Arizona v. Manypenny

• Decision Date: 21 April 1981
• Docket Number: No. 79-621,79-621
• Citation: 451 U.S. 232,68 L.Ed.2d 58,101 S.Ct. 1657
• Parties: State of ARIZONA, Petitioner, v. William Dale MANYPENNY
• Court: U.S. Supreme Court

451 U.S. 232

101 S.Ct. 1657

68 L.Ed.2d 58

State of ARIZONA, Petitioner,

v William Dale MANYPENNY.

No. 79-621.

Argued Nov. 10, 1980.

Decided April 21, 1981.

Rehearing Denied June 15, 1981.

See 452 U.S. 955, 101 S.Ct. 3100.

Syllabus

Respondent was indicted in an Arizona state court for the commission of a state crime. Because the charge arose from an act committed while he was on duty as a federal Border Patrol Agent, respondent, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1442(a)(1), removed the case to Federal District Court. After a jury trial, a guilty verdict was returned, but ultimately the District Court sua sponte concluded that respondent had a valid immunity defense and entered a judgment of acquittal. The State appealed, but the Court of Appeals dismissed the appeal for lack of jurisdiction, holding, inter alia, that a criminal proceeding removed to federal court under § 1442(a)(1) arises under federal law, and accordingly is controlled by that law. The court concluded that only Congress can authorize an appeal by a State in a § 1442(a)(1) criminal prosecution and that it had not done so. The court rejected the suggestion that Arizona's appeal was authorized by 28 U.S.C. § 1291, which confers jurisdiction on United States courts of appeals over appeals from all final decisions of federal district courts, except where a direct review may be had in the Supreme Court.

Held : In a criminal proceeding removed to federal court under § 1442(a)(1), a State may appeal under § 1291 from an adverse judgment if statutory authority to seek such review is conferred by state law. Thus, because Arizona law conferred such authority here, and because removal does not alter the nature of the authority conferred, the State must be allowed to appeal from the post-guilty-verdict judgment of acquittal. Pp. 239-250.

(a) Arizona statutes, as construed by Arizona courts, authorize the prosecution to seek review when it claims that the trial court has exceeded its jurisdiction or abused its discretion, as is the claim in this case. Pp. 239-240.

(b) Respondent, by obtaining a federal forum, fully vindicated the federal policies supporting removal—permitting a trial on the merits of the state-law question free from local interests or prejudice and enabling the defendant to have the validity of his immunity defense adjudicated in a federal forum. No further purpose of the removal statute would be served by denying the State a right to seek review when that very right is available under state law. On the contrary, it would be anomalous to conclude that the State's appellate rights were diminished solely because of the removal. Pp. 241-243.

(c) This Court's prior decisions restricting the availability of § 1291 and its predecessors when the Government seeks to appeal in a criminal case flow from a tradition of requiring that a prosecutorial appeal be affirmatively sanctioned by the same sovereign that sponsors the prosecution. The intention to restrict sovereign power in this area is adequately addressed when the legislature responsible for that power has spoken in express terms, or when a legislative enactment has been authoritatively construed by the sovereign's highest court. Section 1291 neither compels nor forecloses appellate jurisdiction in an appeal taken by a State as prosecutor. Instead, the provision permits a State to appeal if it is authorized to do so by state law. Arizona can rely on § 1291 combined with appellate authorization from the Arizona Legislature. In the circumstances of this case, no more is required. Pp. 244-249.

608 F.2d 1197, reversed and remanded.

Daniel Jesse Smith, Tucson, Ariz., for petitioner.

James D. Whitney, Tucson, Ariz., for respondent.

Justice BLACKMUN delivered the opinion of the Court.

Respondent, a federal officer, was charged in Arizona with the commission of a state crime. On the officer's motion, the case was removed from state court and tried in federal court. The issue presented is whether a federal appellate court has jurisdiction to entertain Arizona's appeal from the District Court's judgment of acquittal entered after a jury verdict of guilty.

I

A.

Respondent William Dale Manypenny had been employed for six years as a Border Patrol Agent in the United States Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS). On the moonlit evening of March 15, 1976, he and fellow Agent Gerald Wayne Hjelle were assigned to patrol the Sweetwater Pass, located on federal land in Pima County, Ariz., approximately 10 miles from the Mexican border.¹ INS officials knew that the Pass was frequently traveled by aliens illegally entering the United States. While patrolling the Pass, respondent and his colleague were expected to stop and question any person suspected of being an alien and to arrest that person if he could not produce a lawful entry permit.² Both agents wore plain clothes, as was customary for patrol work in that rugged desert area. Tr. 248-249, 293.

Three Mexican males were traveling north along the trail when respondent's electronic sensor system signaled their approach.³ Following standard procedure, Agent Hjelle stationed himself near where the path emerged from the canyon onto higher ground. Respondent took a position some 100 yards to the south, on a bluff overlooking but out of sight of the path. The plan called for Hjelle to stop any suspected illegal alien, identify himself, and conduct a brief inquiry to determine the suspect's status, while respondent approached from behind.

The three men emerged from the canyon and saw Hjelle, who ordered them to stop. Id., at 16-17, 283-284. Before, Hjelle could begin his questioning one of the men turned and ran back south toward the border. Respondent shouted after him to halt. Id., at 174. When the fleeing man failed to stop, respondent fired three shotgun blasts in his direction. One hit the fugitive in the buttocks, causing multiple wounds. Id., at 105-106. Another struck him in the upper spine, severing the cord and leaving him a quadriplegic. Id., at 87-88, 93.

B

Respondent was indicted in the Superior Court of Pima County, Ariz., for assault with a deadly weapon, in violation of Ariz.Rev.Stat.Ann. §§ 13-249 A and B (Supp. 1973).⁴ Because the charge arose from an act committed while on duty for the INS, respondent, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1442(a)(1),⁵ removed the case to the United States District Court for the District of Arizona. The case was tried before a jury, and a verdict of guilty was returned. Respondent then timely moved for arrest of judgment or, alternatively, for a new trial. See Fed.Rules Crim.Proc. 33 and 34.⁶ The District Court granted respondent's motion to arrest judgment and dismissed the indictment; it did so on the ground that the State could not assert its criminal jurisdiction over federal lands. 7 Record 7-8. The State immediately moved for reconsideration; the District Court also granted the State's motion and took the matter under advisement. App. 36-38.

Nine months later, the District Court vacated its previous order arresting judgment. 445 F.Supp. 1123 (1977). The court on reconsideration held that Arizona retained criminal jurisdiction over all land within its exterior boundaries.⁷ Having determined that it properly could exercise jurisdiction over Arizona's claim, the District Court then proceeded sua sponte to construe respondent's motion under Rule 34 as a motion for judgment of acquittal, pursuant to Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 29(c). Although an immunity defense had not been raised at trial, and the State had not introduced any evidence designed to overcome that defense, the court concluded that it had erred in failing to instruct the jury on such a defense. Relying on principles enunciated in In re Neagle, 135 U.S. 1, 75, 10 S.Ct. 658, 672, 34 L.Ed. 55 (1890), and Clifton v. Cox, 549 F.2d 722 (CA9 1977), the District Court reasoned that re- spondent would be immune from prosecution on a state criminal charge if he acted under color of federal law and in the honest belief that he acted under color of federal law and in the honest belief that his actions were necessary and proper for the execution of his federal duties. 445 F.Supp., at 1126-1127. The court applied this standard to the evidence adduced at trial, and concluded that a reasonable jury could not have found respondent guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. Id., at 1128. The presumed motion for acquittal was granted and the jury verdict was set aside.

Claiming that the trial court had exceeded its authority,⁸ the State filed a timely notice of appeal from the acquittal. It invoked the appellate court's jurisdiction under 18 U.S.C. § 3731.⁹ The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, by a brief per curiam, opinion citing Sanabria v. United States, 437 U.S. 54, 98 S.Ct. 2170, 57 L.Ed.2d 43 (1978), initially dismissed the appeal on double jeopardy grounds.¹⁰ Upon timely petition for rehearing, however, the Court of Appeals withdrew the opinion, App. to Pet. for Cert. 1a, and substituted another in its place. This time, by a divided vote, the court dismissed Arizona's appeal on the ground that jurisdiction was lacking. 608 F.2d 1197 (1979). It noted that under settled precedent of this Court, the Government may take an appeal from an adverse decision in a criminal case only if expressly authorized by statute to do so. United States v. Martin Linen Supply Co., 430 U.S. 564, 568, 97 S.Ct. 1349, 1352, 51 L.Ed.2d 642 (1977); United States v. Wilson, 420 U.S. 332, 336, 95 S.Ct. 1013, 1018, 43 L.Ed.2d 232 (1975); United States v. Sanges, 144 U.S. 310, 312, 318-323, 12 S.Ct. 609, 610, 612-613, 36 L.Ed. 445 (1892). Emphasizing the language of 18 U.S.C. § 3731, the court held that the statute authorizes an appeal only when the United States is the prosecutor, not when a state prosecution has been removed to federal court.

The Court of Appeals declined to consider whether state law provided Arizona with a right to appeal in this case. Instead, ...