McClearen v. Superior Court of Tulare County
| Citation | 291 P.2d 449,45 Cal.2d 852 |
| Court | United States State Supreme Court (California) |
| Decision Date | 29 December 1955 |
| Parties | W. A. McCLEAREN, Petitioner, v. The SUPERIOR COURT OF TULARE COUNTY, Respondent; The People of the State of California, Real Party in Interest. L. A. 23778. |
Robert Stevenson, Exeter, For petitioner.
Edmund G. Brown, Atty. Gen., James E. Sabine and Irving H. Perluss, Asst. Attys. Gen., Edward P. Hollingshead and Lucian B. Vandegrift, Deputy Attys. Gen., for respondent and real party in interest.
This proceeding in certiorari was brought to review action taken by respondent superior court in connection with an appeal from a justice court order denying the People a lien.
The controversy arose out of attempts by the People to collect delinquent sales taxes from petitioner McClearen by establishing a lien against his claim for wages due from his former employer, Moore Brothers. The People, acting under section 6757 of the Revenue and Taxation Code,1 recorded a certificate of the amount of tax due and, under section 6702,2 served on Moore Brothers a notice to withhold moneys owing to McClearen. Thereafter McClearen brought a suit in the Exeter Justice Court of Tulare County against Moore Brothers on his claim for wages plus penalties and costs.
The People noticed a motion in that action, pursuant to section 688.1 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 3 for an order granting the People, as judgment creditor, a lien against any judgment obtained by McClearen. The motion was denied on June 29, 1953, and the People gave notice of appeal to the superior court on questions of both law and fact.
McClearen obtained a judgment against Moore Brothers in the justice court in October 1953, and in November the superior court directed the issuance of a writ of supersedeas restraining the justice court from enforcing the judgment. In March 1954 the superior court remanded the cause for further hearing on the theory that the judge of the justice court had not exercised his judicial discretion in ruling on the motion for a lien. McClearen obtained a writ of execution on his judgment against Moore Brothers, and the People then secured an order from the superior court restraining enforcement of the judgment and directing that any money or property recovered thereunder be impounded. In May 1954 the superior court recalled the remittitur on the ground that, in remanding the case, it acted under the mistaken belief that the justice court had not heard any issue of fact in denying the motion for a lien. The superior court then ordered a trial de novo which resulted in an order granting the People a lien on McClearen's judgment against Moore Brothers. McClearen now seeks certiorari to annul the action taken by the superior court on the ground that it lacked jurisdiction to entertain any of the proceedings.
The first question to be determined is whether the justice court order of June 29, 1953, denying the People's motion for a lien was appealable, since if the order was not appealable the subsequent actions of the superior court were void. Section 974 of the Code of Civil Procedure, which provides that a party may appeal from a judgment of a justice court, contains no express mention of an order denying a motion to impress a lien, but we have concluded that the order is appealable as a final judgment.
McClearen contends that the People did not seek leave to intervene, that they are not parties to the action and that, therefore, they are not entitled to appeal. It is true that the People did not seek to intervene or request leave to do so. Although though the People were designated as 'Intervener' in the title of the notice of motion, the notice was merely to the effect that, as judgment creditor, the People would move the court for an order granting a lien upon any judgment procured by McClearen against Moore Brothers. It was not necessary, however, for the People to seek leave to intervene in order to be entitled to appeal from a denial of the motion for a lien. As noted above, the lien was sought under section 688.1 of the Code of Civil Procedure, which provides that 'the court or judge thereof may, in his discretion, order that the judgment creditor be granted a lien * * * and * * * may permit said judgment creditor to intervene therein.' The language of the section thus permits, but does not require, intervention. The section is remedial in nature and should be liberally construed to give effect to the remedy which it authorizes. Code Civ.Proc. § 4; Finance & Construction Co. of California v. City of Sacramento, 204 Cal. 491, 493, 269 P. 167; Cullerton v. Mead, 22 Cal. 96, 98; see 23 Cal.Jur. 801.
Ordinarily a lien claimant would have no reason to participate in the main action, and in most instances his needs would be satisfied by the granting of a lien against the prospective judgment. While it might be proper for the court, under some circumstances, to require intervention as a condition to obtaining a lien, thore is nothing in the record to indicate that such a condition was imposed here. Moreover, any noncompliance with such a condition by the lien claimant would relate to the propriety of the denial of a lean rather than to the appealability of the order of denial. A lien claimant is obviously a party to the proceeding on his motion for a lien, even though he does not seek by intervention to become a party to the main action, and his failure to pursue the optional remedy of intervention cannot be considered as having any adverse effect upon his right to appeal from a denial of his motion.
It is clear that the denial of the motion amounted to a final determination of the People's right to a lien, and it is the general rule that a final determination of litigation as to a party constitutes an appealable order or judgment. Bowles v. Superior Court, 44 Cal.2d 574, 582, 283 P.2d 704; Braun v. Brown, 13 Cal.2d 130, 133, 87 P.2d 1009; Dollenmayer v. Pryor, 150 Cal. 1, 3, 87 P. 616; In re Yokohama Specie Bank, 86 Cal.App.2d 545, 195 P.2d 555; Ryan v. McKinley, 124 Cal.App. 765, 766, 13 P.2d 522. These decisions all...
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