Acain v. Int'l Plant Servs., LLC

• Decision Date: 28 October 2014
• Docket Number: No. 01–13–00310–CV.,01–13–00310–CV.
• Citation: 449 S.W.3d 655
• Parties: Renato ACAIN, Randy Agosto, Efren Aliviano, Artemio Anzale, Greg Ba–Ang, Jeffrey Batac, Ferdinand Bellido, Dennis Bicera, Verginio Bolambot, Anatalio Caang, Romeo Candilada, Arnel Castaneda, Liezellito Cloribel, Leonilo Colina, Arturo Conclara, Elleser Cristobal, Ludovico Defacto, Jorge Denaque, Elmer Domingo, Simeon Domingo, Aaron Estrera, Felix Eduardo, Alfredo Farina, Carlito Fidel, Jaygen Genon, Felipe Gutib, Allan Guillartes, Edito Laurito, Gilberto Lauriquez, Edgar Leonor, Camilo Lumagsao, Johnny Macaraig, Nicasio Mangilimotan, Gabino Labadlabad, Ladislao Melgar, Benjamin Nague, Sergio Natad, Zosimo Olimba, Nilo Palamillo, Alejandro Pantalita, Eduardo Patupat, Bienvenido Peralta, Hermogenes Punzalan, Antonio Redoloza, Alfredo Rosales, Feliciano Santos, Alejandro Santizas, Giovanne Saramosing, Florentino Sayago, Felipe Siapno, Rosellier Somoza, Roy Talledo, Larry Urbano, Benjamin Villejo, Baltazar Villejo, and Franklin Villareal, Appellants v. INTERNATIONAL PLANT SERVICES, LLC, Noureddine Ayed, Karim Ayed, Richard Dale Johnston, Adrienne Wilson, and Leysander Bustamonte, Appellees.
• Court: Texas Court of Appeals

449 S.W.3d 655

Renato ACAIN, Randy Agosto, Efren Aliviano, Artemio Anzale, Greg Ba–Ang, Jeffrey Batac, Ferdinand Bellido, Dennis Bicera, Verginio Bolambot, Anatalio Caang, Romeo Candilada, Arnel Castaneda, Liezellito Cloribel, Leonilo Colina, Arturo Conclara, Elleser Cristobal, Ludovico Defacto, Jorge Denaque, Elmer Domingo, Simeon Domingo, Aaron Estrera, Felix Eduardo, Alfredo Farina, Carlito Fidel, Jaygen Genon, Felipe Gutib, Allan Guillartes, Edito Laurito, Gilberto Lauriquez, Edgar Leonor, Camilo Lumagsao, Johnny Macaraig, Nicasio Mangilimotan, Gabino Labadlabad, Ladislao Melgar, Benjamin Nague, Sergio Natad, Zosimo Olimba, Nilo Palamillo, Alejandro Pantalita, Eduardo Patupat, Bienvenido Peralta, Hermogenes Punzalan, Antonio Redoloza, Alfredo Rosales, Feliciano Santos, Alejandro Santizas, Giovanne Saramosing, Florentino Sayago, Felipe Siapno, Rosellier Somoza, Roy Talledo, Larry Urbano, Benjamin Villejo, Baltazar Villejo, and Franklin Villareal, Appellants

v.INTERNATIONAL PLANT SERVICES, LLC, Noureddine Ayed, Karim Ayed, Richard Dale Johnston, Adrienne Wilson, and Leysander Bustamonte, Appellees.

No. 01–13–00310–CV.

Court of Appeals of Texas, Houston (1st Dist.).

Oct. 28, 2014.

Stephen R. Cochell, The Cochell Law Firm, Houston, TX, for Appellants.

Gary M. Jewell, Heather Panick, Christian, Smith & Jewell LLP, Kathryn Smyser, Selman, Munson & Lerner, P.C., Houston, TX, for Appellees.

Panel consists of Chief Justice RADACK and Justices MASSENGALE and HUDDLE.

OPINION ON REHEARING

REBECA HUDDLE, Justice.

Fifty-seven Filipino former employees of International Plant Services, LLC (IPS), a Texas company, sued IPS, MBC Human Resources Development Corporation (the Filipino agency that recruited them to work for IPS in Texas), and various individual defendants who owned or worked for IPS and MBC, alleging that they had been subjected to human trafficking by the defendants, and asserting various tort and contract claims arising out of their employment with IPS. The defendants moved to dismiss the case based on principles of international comity. The trial court granted the defendants' motion, and the plaintiffs appealed. On original submission, we reversed and remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. Appellees filed a motion for rehearing. We deny appellees' motion, but sua sponte withdraw our opinion and judgment of August 12, 2014, to omit unserved defendants MBC Resources Development Corporation and Nida Sarmiento, and issue this opinion and corrected judgment in their stead. Our disposition remains unchanged.

Background

Beginning in 2006, MBC recruited the plaintiffs in the Philippines to work for IPS in Texas. The plaintiffs signed employment contracts with IPS each year. The 2006 contracts stated that they will be “construed” in accordance with the law of Harris County, Texas, while the post–2006 contracts stated they were to be “constructed” in accordance with the law of the Philippines. In May 2011, the plaintiffs sued in Texas state court, alleging that the defendants had subjected them to a human-trafficking scheme by fraudulently inducing them to sign the contracts and then failing to abide by their terms. They alleged that the defendants:

• Misled and induced them to pay “placement fees” by representing that they would have jobs waiting for them in the United States, when there were no jobs;

• Misled and induced them to sign contracts guaranteeing payment, and then refused to pay them, and instead provided them with a monthly “allowance” that had to be repaid, which resulted in debt bondage;

• Intimidated those who complained by threatening, among other things, deportation and “black listing;”

• Prevented them from seeking employment with other companies in Texas; and

• Refused to pay unpaid wages after they left IPS.

They alleged claims for breach of contract, fraud, unjust enrichment, conversion, theft, and conspiracy. They requested actual, mental anguish, and exemplary damages.

The defendants moved to dismiss the plaintiffs' claims based upon principles of international comity. They argued that the plaintiffs had been employed under a highly regulated overseas employment program governed by the Migrant Workers and Overseas Filipino Act of 1995 and that the Filipino National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) had exclusive jurisdiction to adjudicate their claims. In support of this contention, they pointed to Section 10 of the Act, which provides:

Notwithstanding any provision of law to the contrary, ... NLRC ... shall have the original and exclusive jurisdiction to hear and decide, within ninety (90) calendar days after the filing of the complaint, the claims arising out of an employer-employee relationship or by virtue of any law or contract involving Filipino workers for overseas deployment including claims for actual, moral, exemplary and other forms of damages.

Migrant Workers and Overseas Filipino Act of 1995, Republic Act 8042, § 10 (2004) (Phil). The defendants also presented evidence that one of the plaintiffs had filed a complaint with the NLRC regarding his employment with IPS. The defendants asserted that both MBC and IPS are licensed and registered by the Philippines to participate in the overseas employment program, and are thus subject to regulation by the Philippines Overseas Employment Agency (POEA).¹ The defendants pointed to the existence of the POEA and its mandate, as well as to various other Filipino departments and Filipino labor laws to argue that the Philippines' “interest in the parties and issues in this case outweighs by a substantial margin the interests of the United States.” Because the Philippines has “extensively legislated both the laws governing the rights of the parties ... and the procedures for resolution,” the trial court should refrain from exercising subject-matter jurisdiction.

In response to the motion, the plaintiffs emphasized that the defendants conceded that dismissal was not required by any contract, treaty, or statute, and that the trial court had discretion to deny the motion and exercise jurisdiction. They argued that Section 10 of the Act, at most, indicated that the Philippines had concurrent jurisdiction over their claims, and other parts of the Act, in particular Section 22, indicated that the Philippines recognized that workers should make claims through a host country's dispute mechanisms, if they were available. The plaintiffs argued that they elected to sue in Texas because most of them still live in the United States, many live in Texas, the contracts were performed in Texas, they suffered harm in Texas, and the Filipino legal system was known to be corrupt. They argued that deferring to the Philippines based upon comity principles would undermine Texas public policy against human trafficking, and that the cases cited by the defendants in support of dismissal were legally and factually distinguishable. In support of their argument, the plaintiffs submitted the declaration of Melchor Dizon, a Director of the POEA, in which he averred that “[u]nder the facts and circumstances unique to this case, it appears that the Texas courts are in a good position to resolve this case.”

On March 11, 2013, the trial court granted the defendants' motion and dismissed the plaintiffs' claims based on principles of international comity.

Discussion

In a single issue, the appellants, who were the plaintiffs below, contend that the trial court erred in deferring to the Philippines and dismissing their claims.

A. Standard of Review

The parties dispute the standard of review to be applied here, where the trial court dismissed the appellants' claims based upon principles of international comity. The appellants argue that whether a court has subject-matter jurisdiction over a case is a legal question and, therefore, our review should be de novo. See Tex. Dep't of Parks & Wildlife v. Miranda, 133 S.W.3d 217, 226–27 (Tex.2004). The appellees argue that dismissal based on comity is “voluntary and not obligatory,” and therefore the trial court's decision to decline to exercise jurisdiction should be reviewed under an abuse-of-discretion standard. See Griffith v. Griffith, 341 S.W.3d 43, 54 (Tex.App.-San Antonio 2011, no pet.).

Although the appellees titled their motion a “Motion to Dismiss For Lack of Jurisdiction,” they requested in the motion that the trial court decline to exercise jurisdiction based upon principles of international comity. Accordingly, we agree that the applicable standard of review is the abuse-of-discretion standard. See Surgitek, Bristol–Myers Corp. v. Abel, 997 S.W.2d 598, 601 (Tex.1999) (“[W]e look to the substance of a motion to determine the relief sought, not merely to its title.”); Griffith, 341 S.W.3d at 54 (“application of comity vests in the sound discretion of the tribunal of the forum”); see also Perforaciones Exploracion Y Produccion v. Maritimas Mexicanas, S.A. de C.V., 356 Fed.Appx. 675, 680 (5th Cir.2009) (“A district court's decision to exercise or decline jurisdiction in the face of possible international comity concerns is reviewed for abuse of discretion.”); Owens–Illinois, Inc. v. Webb, 809 S.W.2d 899, 902 (Tex.App.-Texarkana 1991, writ dism'd w.o.j.) (“We do not find an abuse of discretion by the Texas trial court in protecting its jurisdiction [by rejecting comity argument] under these circumstances.”).

Generally, a trial court abuses its discretion if it acts arbitrarily, unreasonably, or without regard to guiding legal principles. See Wagner & Brown, Ltd. v. Sheppard, 282 S.W.3d 419, 428–29 (Tex.2008). In matters involving factual disputes, however, a trial court does not abuse its discretion “if it bases its decision on conflicting evidence and some evidence supports its decision.” See Unifund CCR Partners v. Villa, 299 S.W.3d 92, 97 (Tex.2009) (citing In re Barber, 982 S.W.2d 364, 366 (Tex.1998) ).

B. Applicable Law

“Texas courts are bound to exercise jurisdiction vested in them by the Texas Constitution and cannot delegate...