O'Neil v. Spillane

Citation119 Cal.Rptr. 245,45 Cal.App.3d 147
CourtCalifornia Court of Appeals
Decision Date07 February 1975
PartiesHanorah M. O'NEIL, aka Laura M. O'Neil, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. James SPILLANE and Frances Spillane, Defendants and Appellants. Civ. 32854.

Gregory S. Stout, San Francisco, for defendants and appellants.

Kutsko, Moran & Mullin, San Francisco, for plaintiff and respondent.

KANE, Associate Justice.

Defendants, James and Frances Spillane, appeal from the trial court's judgment ordering reconveyance of real property and awarding damages in favor of respondent.

The subject matter of the present litigation is the validity of a gift deed executed by respondent on December 18, 1964. By this deed respondent, the sole owner of residential property located at 87 States Street, San Francisco, created a joint tenancy in said property vesting a one-third undivided interest to appellants James Spillane and Frances Spillane and herself. The circumstances leading to the execution of the deed may be summarized as follows:

In July 1960 respondent lost her sister, her only living relative. The death of her sister wrought an unusually profound emotional strain upon respondent and triggered a downward mental and emotional trend in her life. As a consequence, respondent, an aging and lonely woman, became increasingly dependent upon a few friends upon whom she felt she could rely. Among these friends were appellants.

Toward the end of 1964 respondent asked Mr. Spillane to find an attorney to draft her will so that upon her passing she might reward some of those who had helped her during her lifetime. Mr. Spillane enlisted the services of his longtime friend, Mr. Sullivan, an attorney. Mr. Spillane spoke to Mr. Sullivan, asking him to prepare a will leaving the real property in question to his wife and himself. Mr. Sullivan relayed this information to his wife, Mrs. Sullivan, also an attorney. Thereupon, without first consulting respondent, Mrs. Sullivan drafted a will containing the provisions requested by Mr. Spillane. The next day, Mrs. Sullivan, accompanied by her husband and Mr. Spillane, visited respondent in her home taking a will ready to be signed. After a half-anhour interview with Mrs. Sullivan, respondent signed the will and was convinced that she also ought to execute a deed of joint tenancy with the Spillanes. In an apparent belief that nothing would be taken from her, the following day respondent signed a gift deed giving two-thirds of her property to the Spillanes in joint tenancy.

Following the signing of the deed, everything continued almost the same as it had been before with a few exceptions. Thus, while respondent paid the taxes on the home, appellants paid the taxes on the adjoining vacant lot. Also, at respondent's request, Mr. Spillane made a few repairs around the property, such as fixing broken windows, roof leaks and removing a garage which constituted an encroachment. There was ample evidence from which the jury could infer that the fact that appellants owned two-thirds of the property was concealed from respondent, and that she honestly believed that the presence of appellants' names on the tax bills was only for the purpose of avoiding probate.

When she discovered that appellants were actual owners, respondent requested an immediate reconveyance of the property to her. When appellants refused to comply, respondent attempted to break the joint tenancy by conveyance to a third party and a reconveyance to herself. Thereafter the present action was instituted seeking rescission and damages.

After a lengthy trial, in which testimonial and documentary evidence was introduced, the jury rendered both special and general verdicts. Although in the special verdict appellants were found guilty of undue influence only, and not guilty of fraud, oppression or actual malice, in its general verdict the jury awarded respondent not only rescission and compensatory damages, but punitive damages as well. Both during and after the trial appellants made several motions to eliminate the punitive damages. Thus, they moved for a directed verdict, which was denied. Thereafter, appellants filed a motion for an order vacating judgment under Code of Civil Procedure, section 663, subdivision 2, and when that proved unsuccessful they moved for a judgment notwithstanding the verdict or, in the alternative, for a new trial. In the latter procedure the trial court eliminated the $10,000 punitive damages and granted a new trial unless respondent accepted a reduction of the $10,000 compensatory damages to $2,500. Respondent accepted the remittitur, whereupon the motion for new trial was denied. The present appeal followed.

On appeal, appellants seek reversal mainly on the ground that the finding of undue influence is not supported by sufficient evidence. In addition, they press the argument that the judgment at hand should be overturned also on account of certain procedural errors, misconduct of respondent's counsel, and erroneous jury instructions. We discuss appellants' arguments seriatim.

Sufficiency of Evidence: Pursuant to section 1575 of the Civil Code, 1 'Undue influence consists:

'1. In the use, by one in whom a confidence is reposed by another, or who holds a real or apparent authority over him, of such confidence or authority for the purpose of obtaining an unfair advantage over him;

'2. In taking an unfair advantage of another's weakness of mind; or,

'3. In taking a grossly oppressive and unfair advantage of another's necessities or distress.'

We believe the instant record sustains the finding of undue influence both on the basis that appellants breached the confidential relationship existing between the parties (subd. 1), and that they took an unfair advantage of respondent's weakness of mind (subd. 2).

It is, of course, well settled that while the mere fact that a relationship is friendly and intimate does not necessarily amount to A confidential relationship, such relationship May be said to exist whenever trust and confidence is reposed by one person in the integrity and fidelity of another (Estate of Cover (1922) 188 Cal. 133, 143, 204 P. 583; Faulkner v. Beatty (1958) 161 Cal.App.2d 547, 550, 327 P.2d 41; Meyer v. Zuber (1928) 92 Cal.App. 767, 772, 268 P. 954). It is likewise frequently emphasized that the existence of a confidential relationship presents a question of fact which, of necessity, may be determined only on a case by case basis (Kloehn v. Prendiville (1957) 154 Cal.App.2d 156, 160, 316 P.2d 17; Steinberger v. Steinberger (1943) 60 Cal.App.2d 116, 122, 140 P.2d 31).

Tested by these principles, the instant evidence and the reasonable inferences drawn therefrom amply support the existence of a confidential relationship between appellants and respondent. Thus, the record irrefutably shows that the intimate relationship between the parties was not of recent origin, but rather of long duration, dating back to a friendship between Mrs. Spillane's mother and respondent. The close relationship lasted throughout Mrs. Spillane's childhood and continued after her marriage to Mr. Spillane in 1952. In fact, respondent was considered as a family member. She attended family events, such as weddings and christening of appellants' children and gave generous gifts to the Spillanes and their children. The closeness of the relationship intensified after respondent lost her sister in 1960 and from that time on respondent relied even more heavily on appellants. This is demonstrated Inter alia by the circumstance that she intended to include the Spillanes in her will and enlisted Mr. Spillane's help to obtain an attorney to draft her last will and testament. In addition, there is direct evidence in the record showing that in conducting her affairs respondent placed trust and confidence in Mr. Spillane.

The record is similarly clear that it was due to appellants' activity that the deed in dispute was prepared, executed and recorded. The transaction no doubt resulted in a definite detriment to respondent who was thereby deprived of her primary asset providing her security and livelihood, and yielded a substantial benefit to appellants. In this type of situation a presumption arises that the advantage obtained by the grantee was by reason of undue influence exerted on the grantor (Stewart v. Marvin (1956) 139 Cal.App.2d 769, 775, 294 P.2d 114; Sparks v. Sparks (1950) 101 Cal.App.2d 129, 135, 225 P.2d 238). Such a presumption is evidence and is, by itself sufficient to support the finding of undue influence (Faulkner v. Beatty, supra, 161 Cal.App.2d at p. 551, 327 P.2d 41; Khoury v. Barham (1948) 85 Cal.App.2d 202, 212, 192 P.2d 823).

But the finding of the jury is sustainable also on the ground that by inducing respondent to part with her property and to vest an immediate interest in them, appellants took an unfair advantage of respondent's weakness of mind within the meaning of section 1575, subdivision 2. The record is replete with evidence that respondent was greatly afflicted, both mentally and emotionally, by her sister's death. This, in combination with her age and solitariness, resulted in a gradual loss of her mental vigor and susceptibility to imposition and influence. 2 Perhaps the best evidence to demonstrate her mental state was respondent's trial testimony itself, which was full of self-contradictions and disclosed obvious signs of forgetfulness, senility, loss of comprehension and mental control.

At the same time the record is persuasive that respondent did not actually know what she was doing and was led to believe that she did not part with any part of her property by signing the deed in dispute. This proposition is supported not only by respondent's own testimony but also by mr. Spillane, who stated that respondent was advised that nothing would be taken away from her by the transaction and...

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