Bishop v. Oklahoma ex rel. Edmondson

• Decision Date: 16 August 2006
• Docket Number: No. 04-CV-848-TCK-SAJ.,04-CV-848-TCK-SAJ.
• Citation: 447 F.Supp.2d 1239
• Parties: Mary BISHOP and Sharon Baldwin, individuals; Susan G. Barton and Gay E. Phillips, individuals, Plaintiffs, v. The State of OKLAHOMA, ex rel. Drew EDMONDSON, in his official capacity as Attorney General of the State of Oklahoma and Brad Henry in his official capacity as Governor of the State of Oklahoma; the United States Of America, ex rel. John Ashcroft, in his official capacity as Attorney General of the United States of America, George W. Bush, in his official capacity as President of the United States, Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Northern District of Oklahoma

447 F.Supp.2d 1239

Mary BISHOP and Sharon Baldwin, individuals; Susan G. Barton and Gay E. Phillips, individuals, Plaintiffs, v. The State of OKLAHOMA, ex rel. Drew EDMONDSON, in his official capacity as Attorney General of the State of Oklahoma and Brad Henry in his official capacity as Governor of the State of Oklahoma; the United States Of America, ex rel. John Ashcroft, in his official capacity as Attorney General of the United States of America, George W. Bush, in his official capacity as President of the United States, Defendants.

No. 04-CV-848-TCK-SAJ.

United States District Court, N.D. Oklahoma.

August 16, 2006.

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Laura Lea Eakens, Gibbs Armstrong Borochoff Mullican & Hart, Timothy P. Studebaker, Phillip Craig Bailey, P. Craig Bailey, Tulsa, OK, N. Kay Bridger-Riley, Bridger-Riley & Associates PC, Jenks, OK, for Plaintiffs.

Martha Ruth Kulmacz, Office of the Attorney General, Oklahoma City, OK, W. Scott Simpson, Federal Programs Branch-Civil Division, Washington, DC, for Defendants.

AMENDED OPINION AND ORDER¹

KERN, District Judge.

Before the Court are the Motion to Dismiss of Defendant the State of Oklahoma, ex rel. Drew Edmondson, in his official capacity as Attorney General of the State of Oklahoma and Brad Henry, in his official capacity as Governor of the State of Oklahoma (the "State Defendants") (Docket No. 7); the Motion to Dismiss of the United States of America, ex rel. John Ashcroft, in his official capacity as Attorney General of the United States of America and George W. Bush, in his official capacity as President of the United States (the "Federal Defendants") (Docket No. 15); the Honorable Thad Balkman and Oklahomans For Protection of Marriage Inc.'s Motion to Intervene (Docket No. 4); and Plaintiffs' Motion to Strike (Docket No. 33).

I. Background

Plaintiffs Mary Bishop and Sharon Baldwin ("Bishop and Baldwin") are a lesbian couple in a committed relationship who reside in the Northern District of Oklahoma. They exchanged vows in a church-recognized commitment ceremony in March of 2002 but desire to be civilly married in Oklahoma. Plaintiffs Susan Barton and Gay Phillips ("Barton and Phillips") are a lesbian couple who were joined in a civil union conducted in the State of Vermont on August 4, 2001, and who were legally married in Vancouver, British Columbia, Canada, on May 16, 2005.² Barton and Phillips reside in the Northern District of Oklahoma and desire to have their Vermont civil union and/or Canadian marriage recognized in the State of Oklahoma. Both couples are referred to collectively as Plaintiffs.

In their Complaint, Plaintiffs seek declaratory and injunctive relief that the Defense of Marriage Act ("DOMA"), codified at 1 U.S.C. § 7 and 28 U.S.C. § 1738C, and Article 2, § 35 of the Oklahoma Constitution (the "Oklahoma Amendment"), violate the United States Constitution. Specifically, Plaintiffs allege that DOMA and the Oklahoma Amendment violate the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, the Full Faith and Credit Clause, and the Privileges and Immunities Clause. The Federal Defendants are the federal officials charged with enforcement and execution of DOMA, and the State Defendants are the state officials charged with enforcement and execution of the Oklahoma Amendment. The Federal Defendants and State Defendants have filed separate motions to dismiss.

II. Motion to Dismiss Standard

For a motion made under FED.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6) to succeed, a defendant must show that, as a matter of law, the plaintiff has failed to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. It must appear "beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his claim which would entitle him to relief." Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46, 78 S.Ct. 99, 2 L.Ed.2d 80 (1957). In evaluating a motion to dismiss, a court must accept all well-pled allegations as true and indulge all reasonable references in favor of plaintiff. See Schwartz v. Celestial Seasonings, Inc., 124 F.3d 1246, 1251 (10th Cir.1997); Weatherhead v. Globe Int'l, Inc., 832 F.2d 1226, 1228 (10th Cir.1987).

III. DOMA—Federal Defendants' Motion to Dismiss

DOMA, which became law in 1996, contains two substantive sections. See Pub.L. No. 104-199, 100 Stat. 2419 (1996). Section 2 of DOMA ("Section 2") is entitled "Powers Reserved to the States" and is codified at 28 U.S.C. § 1738C. Section 2 provides that no State "shall be required to give effect to any public act, record, or judicial proceeding of any other State, territory, possession, or tribe respecting a relationship between persons of the same sex that is treated as a marriage under the laws of such other State." 28 U.S.C. § 1738C. Section 3 of DOMA ("Section 3") is entitled "Definition of Marriage" and is codified at 1 U.S.C. § 7. Section 3 provides:

In determining the meaning of any Act of Congress, or of any ruling, regulation, or interpretation of the various administrative bureaus and agencies of the United States, the word "marriage" means only a legal union between one man and one woman as husband and wife, and the word "spouse" refers only to a person of the opposite sex who is a husband or wife.

1 U.S.C. § 7. Plaintiffs challenge the constitutionality of both sections of DOMA.

A. Standing—General Principles

Federal jurisdiction is limited to actual cases and controversies. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, ell The case and controversy requirement involves an analysis of whether a plaintiff has "standing" to bring her claim. "The standing requirement is born partly of an idea, which is more than an intuition but less than a rigorous and explicit theory, about the constitutional and prudential limits to the powers of an unelected, unrepresentative judiciary in our kind of government." Elk Grove Unified Sch. Dist. v. Newdow, 542 U.S. 1, 11 124 S.Ct. 2301, 159 L.Ed.2d 98 (2004) (internal quotation marks omitted). There are three requirements to constitutional standing:

"First, the plaintiff must have suffered an `injury in fact'—an invasion of a legally protected interest which is (a) concrete and particularized, and (b) actual or imminent, not conjectural or hypothetical. Second, there must be a causal connection between the injury and the conduct complained of—the injury has to be fairly ... trace[able] to the challenged action of the defendant, and not th[e] result [of] the independent action of some third party not before the court. Third, it must be likely, as opposed to merely speculative, that the injury will be redressed by a favorable decision."

Bear Lodge Multiple Use Ass'n v. Babbitt, 175 F.3d 814, 821 (10th Cir.1999) (quoting Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 112 S.Ct. 2130, 119 L.Ed.2d 351 (1992)). "The party invoking federal jurisdiction bears the burden of establishing these elements and of coming forward with evidence of specific facts which prove standing." Id. With respect to the pleading requirements for standing at the motion to dismiss stage, the Supreme Court explained:

At the pleading stage, general factual allegations of injury resulting from the defendant's conduct may suffice, for on a motion to dismiss we "presum[e] that general allegations embrace those specific facts that are necessary to support the claim." In response to a summary judgment motion, however, the plaintiff can no longer rest on such "mere allegations," but must "set forth" by affidavit or other evidence "specific facts," which for purposes of the summary judgment motion will be taken to be true. And at the final stage, those facts (if controverted) must be "supported adequately by the evidence adduced at trial."

Lujan, 504 U.S. at 561, 112 S.Ct. 2130 (internal citations omitted).

In addition to constitutional standing requirements, a court must also consider "prudential" standing principles. See Board of County Comm'rs of Sweetwater County v. Geringer, 297 F.3d 1108, 1112 (10th Cir.2002). "Under a prudential standing inquiry, a party that has satisfied the requirements of constitutional standing may nonetheless be barred from invoking a federal court's jurisdiction." Id. Prudential standing has three conditions a party must overcome before invoking federal court jurisdiction. First, a plaintiff must assert his own rights, rather than rights belonging to third parties. Second, a plaintiffs claim must not be a "generalized grievance" shared in substantially equal measure by all or a large class of citizens. Third, the grievance must arguably fall within the zone of interests protected or regulated by the statutory provision or constitutional guarantee involved in the suit. See id.

B. Standing to Challenge Section 2

The Federal Defendants argue that Plaintiffs Bishop and Baldwin lack standing to challenge Section 2 because they have never entered into a marriage or other formal union in another state and therefore Section 2 could have no cognizable effect on them. Bishop and Baldwin conceded this point in their response brief. Therefore, Section 2 is challenged only by Plaintiffs Barton and Phillips.

The Federal Defendants have not raised the issue of whether Barton and Phillips have standing to challenge Section 2. Regardless, the issue of standing must be addressed by the Court as an initial matter. See Smelt v. County of Orange, 447 F.3d 673, 682 (9th Cir.2006) (noting that court must address standing even if not raised by the parties). It is undisputed that Plaintiffs Barton and Phillips were joined in a civil union in the State of Vermont and were legally married in Canada. Each legal relationship will be addressed separately for purposes of their standing to challenge Section 2.

1. Vermont Civil Union

Section 2 recognizes that States are not required to give effect to a "public act, record, or judicial proceeding ... of [another] State ... respecting a relationship between persons of the...