Suddreth v. Caterpillar Tractor Co.

• Decision Date: 05 May 1983
• Docket Number: No. 82-583,82-583
• Citation: 449 N.E.2d 203,114 Ill.App.3d 396,70 Ill.Dec. 329
• Parties: , 70 Ill.Dec. 329 James V. SUDDRETH, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. CATERPILLAR TRACTOR CO., a foreign corporation, Defendant-Appellee.
• Court: United States Appellate Court of Illinois

Page 203

449 N.E.2d 203

114 Ill.App.3d 396, 70 Ill.Dec. 329

James V. SUDDRETH, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. CATERPILLAR TRACTOR CO., a foreign corporation, Defendant-Appellee.

No. 82-583.

Appellate Court of Illinois,

Second District.

May 5, 1983.

Gary B. Friedman, Ltd., Jay R. Giusti, Chicago, for plaintiff-appellant.

Seyfarth, Shaw, Fairweather & Geraldson, Keith C. Hult, Gerald D. Skoning, Chicago, Theodore R. Johnson, Caterpillar Co., Peoria, for defendant-appellee.

UNVERZAGT, Justice:

James V. Suddreth filed a two-count complaint in the circuit court of Kane County wherein he sought compensatory and punitive damages based upon his allegedly retaliatory discharge for the filing of a workers' compensation claim. The trial court dismissed the complaint in view of the fact that Suddreth had failed to exhaust the remedies available to him under his collective bargaining agreement. He appeals from the dismissal of his complaint.

The complaint alleged that on October 3, 1978, the plaintiff, an employee of defendant, Caterpillar Tractor Co., sustained an injury to his back during the course of his employment. In consequence of this injury, the plaintiff was unable to perform his duties for several weeks. On October 13, 1978, the plaintiff filed a claim for workers' compensation. The complaint alleged that, as a direct result of the filing of his claim, plaintiff's employment with defendant was terminated on November 10, 1978. Accordingly, the plaintiff sought $30,000 in compensatory damages and $500,000 in punitive damages. The complaint was originally filed in Cook County and thereafter, pursuant to defendant's motion, the case was transferred to Kane County.

Following the transfer of venue, Caterpillar filed a motion to dismiss wherein it alleged that, at the time of the plaintiff's discharge, both parties were bound by a collective bargaining agreement entered into by Caterpillar and the plaintiff's union. The agreement provided that an employee could only be discharged for just cause and any disputes concerning discharge would be resolved according to an established grievance procedure. Pursuant to this procedure, plaintiff filed a grievance concerning his discharge which was ultimately settled when plaintiff was reinstated on January 22, 1980. Accordingly, defendant asserted that the subject action was barred under the authority of Cook v. Caterpillar Tractor Co. (1980), 85 Ill.App.3d 402, 40 Ill.Dec. 864, 407 N.E.2d 95, which held that an employee must exhaust his remedies under a collective bargaining agreement prior to filing suit for retaliatory discharge.

The motion further alleged that, on October 4, 1979, the parties entered into a settlement agreement which discharged defendant "of and from any and all liability under the workers' compensation act." This settlement agreement apparently included monies awarded to plaintiff by the Illinois Industrial Commission in connection with the original claim for workers' compensation. Defendant asserted that the settlement agreement, by its terms, defeated plaintiff's claim.

The trial court dismissed Suddreth's complaint with prejudice on the basis of the decision in Cook v. Caterpillar Tractor Co. (1980), 85 Ill.App.3d 402, 40 Ill.Dec. 864, 407 N.E.2d 95. This appeal followed.

Two issues are raised: (1) whether an employee who is protected by the grievance procedures of a collective bargaining agreement may sue in tort for retaliatory discharge if he is discharged for filing a workers' compensation claim and (2) whether Federal law preempts the instant action.

In Kelsay v. Motorola, Inc. (1978), 74 Ill.2d 172, 23 Ill.Dec. 559, 384 N.E.2d 353, our supreme court established a cause of action for retaliatory discharged on behalf of employees, otherwise terminable at will, who are discharged for filing claims under the Workers' Compensation Act (Ill.Rev.Stat.1979, ch. 48, par. 138.1, et seq.). The court reasoned that,

"[T]he legislature enacted the workmen's compensation law as a comprehensive scheme to provide for efficient and expeditious remedies for injured employees. This scheme would be seriously undermined if employers were permitted to abuse their power to terminate by threatening to discharge employees for seeking compensation under the Act. We cannot ignore the fact that when faced with such a dilemma many employees, whose common law rights have been supplanted by the Act, would choose to retain their jobs, and thus, in effect, would be left without a remedy either common law or statutory. This result, which effectively relieves the employer of the responsibility expressly placed upon him by the legislature, is untenable and is contrary to the public policy as expressed in the Workmen's Compensation Act." (74 Ill.2d 172, 181-82, 23 Ill.Dec. 559, 384 N.E.2d 353.)

Accordingly, the court concluded that an employer who fires an employee, otherwise terminable at will, for the filing of a workers' compensation claim would be liable for both compensatory and punitive damages.

On appeal, plaintiff asserts that the cause of action enunciated in Kelsay should be available here, notwithstanding the fact that the plaintiff was protected by a collective bargaining agreement which prohibited the defendant from discharging employees without "just cause" and which provided a grievance and arbitration procedure for all discharged employees. This contention was expressly rejected in Cook v. Caterpillar Tractor Co. (1980), 85 Ill.App.3d 402, 40 Ill.Dec. 864, 407 N.E.2d 95.

In Cook, the plaintiff was discharged after having filed a claim for workers' compensation. Pursuant to a collective bargaining agreement apparently identical to the one in the case at bar, the plaintiff filed a grievance which was later submitted to arbitration. The grievance did not contain an allegation regarding retaliatory discharge and it appears that the plaintiff similarly did not make this allegation at the arbitration hearing. Subsequent to the hearing, the labor arbitrator rendered a decision that plaintiff had been discharged for just cause. Plaintiff then filed suit alleging retaliatory discharge. There, as here, the complaint was dismissed. On appeal, the appellate court concluded that retaliatory discharge is subsumed within the just cause provision of the collective bargaining agreement and is within the power of the arbitrator to consider when determining if a discharge was for just cause. Therefore, the plaintiff failed to exhaust his administrative remedies under the contract by raising the issue of retaliatory discharge at the arbitration hearing. The court also determined that the Kelsay doctrine would only apply to an employee who is terminable at will, since that employee would have no recourse against his employer if he were discharged for filing a workers' compensation claim. In such a case, the necessity of choosing between continued employment and the filing of a claim would undermine the Workers' Compensation Act. But where, as here, an employee is protected by a collective bargaining agreement which permits discharge only for just cause and allows for...