.D.C. Jan. 28, 2004). Because Barwood held that an arrest unauthorized under state law does not constitute a Fourth Amendment violation, the Does' "Fourth Amendment claims do not form a basis on which the Court can exercise jurisdiction over Plaintiffs' suit." Id. The Does timely appealed.

B. Statutory Background

In 1984, in response to federal legislation reducing transportation funding to any state that did not raise its legal drinking age to 21, see 23 U.S.C. § 158, the Council of the District of Columbia (D.C.Council) enacted a statute making it unlawful for any person under 21 to consume alcohol or for anyone to sell alcohol to any person under 21. Any underage person who misrepresented his age in order to purchase alcohol was guilty of a misdemeanor, subject to a $25 fine or imprisonment for up to 10 days in the event of non-payment. D.C.Code § 25-130 (1991). In 1994 the Council amended section 25-130 to prohibit anyone under 21 years of age from possessing, purchasing or consuming alcoholic beverages. It also added a revocation of driving privileges penalty for violation of the law. D.C.Code § 25-130 (1995) (1994 law). The 1994 law deleted the misdemeanor offense of false representation of age; instead, it incorporated by cross-reference section 25-132, the catch-all provision of the District's Alcohol Beverage Control Act (ABC Act), which provided for imprisonment of up to one year for any violation thereof. See D.C.Code § 25-831 (2005) (formerly D.C.Code § 25-132 (1981)).

The following year, in District of Columbia v. Morrissey, 668 A.2d 792 (D.C.1995), the D.C. Court of Appeals construed a violation of the 1994 law to constitute a misdemeanor because of its reference to the residual misdemeanor penalty in section 25-132. In dictum,⁸ the writing judge noted that "[i]f the Council did not intend to make the conduct with which Morrissey has been charged a crime subject to trial by jury and punishable by, inter alia, a year in prison, then clarifying legislation should be enacted. Rewriting the statute to make it more humane transcends the judicial function." Morrissey, 668 A.2d at 801.

In 1997, the D.C. Council again amended section 25-130. See D.C.Code § 25-130(a) (1997 law).⁹ The 1997 law no longer cross-referenced section 25-132 and instead added specific penalties for statutory violations, including a "civil" fine, "as an alternative sanction for any infraction." D.C.Code § 25-130(b-2) (emphasis added). The Council included a criminal penalty for misrepresenting one's age in order to purchase alcohol; anyone under 21 who did so was guilty of a misdemeanor and subject to a $300 fine or imprisonment not to exceed 30 days for non-payment. See D.C.Code § 25-130(b-1). Despite the deletion of the reference to section 25-132 and notwithstanding the alternative civil fine sanction, the District continued to follow Morrissey, prosecuting underage possession violators criminally as it had under the 1994 law. As noted, the 1997 law was in effect when John Doe was arrested in September 2000.

In October 2000, Brett Cass, who had been convicted of underage possession of alcohol under the 1997 law and sentenced to probation, challenged his conviction, claiming the statute prescribed only a civil penalty for underage possession. In a decision issued three years later, the D.C. Court of Appeals found the 1997 law's criminal sanction inapplicable to underage possession and therefore concluded that a violation of subsection (a) of section 25-130 constituted a civil offense. Cass v. District of Columbia, 829 A.2d 480 (D.C.2003). The court based its decision on two points of statutory interpretation and one point drawn from legislative history. First, it construed the misdemeanor provision set forth in section 25-130(b-1) to apply, in its own words, only to falsely representing one's age for the purpose of purchasing alcoholic beverages. Second, it considered the misdemeanor provision of ...