Dawson v. Mahoney

• Citation: 451 F.3d 550
• Decision Date: 08 June 2006
• Docket Number: No. 06-99004.,06-99004.
• Parties: David Thomas DAWSON, Petitioner-Appellant, v. Michael MAHONEY, Warden, Respondent-Appellee.
• Court: United States Courts of Appeals. United States Court of Appeals (9th Circuit)

Page 550

451 F.3d 550

David Thomas DAWSON, Petitioner-Appellant, v. Michael MAHONEY, Warden, Respondent-Appellee.

No. 06-99004.

United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.

June 8, 2006.

William F. Hooks, Esq., Helena, MT, Katherine Lund Ross, Esq., Mukilteo, WA, for Petitioner-Appellant.

Pamela P. Collins, Mike Mcgrath, Esq., Office of the Montana Attorney General, Helena, MT, for Respondent-Appellee.

Before WILLIAM C. CANBY, JR., THOMAS G. NELSON, and ANDREW J. KLEINFELD, Circuit Judges.

ORDER

Montana state prisoner David Thomas Dawson was convicted and sentenced to death in 1987 for three counts of deliberate homicide. In 2004, Mr. Dawson moved to discharge his federal habeas counsel, to waive further habeas proceedings, and for the appointment of an independent expert to determine his competency. The federal district court appointed two independent mental health experts to evaluate Mr. Dawson and ordered the parties to provide all relevant materials to those experts. After considering the experts' reports, the federal district court found that Mr. Dawson is competent to waive further proceedings and has made that decision knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily. On December 12, 2005, the federal district court granted Mr. Dawson's motion to discharge his habeas counsel, Kathryn Ross and William Hooks, and granted his motion to waive further habeas proceedings. The federal district court later denied habeas counsel's motion for a certificate of appealability (COA).

On December 15, 2005, the Montana district court conducted a competency hearing at which Mr. Dawson appeared by video. After an extensive colloquy with Mr. Dawson, the Montana district court found that Mr. Dawson is competent and has a made a knowing, intelligent, and voluntary decision to waive further habeas proceedings. On April 11, 2006, the Montana Supreme Court granted Mr. Dawson's motion to dismiss counsel Ross and Hooks and granted Mr. Dawson's motion to dismiss all appeals. On May 15, 2006, the Montana district court set an execution date for August 11, 2006.¹

On December 27, 2005, habeas counsel filed a notice of appeal in federal district court. In this Court, habeas counsel filed "Habeas Counsels' Motion For Certificate of Appealability" (COA) and "Petitioner's, Through Habeas Counsel, Motion For Stay of Execution." Mr. Dawson opposes "former counsel's" COA and stay motions, as does Respondent.

An appeal may not be taken from the final order in a habeas corpus proceeding unless a COA is granted. See 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(1); see also 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2) (a COA may issue only if the applicant has made a substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right); Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 484, 120 S.Ct. 1595, 146 L.Ed.2d 542 (2000) (a substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right includes a showing that reasonable jurists could debate whether the petition should have been resolved in a different manner or that the issues presented were adequate to deserve encouragement to proceed further), citing Barefoot v. Estelle, 463 U.S. 880, 893 & n. 4, 103 S.Ct. 3383, 77 L.Ed.2d 1090 (1983).

Both the federal district court and the Montana state courts found Mr. Dawson competent and granted his motions to discharge habeas counsel Ross and Hooks. Habeas counsel do not contend that Mr. Dawson has a mental disorder or mental defect, nor do they dispute that Mr. Dawson has no history of mental illness.² Counsel, relying on Comer v. Stewart, 215 F.3d 910 (9th Cir.2000), argue instead that Mr. Dawson's decision to waive further proceedings is involuntary due to the combination of the harsh conditions on Montana's death row and his reaction to the suicides of two other inmates on death row. See Comer, 215 F.3d at 917 (in addition to competency, the district court must also determine the separate question of whether petitioner's decision is voluntary); see id. at 918 ("The issue is whether Mr. Comer's conditions of confinement constitute punishment so harsh that he has been forced to abandon a natural desire to live"). Mr. Dawson, however, in state and federal court has expressly disavowed these explanations for his decision to waive further habeas proceedings. See, e.g., December 15, 2005 Montana district court RT at 19-25. Because there is no suggestion that Mr. Dawson is not competent, the state court did not err in accepting Mr. Dawson's testimony that his decision to waive further proceedings is not based on intolerable prison conditions nor on the suicides of two inmates on death row.

Because there was not a shred of evidence proffered in federal district court or in the Montana state courts (or in this Court) that Mr. Dawson is not competent to discharge his counsel, no reasonable jurist would debate that the district court did not err...