Borello v. Allison, 05-3515.

Citation446 F.3d 742
Decision Date11 May 2006
Docket NumberNo. 05-3515.,05-3515.
PartiesRonald T. BORELLO, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Richard ALLISON, Lisa Gales, John Liefer, and John Inman, Defendants-Appellants.
CourtUnited States Courts of Appeals. United States Court of Appeals (7th Circuit)

Edward J. Fanning (argued), Hardin, IL, for Plaintiff-Appellee.

Brett E. Legner (argued), Office of the Attorney General, Civil Appeals Division, Chicago, IL, for Defendants-Appellants.

Before FLAUM, Chief Judge, and MANION and WILLIAMS, Circuit Judges.

FLAUM, Chief Judge.

Plaintiff-Appellee Ronald Borello ("Plaintiff") was an inmate in Illinois state prison. He brought suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against prison employees Richard Allison, Lisa Gales, John Liefer, and John Inman (collectively, "Defendants"), alleging that they violated his Eight Amendment rights by failing to protect him from his cellmate, Roberto Abadia ("Abadia"). Defendants moved for summary judgment, arguing that they were entitled to qualified immunity. The magistrate judge recommended that summary judgment be granted in favor of Defendants. The district court rejected the magistrate judge's report and recommendation and denied summary judgment to Defendants. Defendants appeal. For the following reasons, we reverse the district court's judgment, and remand the case for entry of summary judgment in favor of Defendants on qualified immunity grounds.

I. Background1

Plaintiff was an inmate at Menard Correctional Center, housed in the One North Cellhouse. His cellmate at the time relevant to this appeal was Roberto Abadia. Defendants were assigned to work in Plaintiff's cellhouse, Allison as a casework supervisor, Liefer as a corrections officer, Inman as a department captain, and Gales as a nurse.

On several occasions in early January 2001, another inmate, Michael Woodrome, talked to Inman, Allison, and Gales and expressed concern that Abadia and Plaintiff were assigned as cellmates. Around the same time, Plaintiff told Gales that he wanted to be assigned to a different cell, because Abadia was "nuts." Gales reported Plaintiff's comments to Allison and Inman, who told Gales that they were already aware of the situation. Allison and Inman made statements to Gales that led her to believe that Plaintiff had already declined an offer to be transferred to a different cell.

On January 11, 2001, Abadia starting behaving in a "particularly strange manner." He acted confused and paced in the cell. Also, for long stretches of time, he would place his arms against the cell wall and repeatedly strike his head against his arms. This behavior continued until at least January 15, 2001.

On January 12, 2001, Abadia attempted to strike Plaintiff with his fist. Plaintiff stopped the blow before it landed. Abadia settled down and Plaintiff did not report the incident, feeling that the conflict had been adequately defused.

At approximately 9:30 a.m. on January 16, 2001, Abadia woke up Plaintiff and said he was "going home." Abadia began packing. Corrections officer Liefer observed Abadia's behavior and asked Abadia to explain himself. Abadia said he was packing to go home. Plaintiff asked Liefer to call someone to the cell to help Abadia. Liefer called nurse Gales and asked her to take Abadia to see a psychiatrist. Gales came to the cell and asked Abadia what he was doing. Abadia said he was leaving and his family was waiting for him in the parking lot. Gales realized that Abadia had a considerable amount of time left on his sentence. Plaintiff told Gales that Abadia had recently tried to strike him. Gales called Dr. Vallabhaneni, a psychiatrist, described Abadia's behavior, and arranged for Abadia to visit the doctor. Liefer removed Abadia from the cell and took him for an examination.

About fifteen minutes after being taken to the psychiatrist, Abadia was returned to the cell and then taken to the exercise yard for approximately one hour. While Abadia was in the exercise yard, Plaintiff asked to see department captain Inman. Plaintiff was taken to Inman's office around 10:30 a.m. Casework supervisor Allison was in Inman's office when Plaintiff arrived. Allison had told Inman about the situation between Plaintiff and Abadia. Plaintiff explained to Allison and Inman that Abadia had packed his belongings and said he was going home, and that Abadia had been banging his head against his arms on the cell wall. Plaintiff asked Inman if he could be moved to a different cell, and Inman responded "no." Plaintiff asserts that Inman also called him a "bug," laughed at him, and told him to go back to his cell. Plaintiff acknowledges, however, that Inman told him that he could choose either to go back to the cell he shared with Abadia or be placed in segregation. Plaintiff chose to return to his cell.

Plaintiff was taken back to his cell and Abadia returned from the exercise yard. Inman and Allison questioned Abadia for approximately five minutes, and then left the cell. Plaintiff and Abadia both immediately went to sleep.

Approximately one week later, on January 23, 2001, Abadia hit Plaintiff on the side of the face with a radio, causing serious injury to his left eye.

Plaintiff brought a § 1983 suit against Allison, Gales, Liefer, and Inman, alleging violations of his Eighth Amendment rights. Plaintiff alleged that Defendants were deliberately indifferent to the danger posed to him because they left him in a cell with Abadia. Defendants moved for summary judgment on the basis of qualified immunity. Defendants argued that they did not ignore a risk of harm to Plaintiff, but responded reasonably to his needs by having Abadia examined by a psychiatrist and interviewing the two inmates. Alternatively, Defendants argued, it was not clearly established at the time of the incident that their actions constituted an Eighth Amendment violation.

The magistrate judge recommended that the district court grant summary judgment for Defendants. The magistrate judge found that even if Defendants were aware of the risk of harm to Plaintiff, they took reasonable steps in response to the risk.

The district court rejected the magistrate judge's report and recommendations. The district court found that there was sufficient evidence that Abadia presented a serious risk of harm to Plaintiff. The district court also determined that there was sufficient evidence that Defendants knew of the risk Abadia posed to Plaintiff, but did nothing in response. The district court found relevant that one week before Abadia hit Plaintiff with the radio, Plaintiff asked prison officials to move him out of the shared cell. The district court also emphasized that Plaintiff told Defendants how strangely Abadia had been acting in the previous weeks. Based on this evidence, the district court denied Defendants' qualified immunity defense, finding that there was a material question of fact as to whether Defendants' response was reasonable.

II. Discussion

We review de novo the district court's determination of qualified immunity. See McGrath v. Gillis, 44 F.3d 567, 569 (7th Cir.1995). We will affirm the district court's judgment if we find that Plaintiff is "present[ed] a version of the facts that is supported by the evidence and under which defendants would not be entitled to qualified immunity." Marshall v. Allen, 984 F.2d 787, 793 (7th Cir.1993) (quoting Hall v. Ryan, 957 F.2d 402, 404 (7th Cir. 1992)) (internal quotation marks omitted).

Under the qualified immunity analysis, government officials performing discretionary functions are immune from suit if "their conduct `could reasonably have been thought consistent with the rights they are alleged to have violated.'" Sornberger v. City of Knoxville, 434 F.3d 1006, 1013 (7th Cir.2006) (quoting Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 638-39, 107 S.Ct. 3034, 97 L.Ed.2d 523 (1987)). Qualified immunity protects a defendant from liability as well as from the burden of standing trial. For that reason, courts should determine as early on in the proceedings as possible whether a defendant is entitled to qualified immunity. See id.; see also Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 201, 121 S.Ct. 2151, 150 L.Ed.2d 272 (2001).

In evaluating a claim of qualified immunity, a court conducts a two-step inquiry: "First the court must determine whether the disputed conduct, as alleged, violates a constitutional right; second, the court must determine whether that right was `clearly established' at the time of the alleged conduct." Wernsing v. Thompson, 423 F.3d 732, 742 (7th Cir.2005) (citing Saucier, 533 U.S. at 201, 121 S.Ct. 2151). The Court is required to consider the two steps in the proper order. See Saucier, 533 U.S. at 201, 121 S.Ct. 2151 ("If no constitutional right would have been violated were the allegations established, there is no necessity for further inquiries concerning qualified immunity. On the other hand, if a violation could be made out on a favorable view of the parties' submissions, the next, sequential step is to ask whether the right was clearly established.").

Before we reach the merits of the appeal, however, we must consider whether we have jurisdiction to consider Defendants' arguments. The Court's jurisdiction over an appeal from a denial of a qualified immunity defense is limited: the defendant "may not appeal a district court's summary judgment order insofar as that order determines whether or not the pretrial record sets forth a `genuine' issue of material fact." Board v. Farnham, 394 F.3d 469, 476 (7th Cir.2005) (internal citation and quotation marks omitted). Put another way, "it is inappropriate for us to review a district court's determination about the sufficiency of the evidence." Id.

However, the Court may "review `abstract issues of law.'" Id. (quoting Johnson v. Jones, 515 U.S. 304, 319-20, 115 S.Ct. 2151, 132 L.Ed.2d 238 (1995)). The Court's "jurisdiction extends to interlocutory appeals such as this one challenging a district court's determination that a set...

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