Charles Clifton, Claimant Plaintiff In Error v. the United States

Decision Date01 January 1846
Citation45 U.S. 242,4 How. 242,11 L.Ed. 957
PartiesCHARLES CLIFTON, CLAIMANT, PLAINTIFF IN ERROR, v. THE UNITED STATES
CourtU.S. Supreme Court

THIS case was brought up, by writ of error, from the Circuit Court of the United States for East Pennsylvania.

The facts are fully set forth in the opinion of the court.

The case was argued by Mr. Meredith, for the plaintiff in error and Mr. Cadwallader and Mr. Mason (Attorney-General), for the United States.

Mr. Justice NELSON delivered the opinion of the court.

This is a writ of error from the judgment of the Circuit Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania, affirming a judgment of the District Court of the same district.

The original suit was a libel of information, in rem, founded upon a seizure on land in the said district of some seventy-one cases of cloths and cassimeres imported into the United States, and alleged to have been forfeited.

The libel contained thirteen counts, resting upon different sections of the several acts of Congress regulating the collection of duties on imports and tonnage; but it will be material to notice particularly those only which are founded upon the sixty-sixth section of the act of 1799 (ch. 22, Lit. & Brown's ed.), the fourth section of the act of 1830 (ch. 147), and the fourteenth section of the act of 1832 (ch. 227), which provide against the making up of false invoices and false packages of the goods imported, with the intent to evade or defraud the revenue.

Various pleas were put in by the claimant, but as no questions are raised upon them, they need not be stated.

On the trial of the cause, it appeared that the goods in question had been originally imported into the port of New York, and were there duly entered and landed, and the duties paid upon the invoices produced by the claimant to the collector. The goods were appraised at the custom-house, at a valuation of ten per cent. above the invoice prices, and no appeal taken. They were afterwards transported to the city of Philadelphia, and were there seized by the custom-house officers, under a warrant issued for that purpose, in the stores of certain persons having the custody of them in that city for the claimant.

A good deal of evidence was given on the part of the United States, tending strongly to establish the fact, that the several invoices upon which the duties had been paid at the custom-house in New York, and which invoices were produced before the court, had been made up greatly under the actual cost and value of the goods in England, the place of exportation, and with the intent to evade and Defraud the revenue; and in the progress of the trial, the counsel for the government, in pursuance of a notice given some months previously, called upon the claimant for the production of his ledger containing entries of each of the several invoices of the goods thus imported; also, for the production of his cash-book for the years 1838 and 1839, embracing the period within which the goods had been imported, and for the entries therein relating to the said importations; also, for the charges of the payment of freight upon said goods;—to each of which calls the counsel were answered, that the claimant had no such book in court.

The counsel for the government, like previous notice having been given, also called upon claimant for the production of the accounts in the ledger, for the years 1838 and 1839, with each of the houses in England who had sold and invoiced the said goods to him, and for his letter-book for said years, and the correspondence with each of the said houses respectively, and also for his day-book; to which calls the counsel answered, that neither of them were in court.

When the testimony closed, the court below instructed the jury that it was alleged, on the part of the United States, that the goods in question had been forfeited, from having been imported into New York by false invoices, with intent to evade the payment of part of the duties to which they were subject. That it was incumbent upon the government to show upon the trial that there was probable cause for the prosecution; and if that had been shown, of which the court was to judge, the burden of proof was on the claimant, who must then satisfy the jury that the goods were invoiced at their actual cost.

That with a view to show probable cause, the government relied mainly upon the evidence, that the actual value of the goods in England exceeded the prices per yard mentioned in the invoices, and that after the testimony which had been produced on the part of the government of the value of the goods at the time and place of exportation, as compared with the prices fixed in the invoices, it was material to notice the negative evidence, arising out of the absence of testimony on the part of the defendant of the actual cost of the goods; and to consider whether its absence had been accounted for. That there was evidence that one of the persons, by whom a portion of the goods in controversy appeared to have been invoiced to the claimants, was within the reach of a subpoena, and it was reasonable to presume that it was in the claimant's power to have produced evidence of the real state of his accounts and transactions with all the parties in England from whom the goods had been received, as the correspondence showed that two years ago his counsel had advised him to procure proof on this subject, which had not been produced; that the claimant knew from whom he had bought the goods, and what their actual cost was, and yet he had not produced the evidence, nor accounted for its absence; that to withhold testimony which was in the power of a party to proauce, in order to rebut a charge against him, where it was not supplied by equivalent testimony, might be as fatal as positive testimony in support or confirmation of the charge; that if the claimant had withheld proof which his accounts and transactions with these parties afforded, it might be presumed that if produced they would have operated unfavorably to his case; that the government had shown probable cause, and that the next inquiry was, whether the claimant had relieved himself from the burden of the proof, &c.

The court further instructed the jury, that in respect to some of the invoices, the government and claimant relied upon the same circumstance, namely, that goods included in the information, in passing through the custom-house in New York, were appraised at amounts exceeding the invoice prices, and that the claimant, without appealing, had paid the duties assessed upon the increased value, and received the goods from the custom-house.

The counsel for the government contended that this acquiescence implied an admission that the invoices were untrue, while the counsel for the claimant contended, that by this appraisement, assessment, and payment of duty, the government were precluded from alleging or enforcing a forfeiture of these goods. The court expressed the opinion, that the question of liability to forfeiture was so far distinct from questions connected with the ascertainment and payment of duties, that the passing of goods through the custom-house, under such circumstances, was not, in a legal point of view, decisive of any question before the jury. That the question was, whether the goods were falsely invoiced, with intent to defraud the revenue, &c.

The counsel for the claimant excepted to that part of the charge in which the jury were instructed, that, if the claimant had withheld the testimony of his accounts and transactions with the parties abroad from whom he received the goods, they were at liberty to presume that, if produced, they would have operated unfavorably to his case; and also to that part in which the jury were instructed, that, if the goods in controversy were fraudulently invoiced, they were not exempted from forfeiture by having been appraised in the custom-house at valuations exceeding the prices in the invoices, and delivered to the importer on payment of the duties assessed upon the amount of such appraisement; and also to that part of the instructions in which the jury were advised that probable cause had been shown by the government in support of the prosecution.

A general verdict was rendered for the United States.

As to the instructions given to the jury first excepted to, in which the court below expressed the opinion, 'that if the claimant had withheld proof which his accounts and transactions with the parties afforded, it might be presumed that, if produced, they would have operated unfavorably to his case'; in order to comprehend fully the appropriateness and legality of the instructions, it is material to refer to the posture of the case at the time they were given, and to the question then under the consideration of the court.

The counsel for the government had furnished proof tending strongly to the conclusion, that the invoice prices of the goods in question were greatly under the actual cost at the place and in the country whence they were imported. This proof rested mainly upon the testimony of several merchants, importers, and dealers in the particular article, who had examined the goods and estimated their cost.

The average estimate exceeded the invoice prices some fifty per cent.

The counsel also, with a...

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