Vega v. Jordan Valley Med. Ctr., LP

• Decision Date: 19 July 2019
• Docket Number: No. 20170866,20170866
• Citation: 449 P.3d 31
• Parties: Yolanda VEGA, Appellant, v. JORDAN VALLEY MEDICAL CENTER, LP, Appellees.
• Court: Utah Supreme Court

449 P.3d 31

Yolanda VEGA, Appellant,

v.JORDAN VALLEY MEDICAL CENTER, LP,¹ Appellees.

No. 20170866

Supreme Court of Utah.

Filed July 19, 2019

Troy L. Booher, Beth E. Kennedy, Michael J. Teter, G. Eric Nielson, Mark W. Dahl, Lena Daggs, Salt Lake City, for appellant

Rodney R. Parker, Derek J. Williams, Nathanael J. Mitchell, Brian P. Miller, Frederick Mark Gedicks, Shawn McGarry, Kirk G. Gibbs, David C. Epperson, Salt Lake City, for appellees

Justice Himonas authored the opinion of the Court in which Chief Justice Durrant, Associate Chief Justice Lee, Justice Pearce, and Justice Petersen joined.

On Direct Appeal

Justice Himonas, opinion of the Court:

INTRODUCTION

¶1 For reasons still unknown, Gustavo Vega, an otherwise healthy forty-four-year-old male, went in for a routine gallbladder operation

and came out in a coma. He died a week later. His wife, Yolanda Vega, brought a medical malpractice action against Jordan Valley Medical Center and all related medical providers who were involved in Mr. Vega’s care. The district court dismissed Ms. Vega’s action pursuant to section 78B-3-423(7) of the Utah Health Care Malpractice Act² because she failed to obtain a certificate of compliance from the Division of Occupational and Professional Licensing (DOPL). On appeal Ms. Vega challenges the constitutionality of the Malpractice Act on several grounds. We hold that the Malpractice Act violates Article VIII, section I of the Utah Constitution—the judicial power provision—by allowing DOPL to exercise the core judicial function of ordering the final disposition of claims, like those brought by Ms. Vega, without judicial review. Accordingly, we find the offending provisions in the Act unconstitutional, reverse the district court’s grant of appellees’ motion to dismiss, and remand this case for a determination on the merits.

BACKGROUND

¶2 In 2014, Gustavo Vega underwent a routine procedure to have his gallbladder removed.³ But after the conclusion of the surgery, Mr. Vega did not wake up. Mr. Vega had a CT scan

that revealed "low lung volumes" and neurologists diagnosed him with an anoxic brain injury that occurred during the surgery or immediately afterwards. A cardiologist was consulted and noted in the record that the "events immediately following that [gallbladder] surgery are not clear to me." Mr. Vega died a week after the surgery at the age of forty-four. Following his death, Ms. Vega, his wife of twenty years, prepared to file this malpractice action under the Utah Health Care Malpractice Act, UTAH CODE § 78B-3-401 to -426.

¶3 By way of background, the Malpractice Act requires plaintiffs to obtain a certificate of compliance from DOPL before filing their case in district court. UTAH CODE § 78B-3-412(1)(b). This was not always the case. Prior to 2010, the Malpractice Act only required that plaintiffs submit to a non-binding prelitigation hearing. See UTAH CODE § 78B-3-416(1) (2009). Regardless of the outcome of the prelitigation hearing, plaintiffs were permitted to file their claims in district court; no certificate of compliance was required. Id . However, under the current regime, as enacted through the 2010 amendments, a certificate of compliance is a prerequisite to a plaintiff filing a medical malpractice action in district court. UTAH CODE § 78B-3-412(1)(b).

¶4 Pursuant to the Malpractice Act, Ms. Vega filed her notice of intent to commence this action. Id . § 78B-3-412(1)(a).⁴ Parties that file this notice are then required to present their case to a prelitigation panel that consists of a doctor, a lawyer, and a layperson. Id . § 78B-3-416(4)(a)–(c). The prelitigation panel "proceedings are informal, nonbinding and ... are compulsory as a condition precedent to commencing litigation."

Id. § 78B-3-416(1)(c). The formal rules of evidence do not apply to these hearings and discovery is only permitted by a finding of "special order of the panel, and for good cause shown demonstrating extraordinary circumstances." Id . § 78B-3-417(4). DOPL may also "issue subpoenas for medical records directly related to the claim of medical liability." Id . § 78B-3-417(2). The panel must determine whether "each claim against each health care provider has merit or has no merit." Id. § 78B-3-418(2)(a)(i). If the panel finds that a plaintiff’s claim has merit, DOPL issues a certificate of compliance for each meritorious claim, id. § 78B-3-418(3)(a), and the plaintiff can then file the case in district court, id. § 78B-3-412(1)(b).

¶5 If the panel decides that a plaintiff’s claim lacks merit, the Malpractice Act permits the plaintiff to nonetheless compel DOPL to issue a certificate of compliance by obtaining an affidavit of merit from a health care provider. Id. § 78B-3-423(1). DOPL will issue a certificate of compliance for a claim if the affidavit of merit includes a statement that the plaintiff or the plaintiff’s attorney "consulted with and reviewed the facts of the case with a health care provider who has determined after a review of the medical record and other relevant material involved in the particular action that there is a reasonable and meritorious cause for the filing of a medical liability action." Id. § 78B-3-423(2)(a). An affidavit of merit from a health care provider must state that:

(i) in the health care provider’s opinion, there are reasonable grounds to believe that the applicable standard of care was breached;

(ii) in the health care provider’s opinion, the breach was a proximate cause of the injury claimed in the notice of intent to commence action; and

(iii) the reasons for the health care provider’s opinion.

See id . § 78B-3-423(2)(b).

¶6 Ms. Vega attempted to obtain a certificate of compliance through DOPL’s prelitigation panel. But the panel determined that Ms. Vega’s claim lacked merit.

¶7 Having received a finding of no merit from the prelitigation panel, Ms. Vega’s only other option to obtain a certificate of compliance was through an affidavit of merit. See id. Ms. Vega retained Dr. Myer Rosenthal, a doctor at the Stanford University School of Medicine, to provide the necessary affidavit. Dr. Rosenthal was able to certify that he believed there were reasonable grounds to believe there was a breach in the standard of care that proximately caused the death of Mr. Vega, but he could not provide the details and reasoning for his opinion based on the medical record. Dr. Rosenthal stated that he "cannot specifically comment on the actions of the Respondents that constitute breaches in the standard of care due to the inadequacy of the medical records provided to [Ms. Vega]" and that "[t]he circumstances surrounding Mr. Vega’s injury are highly suspect." DOPL determined that Ms. Vega’s affidavit was inadequate and asked Ms. Vega to file an amended affidavit. Because Ms. Vega did not provide an amended affidavit, and so did not comply with DOPL’s requirements, Ms. Vega did not obtain a certificate of compliance.

¶8 Ms. Vega filed suit against appellees four months later without the certificate of compliance. Appellees filed a motion to dismiss with prejudice citing Utah Code section 78B-3-423(7) of the Malpractice Act, which states that "[i]f a claimant or the claimant’s attorney does not file an affidavit of merit as required ... the division may not issue a certificate of compliance for the claimant and the malpractice action shall be dismissed by the court ." (emphasis added). Ms. Vega opposed the motion to dismiss, arguing that the Malpractice Act violated several provisions of the Utah Constitution. Specifically, Ms. Vega argued that the Malpractice Act violates the separation of powers doctrine, the wrongful death provision, the open courts clause, the uniform operation of laws clause, and the due process clause of the Utah Constitution. Citing the inadequacy of prelitigation discovery and the lack of clear physician notes, the district court determined that "it [was] impossible [for Ms. Vega] to comply with what DOPL is asking," and therefore Ms. Vega could never cure the deficiency in her affidavit. The district court further determined that dismissing the case without prejudice to allow Ms. Vega to seek the opinion of another expert would be futile. Accordingly, the district court granted the motion to dismiss with prejudice.⁵

¶9 Ms. Vega appealed to this court, preserving her claims that the Malpractice Act violates the separation of powers provisions, the wrongful death provision, the due process clause, the open courts provision, and the uniform operation of laws provision of the Utah Constitution.

¶10 We exercise jurisdiction under Utah Code section 78A-3-102(3)(j).

STANDARD OF REVIEW

¶11 We review constitutional and statutory interpretation issues for correctness, granting no deference to the district court. Schroeder v. Utah Attorney Gen.’s Office , 2015 UT 77, ¶ 16, 358 P.3d 1075.

ANALYSIS

¶12 Ms. Vega’s facial challenge to the Malpractice Act raises several important issues of constitutional law. We presume that legislative enactments are constitutional and where possible will construe them as complying with our state and federal constitutions. See State v. Drej , 2010 UT 35, ¶ 9, 233 P.3d 476. The presumption of constitutionality also means that we will seek to resolve doubts about a statute’s validity in favor of constitutionality, and will not declare a legislative enactment invalid unless it clearly violates a constitutional provision. See , e.g. , State v. Angilau , 2011 UT 3, ¶ 7, 245 P.3d 745 ; Merrill v. Utah Labor Comm’n , 2009 UT 26, ¶ 5, 223 P.3d 1089 ; In re Estate of S.T.T. , 2006 UT 46, ¶ 26, 144 P.3d 1083 ; Jones v. Utah Bd. of Pardons & Parole , 2004 UT 53, ¶ 10, 94 P.3d 283. Moreover, in a facial challenge to a statute, like Ms. Vega’s, we will only overturn the will of the legislature when "the statute is so constitutionally flawed that no set of circumstances exists under which the [statute] would be valid." Gillmor v. Summit Cty. , 2010 UT 69, ¶ 27, 246 P.3d 102 (alteration in original) (...