McCormick v. Braverman

• Decision Date: 20 June 2006
• Docket Number: No. 04-1708.,04-1708.
• Citation: 451 F.3d 382
• Parties: Linda McCORMICK, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Eric A. BRAVERMAN, et al.; Citizens Insurance Company of America, et al., Defendants-Appellees.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Sixth Circuit

Page 382

451 F.3d 382

Linda McCORMICK, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Eric A. BRAVERMAN, et al.; Citizens Insurance Company of America, et al., Defendants-Appellees.

No. 04-1708.

United States Court of Appeals, Sixth Circuit.

Submitted: February 2, 2006.

Decided and Filed: June 20, 2006.

COPYRIGHT MATERIAL OMITTED

ON BRIEF: Eric A. Braverman, Lincoln Park, Michigan, Margaret A. Nelson, Office of the Attorney General, Lansing, Michigan, David M. Findling, Findling Law Firm, Royal Oak, Michigan, for Appellees. Linda McCormick, Livonia, Michigan, pro se.

Before: COLE, CLAY, and GIBBONS, Circuit Judges.

OPINION

CLAY, Circuit Judge.

Plaintiff Linda McCormick appeals the March 17, 2004 order of the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan dismissing Plaintiff's cases against Defendants Eric A. Braverman ("Braverman"), et al. and Citizens Insurance Company of America ("Citizens Insurance"), et al. for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. Plaintiff claims violations of 42 U.S.C. § 1983, the First, Fourth, Fifth, and Fourteenth Amendments of the United States Constitution, Michigan common and statutory law, and the Michigan constitution. Although Plaintiff sets forth a myriad of claims, her underlying contention is that she is the owner of certain real property, and that Defendants have acted illegally in interfering with her ownership. For the following reasons, we AFFIRM the district court order.

I. BACKGROUND

In 1976, Mary G. McCormick ("Mary") filed a complaint of divorce against her husband Edward J. McCormick ("Edward"). On July 19, 1976, Mary and Edward entered into a reconciliation agreement. In consideration of Mary's promise to withdraw her complaint of divorce and to attempt a reconciliation for a period of one year, Edward conveyed his interest in marital real property located at Henry Ruff Road in Livonia, Michigan ("Henry Ruff Property") to Mary. On July 19, 1976, Edward conveyed his interest in the Henry Ruff Property via quitclaim deed to Mary. Plaintiff alleges that on July 19, 1976, as a result of the reconciliation agreement, Judge Colombo of the Wayne County Circuit Court dismissed the complaint of divorce with the consent of the parties.

On July 20, 1977 Mary entered into an agreement with her daughter Linda McCormick, Plaintiff in the instant case. Mary promised Plaintiff that she would repay Plaintiff for any house payments, taxes, maintenance costs, and any other payments concerning the Henry Ruff Property that Plaintiff made. The agreement secured the indebtedness by promising to pay Plaintiff for all sums provided if and when the Henry Ruff Property was sold. Plaintiff alleges that after July 1976, Plaintiff made all of the mortgage payments on the Henry Ruff Property.

On March 21, 1980, Mary conveyed the Henry Ruff Property via quitclaim deed to herself and her daughters Plaintiff, Nancy D. McCormick ("Nancy"), and Frances S. McCormick ("Frances"), in joint tenancy. On April 25, 1980, Frances conveyed her interest to the remaining joint tenants. On July 26, 1984, Nancy conveyed her interest to the remaining joint tenants. On March 19, 1986, Mary conveyed her interest via quitclaim deed to Plaintiff. Plaintiff gave nominal consideration for the conveyance. As of March 19, 1986, Plaintiff was the sole title holder of the Huff Road Property.¹

In 1984, Mary filed a second complaint of divorce against Edward. On August 3, 1987, the circuit court entered a default judgment of divorce. McCormick v. McCormick, No. 193967, 1997 WL 33344872, at *1 (Mich.Ct.App. Aug.1, 1997) (unpublished opinion). The circuit court found that the Henry Ruff Property was marital property to be divided between Mary and Edward. Mary appealed from the property provision of the divorce judgment.² Id. As a condition of the appeal, the circuit court issued an injunction which froze marital assets in certain bank accounts. Id.

On September 9, 1991, the Michigan court of appeals affirmed in part and reversed in part the circuit court's judgment of divorce between Mary and Edward. Specifically, the court of appeals reversed the circuit court's decision to distribute the Henry Ruff Property as marital property. The court of appeals found that the circuit court had failed to make any findings with respect to Mary's property interest, if any, in the Henry Ruff Property. The circuit court failed to even address whether the 1976 reconciliation agreement was valid. The court of appeals remanded the case to the circuit court to determine whether the 1976 reconciliation agreement and any of the subsequent transfers were valid, as there was a question of whether the transfers were part of a conspiracy to deprive Edward of his rightful marital property. The court of appeals also advised that third parties whose property rights might be affected, such as Plaintiff, "usually must be added to the action, and at a minimum, should have the opportunity to testify at trial. In most cases, third parties should also be represented by counsel." (J.A. at 38 (citation omitted).)

On October 24, 1992, before the remand had occurred, Edward died. McCormick, 1997 WL 33344872, at *1.

After Edward's death, Mary filed a motion to dismiss the post-appeal proceeding without notifying Edward's estate. Id. On March 15, 1993, Judge Gillis of the Wayne County Circuit Court dismissed the post-appeal proceeding and lifted the injunction on the marital bank accounts. Mary and Plaintiff subsequently withdrew money from those accounts.

Upon learning of the dismissal, Edward's estate moved for reinstatement of the post-appeal proceeding. On May 21, 1993, Judge Talbot of the Wayne County Circuit Court set aside the March 15, 1993 dismissal and reinstated the post-appeal proceeding, and he ordered the return of the money withdrawn from the marital bank accounts.³ Judge Talbot also transferred the case to the Wayne County Probate Court.

On February 16, 1994, Judge Mack of the Wayne County Probate Court entered an order of divorce between Mary and Edward.⁴ Judge Mack acted pursuant to the remand instructions of the September 9, 1991 order of the Michigan court of appeals. Judge Mack awarded the Henry Ruff Property to Edward's estate, on the grounds that Mary "refused to purge herself of the contempt of this Court, has willfully secreted assets of the marital estate, and has violated Orders of the Wayne County Circuit Court." (J.A. at 43.) Judge Mack did not base his decision on an analysis of the validity of the 1976 reconciliation agreement or any of the subsequent transfers.

In 1994, after the judgment of the probate court, Plaintiff filed a quiet title claim against Edward's estate with respect to the Henry Ruff Property. McCormick v. McCormick, No. 84-422014-DO, at 7 (Wayne County Circuit Court Jul. 13, 2004).⁵ The circuit court held that Plaintiff had no ownership interest in the Henry Ruff Property. Id. at 8. The circuit court found that the 1976 conveyance from Edward to Mary was void because it lacked consideration and because it was against public policy. Id. The circuit court found that the conveyances from Frances and Nancy to the joint tenants were void because the signatures on those deeds were forged. Id. The circuit court also found that the March 19, 1986 transfer from Mary to Plaintiff was void because it "was an attempt to conceal the marital assets from the divorce court and a violation of the injunctive orders against the transfer of marital property." Id. Both the Michigan court of appeals and the Michigan Supreme Court denied Plaintiff's appeal. Id. at Exhibit A.

On February 21, 1997, the Michigan court of appeals vacated the May 21, 1993 order to the extent it transferred the post-appeal proceeding to the probate court. McCormick v. McCormick, 221 Mich.App. 672, 562 N.W.2d 504, 508 (1997). The court of appeals also vacated the judgment of the probate court. Id. The court of appeals found that Judge Talbot could properly reinstate the post-appeal proceeding, as the marriage was dissolved and the divorce was final before Edward's death. Id. at 507. The court of appeals, however, found that Judge Talbot improperly transferred the case to the probate court. The remand instructions from the September 9, 1991 order of the court of appeals instructed the circuit court to determine the ownership interests in the Henry Ruff Property, but instead of following this instruction, the circuit court passed the case on to the probate court. Id. at 507-08. The court of appeals remanded the case to the circuit court with the instructions given in the September 9, 1991 order. Id. at 508-09. The court of appeals offered the following guidance:

[W]e note that [Mary's] continued refusal to answer questions about the funds she removed from bank accounts in violation of injunctive orders provides an equitable ground for granting judgment against her. Thus, the circuit court would be permitted to award [the Henry Ruff Property] to [Edward's] estate, subject to the property interest of ... Linda McCormick ....

Id. at 509.

On remand, the circuit court found that the Henry Ruff Property was the sole property of the Edward's estate, subject to a life estate for Mary, so long as Mary obeyed certain conditions, such as insuring the property in the name of Edward's estate. McCormick v. McCormick, No. 84-422014-DO, at 4 (Wayne County Circuit Court Sep. 10, 1999). The Michigan court of appeals affirmed the decision. McCormick v. Braverman, No. 222415, 2002 WL 1065641, at *1 (Mich.Ct.App. May 24, 2002) (unpublished opinion). On March 5, 2003, the Michigan Supreme Court affirmed the court of appeals decision with respect to the Henry Ruff Property, but it vacated other portions of the decision that have no bearing on the instant case. McCormick v. Braverman, 468 Mich. 858, 657 N.W.2d 118, 118 (2003). The supreme court then remanded the case to the circuit court to address those vacated portions. Id. Thus, after almost twenty years of...