Filiaggi v. Bagley

• Citation: 445 F.3d 851
• Decision Date: 14 April 2006
• Docket Number: No. 04-3513.,04-3513.
• Parties: James J. FILIAGGI, Petitioner-Appellant, v. Margaret BAGLEY, Warden, Respondent-Appellee.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Sixth Circuit

Page 851

445 F.3d 851

James J. FILIAGGI, Petitioner-Appellant, v. Margaret BAGLEY, Warden, Respondent-Appellee.

No. 04-3513.

United States Court of Appeals, Sixth Circuit.

Argued: January 31, 2006.

Decided and Filed: April 14, 2006.

ARGUED:

Jeffrey M. Gamso, Toledo, Ohio, for Appellant. Daniel R. Ranke, Office of the Attorney General, Capital Crimes Section, Cleveland, Ohio, for Appellee.

ON BRIEF:

Jeffrey M. Gamso, Toledo, Ohio, Spiros P. Cocoves, Toledo, Ohio, for Appellant. Daniel R. Ranke, Office of the Attorney General, Capital Crimes Section, Cleveland, Ohio, for Appellee.

Before: BATCHELDER, COLE, and GIBBONS, Circuit Judges.

BATCHELDER, J., delivered the opinion of the court, in which GIBBONS, J., joined.

COLE, J. (pp. 859-861), delivered a separate dissenting opinion.

OPINION

ALICE M. BATCHELDER, Circuit Judge.

Petitioner James J. Filiaggi, an Ohio death-row prisoner, appeals a district court order denying his petition for a writ of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2254. The district court granted a certificate of appealability ("COA") on two claims. In his first claim, Filiaggi argues that his jury waiver was invalid because he was incompetent at the time it was made and because the trial court did not engage him in an adequate colloquy. Second, Filiaggi argues that the trial court should have found him incompetent during his trial. Because we conclude that the Ohio Supreme Court reasonably interpreted the facts of the case and reasonably applied clearly established federal law, we AFFIRM the district court's denial of Filiaggi's petition for a writ of habeas corpus.

The story of Filiaggi's crime, which is not relevant to his petition, is set forth in the Ohio Supreme Court's opinion, State v. Filiaggi, 86 Ohio St.3d 230, 714 N.E.2d 867, 870-72 (1999). Our account begins with Filiaggi's first appearance in court.

On the first day of Filiaggi's trial, the stun belt used to restrain him as he was being transported to court misfired, resulting in what Filiaggi refers to as his "electrocution." Inasmuch as Filiaggi remains among the living, we will refer to the incident as an electrical shock. Afterward, Filiaggi was visibly shaken, his back was burned, and he suffered muscle spasms. The jail physician gave him ten milligrams of valium to ease his pain and to relax his muscles. Because of this incident, the court delayed the start of his trial until the afternoon. During the afternoon session, Filiaggi waived his right to a jury trial and elected instead to be tried to a three-judge panel. The next day, at the behest of defense counsel, the trial court ordered an evaluation of Filiaggi's competence to stand trial. Dr. Thomas Haglund examined Filiaggi that afternoon. The court held a competency hearing the following day, and Dr. Haglund testified, albeit it somewhat hesitantly, that Filiaggi understood the proceedings against him, and was able to consult with his counsel and to assist them in preparing his defense. The court therefore held that Filiaggi was competent to stand trial. Filiaggi's counsel disagreed and requested reevaluation. The court refused the request and the trial proceeded. The panel eventually found Filiaggi guilty and sentenced him to death.

After procedurally exhausting his direct appeal and post-conviction claims in the State of Ohio, Filiaggi filed a petition for writ of certiorari in the United States Supreme Court. The petition was denied. Filiaggi v. State, 528 U.S. 923, 120 S.Ct. 287, 145 L.Ed.2d 240 (1999). In January 2001, Filiaggi filed this petition in the district court for a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254, asserting ten constitutional violations. The district court denied the writ but granted a COA on Filiaggi's first two claims: whether he had knowingly, voluntarily and intelligently waived his right to a jury trial and whether he had been competent at the time of his trial. Filiaggi did not attempt to expand the COA in this court, and he appeals only the two claims for which the district court granted a certificate.

I. Standard of Review

The provisions of the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 ("AEDPA") apply to Filiaggi's petition. Lindh v. Murphy, 521 U.S. 320, 336, 117 S.Ct. 2059, 138 L.Ed.2d 481 (1997) (holding that AEDPA applies to petitions filed after April 24, 1996). Title 28 U.S.C. § 2254 sets out the requirements for a grant of habeas relief:

(d) An application for a writ of habeas corpus on behalf of a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court shall not be granted with respect to any claim that was adjudicated on the merits in State court proceedings unless the adjudication of the claim —

(1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States; or

(2) resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented at the State court proceedings.

28 U.S.C. § 2254(d).

Under the "contrary to" clause, a federal habeas court may grant the writ if the state court arrives at a conclusion opposite to that reached by this Court on a question of law or if the state court decides a case differently than this Court has on a set of materially indistinguishable facts. Under the "unreasonable application" clause, a federal habeas court may grant the writ if the state court identifies the correct governing legal principle from this Court's decisions but unreasonably applies that principle to the facts of the prisoner's case.

Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 412-13, 120 S.Ct. 1495, 146 L.Ed.2d 389 (2000). "[A] federal habeas court may not issue a writ under the unreasonable application clause simply because that court concludes in its independent judgment that the relevant state-court decision applied clearly established federal law erroneously or incorrectly." Bell v. Cone, 535 U.S. 685, 694, 122 S.Ct. 1843, 152 L.Ed.2d 914 (2002) (quotation omitted). If the state court decision does not squarely address the federal constitutional issue in question, but its analysis bears "some similarity" to the requisite constitutional analysis, we must carefully review both the record and the applicable law, and we may reverse only if we conclude that the state court's decision is contrary to or an unreasonable application of federal law. Maldonado v. Wilson, 416 F.3d 470, 476 (6th Cir.2005).

When reviewing a district court's decision to grant or deny a writ of habeas corpus, we review de novo the court's legal conclusions and its own factual findings for clear error. Smith v. Hofbauer, 312 F.3d 809, 813 (6th Cir.2002). Like the district court, we must presume that factual determinations made by the state court are correct, unless the habeas petitioner has rebutted them by clear and convincing evidence. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1).

II. Jury Waiver

Filiaggi argues that his waiver of a jury trial was not knowing, voluntary or intelligent. Specifically, he asserts that, due to the electrical shock, he was not competent at the time of the waiver. He also asserts that his attorneys did not inform him that the waiver would make certain errors, such as evidentiary errors, essentially unreviewable on appeal. Finally, he argues that the trial court did not engage him in a sufficient colloquy.

Because the right to a jury trial is fundamental, Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 154, 88 S.Ct. 1444, 20 L.Ed.2d 491 (1968), Filiaggi's waiver of that right — to be valid — must have been knowingly, intelligently and voluntarily made. Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477, 482, 101 S.Ct. 1880, 68 L.Ed.2d 378 (1981). The clearly established Supreme Court precedent at the time that Filiaggi waived his right to a jury trial, as well as at the time that the Ohio Supreme Court held that his waiver was valid, required only that the waiver be consented to by the government and sanctioned by the court, and that it reflect the "express and intelligent consent of the defendant." Patton v. United States, 281 U.S. 276, 312, 50 S.Ct. 253, 74 L.Ed. 854 (1930). As the Court explained a decade later:

The Patton decision left no room for doubt that a determination of guilt by a court after waiver of jury trial could not be set aside and a new trial ordered except upon a plain showing that such waiver was not freely and intelligently made. If the result of the adjudicatory process is not to be set at naught, it is not asking too much that the burden of showing essential unfairness be sustained by him who claims such injustice and seeks to have the result set aside, and that it be sustained not as a matter of speculation but as a demonstrable reality.

Adams v. United States ex rel. McCann, 317 U.S. 269, 281, 63 S.Ct. 236, 87 L.Ed. 268 (1942). Filiaggi therefore has the burden of demonstrating that he did not expressly and intelligently consent to waive a jury trial and that the Ohio Supreme Court's judgment to the contrary is either an unreasonable application of clearly established Supreme Court precedent or contrary to that precedent, or resulted from an unreasonable interpretation of the evidence presented to the state courts.

The Ohio Supreme Court held in State v. Filiaggi, 86 Ohio St.3d 230, 714 N.E.2d 867 (1999), that Filiaggi's claims that his waiver was not valid were meritless. The court first held that there was no requirement that a trial court "interrogate a defendant in order to determine whether he or she is fully apprised of the right to a jury trial;" that the trial court's failure to make inquiry of Filiaggi as to whether he understood the presumption of correctness that attached to the findings of the three-judge panel was therefore not error; and that the trial court's reading aloud of the written waiver and ensuring that it reflected Filiaggi's desire, was all that was required. Id. at 875. The court went on to hold that:

The record supports de...