State v. Meier

Decision Date29 March 1898
Citation45 S.W. 306,143 Mo. 439
CourtMissouri Supreme Court
PartiesSTATE ex rel. NORTH & SOUTH RY. CO. v. MEIER.

The St. Louis city charter provides that, on the passage of a bill through each of the legislative bodies composing its municipal assembly, it shall not become an ordinance until it shall be signed by the presiding officer of each of the two houses in open session; that when the bill is passed, if no objection be made, the presiding officer "shall sign," and if objections are made and sustained by the house he "shall withhold his signature." Held that, when the bill is presented to the presiding officer for his signature, and no objection is made, or, if made, is not sustained, he has no discretion, but must sign the bill, and mandamus may issue to compel him to do so. State v. Stone, 25 S. W. 376, 120 Mo. 428, distinguished.

Sherwood, J., dissenting.

In banc. Appeal from St. Louis circuit court; Leroy B. Valliant, Judge.

Action in the name of the state, on the relation of the North & South Railway Company, for mandamus to E. F. W. Meier. From a judgment dismissing relator's bill, it appealed to the St. Louis court of appeals, where the judgment was reversed, and the matter was then certified to the supreme court. Judgment of the court of appeals affirmed.

Leverett Bell and John H. Overall, for appellant. Charles Claflin Allen, for respondent.

BRACE, J.

The respondent is president of the council of the city of St. Louis. On the 9th of August, 1897, an alternative writ of mandamus was issued by the circuit court, city of St. Louis, commanding the respondent to sign house bill No. 59, being an ordinance granting certain rights, privileges, and franchises to the relator, or show cause why he should not, to which writ, for such cause, the respondent made return, in substance, that said house bill No. 59 never was read on three different days before the council of the municipal assembly, as required by the charter. On the hearing it appeared, from the journal, that the bill was read in the council "on three different days, May 25th, May 28th, and July 20th," and oral testimony was introduced, over the objections of relator, tending to prove that the bill "was read at length in the council once on May 25th, by its title on May 28th, again by its title on July 13th, and at length in committee of the whole on July 20th, and that there was no other reading before its alleged passage." Thereupon the court found for the respondent, dismissed the relator's bill, rendered judgment in respondent's favor for costs, and the relator appealed to the St. Louis court of appeals, where the judgment of the circuit court was reversed, Judge Biggs dissenting; and, he deeming the decision of the majority of the court in conflict with the decision of this court in State v. Stone, 120 Mo. 428, 25 S. W. 376, the case was certified here for determination. In State v. Stone it was held that mandamus will not issue to the governor to compel the performance of any duty pertaining to his office prescribed by law, and it is contended for respondent that the same rule applies to the president of the council of the city of St. Louis, under the requirement of the constitution (article 3) that "the powers of government shall be divided into three distinct departments, the legislative, executive and judicial, each of which shall be confided to a separate magistracy, and no person or collection of persons charged with the exercise of powers properly belonging to one of those departments, shall exercise any power properly belonging to either of the others except in the instances in this constitution expressly directed or permitted;" the contention being that the respondent, as president of the council, in signing a bill passed by the municipal assembly, in order that it may become an ordinance of the city, is charged with the exercise of a legislative power, over which the judicial department has no control.

By the charter of the city of St. Louis its legislative power is vested in a council and a house of delegates, styled the "Municipal Assembly of the City of St. Louis." Section 1. The council consists of 13 members, one of whom, chosen on a general ticket by the qualified voters of the city for four years, is "president." Sections 2, 8. It is further provided by the charter that: "No ordinance shall be passed except by bill, and no bill shall be so amended in its passage through either house as to change its original purpose. Bills may originate in either house, and may be amended or rejected by the other, and every bill shall be read three different days in each house. No bill shall be considered for final passage unless the same has been reported upon by a committee. * * *" Section 13. No bill shall become an ordinance unless, on its final passage, the majority of the members elected to each house vote in its favor, and the vote be taken by yeas and nays, and the names of the members voting for and against the same be entered on the journal. Section 16. And when a bill shall have thus attained its final passage, the charter provides that it shall not become an ordinance "until the same shall have been signed by the presiding officers of each of the two houses in open session; and before such officer shall affix his signature to any bill, he shall suspend all other business, declare that such bill will now be read, and that if no objections be made, he will sign the same to the end that it may become an ordinance. The bill shall then be read at length, and if no objection be made, he shall in the presence of the house in open session, and before any other business is entertained, affix his signature, which fact shall be noted on the journal, and the bill immediately sent to the other house. When it reaches the other house, the presiding officer shall announce the reception of the bill and the same proceedings shall thereupon be observed in every respect as in the house in which it was first signed. If in either house any member shall object that any substitution, omission or insertion has occurred so that the bill proposed to be signed is not the same in substance and form as when considered and passed by the house, such objection shall be passed upon by the house, and if sustained, the presiding officer shall withhold his signature." Section 22. Having thus received the signature of the president of the council, it must then be presented to the mayor for his approval or disapproval before it can become a law. Section 23.

That the municipal assembly, in thus making a law by virtue of the power vested in it under the constitution and laws of the state, exercises powers properly belonging to the legislative department of the state, is beyond question. Taylor v. City of Carondelet, 22 Mo. 105; City of St. Louis v. Foster, 52 Mo. 513; State v. Vic. De Bar, 58 Mo. 395; Moore v. City of Cape Girardeau, 103 Mo. 470, 15 S. W. 755; Union Depot R. Co. v. Southern Ry. Co., 105 Mo. 562, 16 S. W. 920; Jackson v. Railway Co., 118 Mo. 199, 24 S. W. 192; 2 Dill. Mun. Corp. (2d Ed.) § 245. That the respondent, as president...

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37 cases
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