Nelson v. Keefer
Citation | 451 F.2d 289 |
Decision Date | 15 November 1971 |
Docket Number | No. 19416-19418.,19416-19418. |
Parties | Ernest NELSON, 3rd, a minor, by his parents and natural guardians, et al., Appellant in No. 19416. v. Ernest KEEFER and Frank Keefer v. Howard BRINKLEY and Walter G. Locke, Third Party Defendants. Appeal of Ernest J. NELSON, Jr., in No. 19417. Appeal of Patsy NELSON, in No. 19418. |
Court | United States Courts of Appeals. United States Court of Appeals (3rd Circuit) |
COPYRIGHT MATERIAL OMITTED
Bernard J. McAuley, Wayman, Irvin, Trushel & McAuley, Pittsburgh, Pa., for appellants.
William K. Herrington, Weis & Weis, Pittsburgh, Pa., for appellees Ernest Keefer and Frank Keefer.
Arthur R. Gorr, Stein and Winters, Pittsburgh, Pa., for appellee Locke.
Before VAN DUSEN, ALDISERT and GIBBONS, Circuit Judges.
These appeals question the propriety of dismissing a personal injury diversity action at pre-trial because the district court concluded that it appeared "to a legal certainty" that the claims were "really for less than the jurisdictional amount"1 of $10,000.2
Appellants concede that the court had the power to determine the facts requisite to jurisdiction, Wetmore v. Rymer, 169 U.S. 115, 18 S.Ct. 293, 42 L.Ed. 682 (1898), but contend that the cause should not have been terminated at pre-trial because of the possibility of adducing proof later as to the extent of the injuries.
Thus posited, the issue is whether the facts alleged at pre-trial supporting the complaint were legally insufficient to give rise to a $10,000 claim. St. Paul Mercury Indemnity Co. v. Red Cab Co., supra; Gray v. Occidental Life Insurance Co. of California, 387 F.2d 935 (3rd Cir. 1968); Jaconski v. Avisun Corp., 359 F.2d 931 (3rd Cir. 1966); Wade v. Rogala, 270 F.2d 280 (3rd Cir. 1959). It is appropriate to emphasize that "this court has taken the lead in recognizing diversity jurisdiction over an entire lawsuit in tort cases presenting closely related claims based, in principal part at least, on the same operative facts and normally litigated together, even though one of the claims, if litigated alone, would not satisfy a requirement of diversity jurisdiction."3 Thus, if any of the three plaintiffs meets the jurisdictional amount, we will extend hospitality to the other claims.4
In their combined pre-trial statement, appellants allege that, as a result of an automobile accident caused by defendant's negligence, the minor son sustained a thoracic lumbar sprain, and, as of August 20, 1968—three years after the August 21, 1965 injury—he had incurred a physician's bill of $95.50, hospital expenses of $15.00, and a $25.78 bill for a back brace. Reports of physicians indicate that he was seen by them on four occasions: August 21, 1965, September 1, 1965, November 29, 1965, and February 6, 1968. X-rays taken on August 24, 1965, and November 26, 1965, were negative.
The wife-plaintiff was diagnosed as having sustained a hematoma of the skull, neck lash, and contusions of the right shoulder and right ribs. She was seen by her physician on August 23, 1965, and had an x-ray taken on August 25, 1965, which proved negative. The physician issued a report on October 31, 1966, revealing treatment on August 23, 1965, for which he submitted a bill for $163.00. The bill for the x-rays at St. Luke's Hospital amounted to $65.00, and there was an additional Mercer College Hospital bill for $30.00.
The husband-father supported his claim with the following:
Dr. Brown ................ $322.75 St. Luke's Hospital .... 262.75 Drugs ............. 18.00 Property Damage ........ 727.69
Dr. Brown's report of October 31, 1966, indicated that Nelson's first treatment was on August 24, 1965, that the diagnosis was "neck lash, bruise left shoulder, pain over lumbar region with tenderness over spleen" and that Nelson "still has pain in neck and shoulder." It is significant that in the 1966 report, Dr. Brown made no attempt to relate the accident to Nelson's hospitalization from August 25 to 28, 1965, which apparently was treatment for "diarrhea, undetermined etiology," including x-rays showing duodenal ulcer symptomotalogy. In analyzing Nelson's medical expenses, the trial court characterized the bills of the physician and hospital as "of doubtful relation of entire bill to the accident because the hospital treatment and Dr. Brown's records deal mostly with his treatment for diarrhea and pre-existing hemorrhoids." Indeed, in answers to interrogatories, Nelson stated "no loss of compensation (from employment) is being claimed," and to the question: "How much time in weeks and days did you lose from work as a result of the injuries sustained in the accident," he responded, "Not applicable."
Before we apply these facts to the appropriate law, it becomes necessary to observe that other circuits have attributed more sweep to the rule of Wade v. Rogala, supra, than is set forth in the holding of the case.5
We did not there say that in all cases where there were intangible factors such as pain, suffering and inconvenience, the cause was required to be submitted to a jury. We did say that "the necessary choice, except in the flagrant case, where the jurisdictional issue cannot be decided without the ruling constituting at the same time a ruling on the merits, is to permit the cause to proceed to trial." 270 F.2d at 285.
It is our intention to require removal from the trial list of those "flagrant" cases where it can be determined in advance "with legal certainty" that the congressional mandate of a $10,000 minimum was not satisfied. Although adhering to Wade v. Rogala, we have subsequently stated:
Jaconski v. Avisun Corp., supra, 359 F.2d at 934, 935.6
We are not persuaded by the argument that a termination prior to trial deprives a "plaintiff of his present statutory right to a jury trial." See Deutsch v. Hewes Street Realty Corp., supra, 359 F.2d at 100. Indeed, such an argument begs the question, for the precise issue is whether plaintiff has a statutory right to enter the courtroom for any trial, jury or otherwise. The corollary suggestion that the remedy lies with Congress is similarly specious,7 for the reality is that Congress did act in 1958 in raising the amount in controversy from $3,000 to $10,000.8
The stated purpose of the 1958 amendment as urged by the Judicial Conference of the United States was to:
make jurisdiction available in all substantial controversies where other elements of Federal jurisdiction are present. The jurisdictional amount should not be so high to convert the Federal courts into courts of big business nor so low as to fritter away their time in the trial of petty controversies.
U.S.Code Cong. and Admin.News, Senate Report No. 1830, 85th Cong., 2d Sess., p. 3101 (1958) (emphasis added).
Moreover, the Supreme Court recently announced that the congressional purpose "was to check, to some degree, the rising caseload of the federal courts, especially with regard to the federal courts' diversity of citizenship jurisdiction." Snyder v. Harris, 394 U.S. 332, 339-340, 89 S.Ct. 1053, 1058, 22 L.Ed.2d 319 (1969). There, the Court explicitly reaffirmed its earlier expression of congressional intention in Healy v. Ratta, 292 U.S. 263, 269-270, 54 S.Ct. 700, 703, 78 L.Ed. 1248 (1933):
From the beginning suits between citizens of different states, or involving federal questions, could neither be brought in the federal courts nor removed to them, unless the value of the matter in controversy was more than a specified amount. Cases involving lesser amounts have been left to be dealt with exclusively by state courts, except that judgment of the highest court of a state adjudicating a federal right may be reviewed by this Court. Pursuant to this policy the jurisdiction of federal courts of first instance has been narrowed by successive acts of Congress, which have progressively increased the jurisdictional amount. The policy of the statute calls for its strict construction. The power reserved to the states, under the Constitution, to provide for the determination of controversies in their courts may be restricted only by the action of Congress in conformity to the judiciary sections of the Constitution. See Kline v. Burke Construction Co., 260 U.S. 226, 233-234 43 S. Ct. 79, 67 L.Ed. 226, 24 A.L.R. 1077. Due regard for the rightful independence of state governments, which...
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