Dennis v. Sparks

Citation101 S.Ct. 183,66 L.Ed.2d 185,449 U.S. 24
Decision Date17 November 1980
Docket NumberNo. 79-1186,79-1186
PartiesOrville E. DENNIS, Petitioner, v. Sidney SPARKS and R. L. Lynd, d/b/a Sidney A. Sparks, Trustee
CourtUnited States Supreme Court
Syllabus

After a Texas state court's injunction against respondents' production of minerals from certain oil leases was dissolved by an appellate court as having been illegally issued, respondents filed suit in Federal District Court alleging a cause of action for damages under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against the judge who issued the injunction, the corporation that had obtained the injunction, its owner, and the sureties on the injunction bond (one of whom is the petitioner). Respondents claimed that the injunction had been corruptly issued as the result of a conspiracy between the judge and the other defendants, thus causing a deprivation of property without due process of law. The District Court dismissed the action, holding that the judge was immune from liability in a § 1983 suit because the injunction was a judicial act within the jurisdiction of the state court, and that with the dismissal of the judge the remaining defendants could not be said to have conspired "under color" of state law within the meaning of § 1983. The Court of Appeals agreed that the judge was immune from suit, but ultimately reversed as to the dismissal of the claims against the other defendants.

Held: The action against the private parties accused of conspiring with the judge is not subject to dismissal. Private persons, jointly engaged with state officials in a challenged action, are acting "under color" of law for purposes of § 1983 actions. And the judge's immunity from damages liability for an official act that was allegedly the product of a corrupt conspiracy involving bribery of the judge does not change the character of his action or that of his co-conspirators. Historically at common law, judicial immunity does not insulate from damages liability those private persons who corruptly conspire with a judge. Nor has the doctrine of judicial immunity been considered historically as excusing a judge from responding as a witness when his co-conspirators are sued, even though a charge of conspiracy and judicial corruption will be aired and decided. Gravel v. United States, 408 U.S. 606, 92 S.Ct. 2614, 33 L.Ed.2d 583 distinguished. The potential harm to the public from denying immunity to co-conspirators if the factfinder mistakenly upholds a charge of a corrupt conspiracy is outweighed by the benefits of providing a remedy against those private persons who participate in subverting the judicial process and in so doing inflict injury on other persons. Pp. 27-32.

5th Cir., 604 F.2d 976, affirmed.

Finley L. Edmonds, Corpus Christi, Tex., for petitioner.

Garland F. Smith, Weslaco, Tex., for respondents.

Justice WHITE delivered the opinion of the Court.

In January 1973, a judge of the 229th District Court of Duval County, Tex., enjoined the production of minerals from certain oil leases owned by respondents. In June 1975, the injunction was dissolved by an appellate court as having been illegally issued. Respondents then filed a complaint in the United States District Court purporting to state a cause of action for damages under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.1 Defendants were the Duval County Ranch Co., Inc., which had obtained the injunction, the sole owner of the corporation, the judge who entered the injunction, and the two individual sureties on the injunction bond, one of whom is now petitioner in this Court. Essentially, the claim was that the injunction had been corruptly issued as the result of a conspiracy between the judge and the other defendants, thus causing a deprivation of property, i. e., two years of oil production, without due process of law.

All defendants moved to dismiss, the judge asserting judicial immunity and the other defendants urging dismissal for failure to allege action "under color" of state law, a necessary component of a § 1983 cause of action. The District Court concluded that because the injunction was a judicial act within the jurisdiction of the state court, the judge was immune from liability in a § 1983 suit, whether or not the injunction had issued as the result of a corrupt conspiracy. Relying on Haldane v. Chagnon, 345 F.2d 601 (CA9 1965), the District Court also ruled that with the dismissal of the judge the remaining defendants could not be said to have conspired under color of state law within the meaning of § 1983. The action against them was accordingly dismissed "for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted."

In a per curiam opinion, a panel of the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit affirmed, agreeing that the judge was immune from suit and that because "the remaining defendants, who are all private citizens, did not conspire with any person against whom a valid § 1983 suit can be stated," Sparks v. Duval County Ranch Co., 588 F.2d 124, 126 (1979), existing authorities in the Circuit required dismissal of the claims against these defendants as well.2 The case was reconsidered en banc, prior Circuit authority was overruled and the District Court judgment was reversed insofar as it had dismissed claims against the defendants other than the judge. Sparks v. Duval County Ranch Co., 604 F.2d 976 (1979). The court ruled that there was no good reason in law, logic, or policy for conferring immunity on private persons who persuaded the immune judge to exercise his jurisdiction corruptly. Because the judgment below was inconsistent with the rulings of other Courts of Appeals 3 and involves an important issue, we granted the petition for certiorari. 445 U.S. 942, 100 S.Ct. 1336, 63 L.Ed.2d 775. We now affirm.

Based on the doctrine expressed in Bradley v. Fisher, 13 Wall. 335, 20 L.Ed. 646 (1872), this Court has consistently adhered to the rule that "judges defending against § 1983 actions enjoy absolute immunity from damages liability for acts performed in their judicial capacities. Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547 [87 S.Ct. 1213, 18 L.Ed.2d 288] (1967); Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349 [98 S.Ct. 1099, 55 L.Ed.2d 331] (1978)." Supreme Court of Virginia v. Consumers Union, 446 U.S. 719, 734-735, 100 S.Ct. 1967, 1976, 64 L.Ed.2d 641 (1980). The courts below concluded that the judicial immunity doctrine required dismissal of the § 1983 action against the judge who issued the challenged injunction, and as the case comes to us, the judge has been properly dismissed from the suit on the immunity grounds. It does not follow, however, that the action against the private parties accused of conspiring with the judge must also be dismissed.

As the Court of Appeals correctly understood our cases to hold, to act "under color of" state law for § 1983 purposes does not require that the defendant be an officer of the State. It is enough that he is a willful participant in joint action with the State or its agents. Private persons, jointly engaged with state officials in the challenged action, are acting see "under color" of law for purposes of § 1983 actions. Adickes v. S. H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144, 152, 90 S.Ct. 1598, 1605, 26 L.Ed.2d 142 (1970); United States v. Price, 383 U.S. 787, 794, 86 S.Ct. 1152, 1156, 16 L.Ed.2d 267 (1966).4 Of course, merely resorting to the courts and being on the winning side of a lawsuit does not make a party a co-conspirator or a joint actor with the judge. But here the allegations were that an official act of the defendant judge was the product of a corrupt conspiracy involving bribery of the judge. Under these allegations, the private parties conspiring with the judge were acting under color of state law; and it is of no consequence in this respect that the judge himself is immune from damages liability. Immunity does not change the character of the judge's action or that of his co-conspirators.5 Indeed, his immunity is dependent on the challenged conduct being an official judicial act within his statutory jurisdiction, broadly construed. Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349, 356, 98 S.Ct. 1099, 1104, 55 L.Ed.2d 331 (1978); Bradley v. Fisher, supra, at 352, 357. Private parties who corruptly conspire with a judge in connection with such conduct are thus acting under color of state law within the meaning of § 1983 as it has been construed in our prior cases. The complaint in this case was not defective for failure to allege that the private defendants were acting under color of state law, and the Court of Appeals was correct in rejecting its prior case authority to the contrary.

Petitioner nevertheless insists that unless he is held to have an immunity derived from that of the judge, the latter's official immunity will be seriously eroded. We are unpersuaded. The immunities of state officials that we have recognized for purposes of § 1983 are the equivalents of those that were recognized at common law. Owen v. City of Independence, 445 U.S. 622, 637-638, 100 S.Ct. 1398, 1408-1409, 63 L.Ed.2d 673 (1980); Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 417, 96 S.Ct. 984, 988, 47 L.Ed.2d 128 (1976); Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547, 554, 87 S.Ct. 1213, 18 L.Ed.2d 288 (1967), and the burden is on the official claiming immunity to demonstrate his entitlement. Cf. Butz v. Economou, 438 U.S. 478, 506, 98 S.Ct. 2894, 2911, 57 L.Ed.2d 895 (1978). Thus, in Owen v. City of Independence, supra, a municipality's claim that it could assert the immunity of its officers and agents in a § 1983 damages action was rejected since there was no basis for such a right at common law. Here, petitioner has pointed to nothing indicating that, historically, judicial immunity insulated from damages liability those private persons who corruptly conspire with the judge.6

In Gravel v. United States, 408 U.S. 606, 92 S.Ct. 2614, 33 L.Ed.2d 583 (1972), we recognized that the Speech or Debate Clause conferred im- munity upon a Senator's aide as well as the Senator, but only in those situations where the conduct of the aide would...

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