446 F.2d 667 (9th Cir. 1971), 71-1825, Bacon v. United States
|Citation:||446 F.2d 667|
|Party Name:||In the Matter of Leslie BACON, a witness before the Grand Jury, Appellant, v. UNITED STATES of America, Appellee.|
|Case Date:||June 24, 1971|
|Court:||United States Courts of Appeals, Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit|
Honorable William N. Goodwin, District Judge, Benjamin Dreyfus (argued), of Garry, Drefus, McTernan & Brotsky, San Francisco, Cal., Jennie Rhine, Oakland, Cal., Jan Peterson, Seattle, Wash., for appellant.
Robert L. Keuch (argued), Dept. of Justice, Garvin Lee Oliver, Richard S. Stolker, Dept. of Justice, Guy L. Goodwin, Sp. Atty., Washington, D.C., Robert C. Mardian, Asst. Atty. Gen., Stan Pitkin, U.S. Atty., Seattle, Wash., for appellee.
Before HAMLEY, KOELSCH and DUNIWAY, Circuit Judges.
Leslie Bacon appeals from a civil contempt order of confinement entered on May 19, 1971, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1826. The order is based upon a finding that appellant had refused to obey the
court's prior order of the same day, issued pursuant to 18 U.S.C. §§ 6002 and 6003, granting her immunity and ordering her to answer the questions asked by the grand jury which she had previously refused to answer. On June 15, 1971, we entered orders releasing appellant from custody subject to specified conditions, pending disposition of this appeal, and expediting the appeal.
Appellant argues that the 'use immunity' provided by section 6002 does not provide her protection commensurate with the Self-Incrimination Clause of the Fifth Amendment, and that only if she were provided a 'transaction immunity' would she be under compulsion to testify before the grand jury.
We must reject this argument in view of recent decisions of this court holding to the contrary on this precise question. See Charleston v. United States (Herlicy v. United States) 444 F.2d 504 (9th Cir. 1971), and Stewart v. United States (Kastigar v. United States), 440 F.2d 954 (9th Cir. 1971), cert. granted May 17, 1971, 402 U.S. 971, 91 S.Ct. 1668, 29 L.Ed.2d 135.
After three and one-half days of testifying before the grand jury, appellant filed a motion to compel the disclosure of electronic surveillance by the Government and to obtain a hearing thereon. She contended that both her subpoena and the questions asked of her by the grand jury were 'tainted' by illegally seized evidence, in that the information obtained by illegal wiretaps led to her being...
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