Ferguson v. Kelley, 76 C 3898.

Decision Date10 April 1978
Docket NumberNo. 76 C 3898.,76 C 3898.
Citation448 F. Supp. 919
PartiesA. F. FERGUSON, Plaintiff, v. Clarence M. KELLEY, Federal Bureau of Investigation, Edward Levi and Department of Justice, Defendants.
CourtU.S. District Court — Northern District of Illinois

COPYRIGHT MATERIAL OMITTED

Lance Haddix, Arthur W. Friedman of Devoe, Shadur & Krupp, Chicago, Ill., for plaintiff.

Antonio J. Curiel, Asst. U.S. Atty., N.D. Ill., Chicago, Ill., for defendants.

MEMORANDUM OPINION

GRADY, District Judge.

Plaintiff brings this action under the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA), 5 U.S.C. § 552, to compel disclosure of information held by the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) which pertains to the plaintiff. The defendants have moved for summary judgment, claiming exemptions under Section 552(b)(2), (5) and (7). We will grant partial summary judgment as to certain documents and require in camera inspection before ruling on defendants' motion as to others.

To justify its deletion of administrative markings, routing information, transmittal memoranda, leads and status information, the government claims an exemption under Section 552(b)(2) which exempts from disclosure "matters that are related solely to the internal personnel rules and practices of an agency." 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(2). We agree with the government that administrative markings and routing information are matters related only to the internal practices of the FBI and not the focus of "genuine and significant public interest." See Department of Air Force v. Rose, 425 U.S. 352, 96 S.Ct. 1592, 48 L.Ed.2d 11 (1976). However, leads, transmittal memoranda and status information do not qualify for this exemption. They do not fall in the same category as "rules as to personnel's use of parking facilities or regulations of lunch hours, statements of policy as to sick leave, and the like." S.Rep.No. 813, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. at 8 (1965), as quoted in, Department of Air Force v. Rose, 425 U.S. 352, 363, 96 S.Ct. 1592, 48 L.Ed.2d 11 (1976) — matters of little interest to the public. Indeed, the disclosure of leads and status information in the case may reveal how the FBI proceeds in investigating a member of a "subversive organization," the Socialist Workers Party, — a matter of genuine and significant interest to the public.1 Therefore, we will order the production of that deleted information for in camera inspection. We will release the information only if we decide that it qualifies for neither a (b)(2) nor (b)(7)(E) exemption.

We also want to examine information deleted by the government under Section 552(b)(7)(E) which protects "investigatory records compiled for law enforcement purposes, but only to the extent that the production of such records would disclose investigative techniques and procedures." This provision does not exempt all investigative procedures and techniques from disclosure. Delineating the scope of this exemption, the Conference Committee states:

The conferees wish to make clear that the scope of this exception against disclosure of "investigative techniques and procedures" should not be interpreted to include routine techniques and procedures already well known to the public, such as ballistics tests, fingerprinting, and other scientific tests or commonly known techniques. Nor is this exemption intended to include records falling within the scope of subsection 552(a)(2) of the Freedom of Information law, such as administrative staff manuals and instructions to staff that affect a member of the public. Conference Report No. 93-1200, 93d Cong. 2d Sess., reprinted in 1974 U.S. Code Cong. & Admin. News, pp. 6285, 6291. We will examine the deleted information in light of this statement of legislative intent.

We agree with the agency that deletion of names and other information identifying confidential sources and of information elicited under an implicit or explicit promise of confidence is authorized under Section 552(b)(7)(D). However, we do not concur with the court in Church of Scientology v. Department of Justice, 410 F.Supp. 1297 (C.D.Cal.1976), that

it is clear that the Congress did not intend to throw open the confidential files of law enforcement to the general public, and its intent to protect against disclosure of confidential information extends to material provided by any confidential source including law enforcement agencies.

Id. at 1303. We are not certain that other law enforcement agencies can reasonably believe that all information which they may supply to a federal agency will be shielded from public disclosure. As public agencies subject to public scrutiny, other law enforcement agencies are in a very different position from that of a private citizen who has no legal duty to volunteer information to law enforcement agencies. However, we do not preclude the possibility that the information, although it may not be exempt under (b)(7)(D), may qualify for another exemption. Therefore, that deleted information, including the names of other law enforcement agencies, should be produced for in camera inspection.

The agency's excision of names and information identifying third persons as subjects of FBI investigation under Section 552(b)(7)(C) is valid. We agree with the agency that disclosure of that information would "constitute an unwarranted invasion of personal privacy."2See Tax Reform Research Group v. Internal Revenue Service, 419 F.Supp. 415, 419-20 (D.C.Cir. 1976). Nevertheless, we are not satisfied with the agency's refusal to disclose documents containing large portions that pertain to the plaintiff because redaction of names will not adequately protect the privacy of third persons. Under Section 552(b), the agency has a duty to provide "reasonably segregable" portions of these documents. See Kanter v. Internal Revenue Service, 433 F.Supp. 812, 821-22 (N.D. Ill.1977). We will order in camera inspection of those documents to determine whether the agency's failure to provide larger portions of those documents was reasonable.

We do not believe that the excision of agents' names can be justified under (b)(7)(C) as an unwarranted invasion of their privacy. As employees of a public agency, they have no legitimate privacy right to the deletion of their names. Their involvement in investigative activities for the FBI is not a "private fact." While there may be instances when disclosure of an agent's identity would endanger his safety, exemption from disclosure under 552(b)(7) will be allowed only after a showing of that danger.3 We will give the agency an opportunity to make such a showing before deciding whether to release this information.

We also question the agency's use of Section 552(b)(5) exemption for "intra-agency" memoranda. We will examine the portions deleted under that exemption to determine whether the information qualifies as "deliberative, non-factual, pre-decisional memoranda, the disclosure of which would injure the quality of agency decisions." Tax Reform Research Group v. Internal Revenue Service, 419 F.Supp. 415, 422 (D.C.Cir.1976).

Finally, we regard as frivolous the defendants' request that we dismiss the entire action because the Director of the FBI as well as the agency itself was named as a defendant. See Hamlin v. Kelley, 433 F.Supp. 180 (N.D.Ill.1977).

Accordingly, we grant partial summary judgment for the defendants permitting them to withhold the following information:

1. Deleted information from documents 1 (9 page report), 3, 5, 6, 7, 8, 11, 15, 17, 18, 21, 22, 23.
2. Documents 24, 25, 26, 27, 28.

The following documents are to be produced for in camera inspection:

1 (5 page administrative report), 2, 4, 9, 10, 12, 13, 14, 16, 19, 20, 29, 30, 31, 32, 33.
SUPPLEMENTAL OPINION

Pursuant to the court's order of September 29, 1977, the FBI has produced a series of documents for in camera inspection so that we might determine the portions of those documents which should be disclosed to the plaintiff under the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA), 5 U.S.C. § 552. The government continues to claim exemptions under Section 552(b)(7)(C), (D) and (E).1 Section 552(b)(7) exempts investigatory records compiled for law enforcement purposes to the extent such records:

(C) constitute an unwarranted invasion of personal privacy, (D) disclose the identity of a confidential source and, in the case of a record compiled . . . by an agency conducting a lawful national security intelligence investigation, confidential information furnished only by the confidential source, (E) disclose investigative techniques and procedures . . ..

The claimed exemptions can be categorized as follows:

1. Names of FBI agents and local police officers, claimed under (b)(7)(C) as an "unwarranted invasion of personal privacy."
2. Names and identifying information concerning individuals who supplied the FBI with routine information and who are not "confidential sources" protected by (b)(7)(D). Privacy exemption claimed under (b)(7)(C).
3. Names and identifying data concerning "confidential sources"—persons giving information under an express or implied promise of confidentiality, protected by (b)(7)(D).
4. Information obtained only from confidential sources under an express or implied promise of confidentiality in the course of a national security investigation. (b)(7)(D).
5. Information identifying a third person subject to FBI investigation, where information concerning the plaintiff was allegedly not "reasonably segregable." (b)(7)(C) privacy exemption claimed.
6. (b)(7)(E) exemption claimed for one investigative technique found in Documents 13, 16, and 19.
DISCUSSION

1. Names of FBI agents and local police. In our Memorandum Opinion of September 29, 1977, we decided that the excision of agents' names was not justified under (b)(7)(C) as an unwarranted invasion of their privacy. Exemption from disclosure under 552(b)(7) will be allowed only after a showing that disclosure of an agent's identity would endanger his...

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