Willett v. Southern Ry. Co.

• Decision Date: 30 June 1903
• Citation: 45 S.E. 93,66 S.C. 477
• Parties: WILLETT v. SOUTHERN RY. CO.
• Court: South Carolina Supreme Court

45 S.E. 93

66 S.C. 477

WILLETT v. SOUTHERN RY. CO.

Supreme Court of South Carolina

June 30, 1903

Appeal from Common Pleas Circuit Court of Aiken County; Gage, Judge.

Action by Thomas Willett against the Southern Railway Company. From circuit order affirming magistrate's judgment, defendant appeals. Affirmed.

B. L Abney and Hendersons, for appellant. Sawyer & Owens, for respondent.

WOODS J.

The plaintiff, Thomas Willett, delivered an ornamental camphor wood chest to an expressman at Port Chester, N. Y., marked "Thomas Willett, Aiken, S. C., via Clyde Line." The chest was delivered to the plaintiff at Aiken, S. C., by the Southern Railway Company, in a damaged condition, with the crate shattered. This action to recover for the value of the chest was brought against Southern Railway Company as the last carrier having it in charge; the plaintiff alleging that the damage was so great as to make the chest valueless. No evidence was offered on either side as to where the damage was done. The plaintiff recovered judgment in a magistrate's court, which was affirmed by the circuit court. The defendant appeals, and its exceptions involve two inquiries.

1. First, where goods are delivered to the consignee by the last carrier of connecting lines in a damaged condition, is there any presumption that they were damaged while in charge of the last carrier, or has such presumption been entirely removed and transferred to the initial carrier by section 2176 of the Civil Code, which was in force when this action was commenced, and which makes the initial carrier liable in every case for loss or damage to goods, allowing it, however to discharge itself by the production of a written receipt from the next carrier to which it properly delivered the goods? The general rule is that the burden is on the carrier which delivers the goods to consignee to respond to any damage which occurs in transit, or show that it was done while in the hands of some other carrier. This rule has never been under judicial discussion in this state, but it is supported by the great weight of authority elsewhere. 6 Cyc. 491; Moore v. R. R. Co., 173 Mass. 335, 53 N.E 816, 73 Am. St. Rep. 298; Laughlin v. Ry. Co., 28 Wis. 204, 9 Am. Rep. 493. Hale on Bailments and Carriers thus states the rule, quoting numerous authorities in support of it: "In an action against the last carrier, if it is shown that the goods were delivered to the first carrier in good order, this condition, in the absence of a contrary showing, will be presumed to continue until the goods come into the possession of the last carrier, and that the injury occurred on that line. This is on the principle that things once proved to have existed in a certain condition are presumed to have continued in that condition until the contrary is established by evidence." We think this doctrine is supported by public policy so important as to amount to necessity. With the immense traffic and the resulting complicated business methods of modern American railroads, and the connection of these roads with one another, to impose upon the owner of property passing over connecting lines the burden of making affirmative proof that the loss occurred on a certain one of these lines would be practically relieving of liability railroads handling freight as connecting lines; for the owner could rarely make the required proof, and, when he could make it, in most instances the expense of doing so would be greater than the value of the goods. The rule works no hardship to the railroads as common carriers, because they receipt to one another, and can easily trace loss or damage.

Prior to the enactment of the statute above referred to, the initial carrier was not liable, except upon actual proof of damage or loss while the goods were in its possession, unless it expressly contracted to deliver the goods at their destination. Kyle v. R. R. Co., 10 Rich. 382, 70 Am Dec. 231; Hill v. R. R. Co., 43 S.C. 471, 21 S.E. 337. This statute makes no reference to the liability of the last carrier, which we have seen existed before it was passed; and certainly a law imposing a similar liability on the initial carrier cannot be held by implication to relieve the last carrier of its liability. The statute was intended to...