State v. Morgan

• Decision Date: 17 October 2019
• Docket Number: Case No. S-2018-952
• Citation: 452 P.3d 434
• Parties: The STATE of Oklahoma, Appellant, v. John Glenn MORGAN, Appellee.
• Court: United States State Court of Criminal Appeals of Oklahoma. Court of Criminal Appeals of Oklahoma

452 P.3d 434

The STATE of Oklahoma, Appellant,

v.John Glenn MORGAN, Appellee.

Case No. S-2018-952

Court of Criminal Appeals of Oklahoma.

FILED OCTOBER 17, 2019

APPEARANCES IN DISTRICT COURT

RANDALL YOUNG, ASST. DISTRICT ATTORNEY, TULSA COUNTY, 500 S. DENVER, SUITE 900, TULSA, OK 74103, ATTORNEY FOR STATE.

MATTHEW HALL, ATTORNEY AT LAW, 2727 EAST 21^ST STREET, SUITE 600, TULSA, OK 74114, ATTORNEY FOR DEFENDANT.

APPEARANCES ON APPEAL

RANDALL YOUNG, ASST. DISTRICT ATTORNEY, TULSA COUNTY, 500 S. DENVER, SUITE 900, TULSA, OK 74103, ATTORNEY FOR STATE.

OPINION

ROWLAND, JUDGE:

¶1 The State of Oklahoma charged Appellee John Glenn Morgan by Misdemeanor Information in the District Court of Tulsa County, Case No. CM-2017-4166, with Possession of Controlled Drug (Count 1), in violation of 63 O.S.Supp.2017, § 2-402(A)(1), Unlawful Possession of Drug Paraphernalia (Count 2), in violation of 63 O.S.2011, § 2-405, and Unsafe Lane Change (Count 3), in violation of 47 O.S.Supp.2017, § 11-309. Morgan filed a motion to suppress all evidence seized from the warrantless search of his vehicle by the arresting officers during the traffic stop. After a hearing, the Honorable April Seibert, Special Judge, sustained Morgan's motion and dismissed Counts 1 and 2. The State announced its intent to appeal and timely filed the instant appeal of the district court's order, seeking review of four issues:

(1) whether the trial court failed to properly evaluate the durational requirements of the traffic stop;

(2) whether the trial court erred in failing to conclude that Morgan's consent to a search of his trailer altered the durational requirements of the stop;

(3) whether the trial court failed to recognize that the police were justified in holding Morgan beyond the initial traffic stop; and

(4) whether the trial court failed to recognize an independent source to hold Morgan.

¶2 We affirm the district court's order for the reasons discussed below.

BACKGROUND

¶3 On September 5, 2018, Owasso Police Officer Josua Goins was on patrol duty when he responded to a dispatch that a reckless driver of a semi-truck was northbound on Highway 169. Officer Goins located the semi-truck and observed it crossing the lane lines. Goins stopped the vehicle which was driven by John Glenn Morgan. During the course of the stop an officer from the canine unit walked a drug dog around the semi-truck. The dog alerted on the cab and a subsequent search revealed an eyeglass case in a bed rack that contained a substance that field tested positive for methamphetamine. A pipe was also found. Morgan was arrested.

¶4 Following a motion to suppress during which the trial judge heard evidence and watched video evidence of the entire encounter, the Court sustained the motion. Specifically, the Court held that once Goins had investigated the truck's swerving by speaking with the driver, administering field sobriety tests, and inspecting the inside of the trailer, further detention for the purpose of screening the vehicle with a drug dog was not supported by reasonable suspicion and therefore violated the Fourth Amendment.

DISCUSSION

¶5 The State challenges the district court's order granting Morgan's motion to suppress.¹ We exercise jurisdiction under 22 O.S.2011, § 1053(5)² because the State's ability to prosecute Morgan on the charges of unlawful possession of a controlled drug and unlawful possession of drug paraphernalia is substantially impaired absent the suppressed evidence, making review appropriate. See State v. Strawn , 2018 OK CR 2, ¶ 18, 419 P.3d 249, 253. In reviewing a district court's ruling on a motion to suppress evidence based on an allegation the search or seizure was illegal, we credit the district court's findings of fact unless they are clearly erroneous. State v. Alba , 2015 OK CR 2, ¶ 4, 341 P.3d 91, 92. "However, we review de novo the magistrate's legal conclusions drawn from those facts." State v. Nelson , 2015 OK CR 10, ¶ 11, 356 P.3d 1113, 1117.

PROPOSITION 1: THE TRIAL COURT FAILED TO PROPERLY EVALUATE THE DURATIONAL REQUIREMENT OF THE STOP.

¶6 Morgan had a right under both the United States and Oklahoma Constitutions to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures. U.S. Const. Amend. IV ; Okla. Const. Article II, Section 30. It is well-established that a traffic stop is a seizure under the Fourth Amendment. Strawn , 2018 OK CR 2, ¶ 21, 419 P.3d at 253 (citing McGaughey v. State , 2001 OK CR 33, ¶ 24, 37 P.3d 130, 136 ). The scope and duration of a traffic stop must be related to the stop and must last no longer than is necessary to effectuate the purpose of the stop (i.e., investigate the potential traffic infraction). Seabolt v. State , 2006 OK CR 50, ¶ 6, 152 P.3d 235, 237 (citing Florida v. Royer , 460 U.S. 491, 500, 103 S.Ct. 1319, 1325, 75 L.Ed.2d 229 (1983) ; Terry v. Ohio , 392 U.S. 1, 20, 88 S.Ct. 1868, 1879, 20 L.Ed.2d 889 (1968) ). "If the length of the investigative detention goes beyond the time necessary to reasonably effectuate the reason for the stop, the Fourth Amendment requires reasonable suspicion that the person stopped has committed, is committing or is about to commit a crime." Seabolt , 2006 OK CR 50, ¶ 6, 152 P.3d at 237-38.

¶7 The United States Supreme Court has held that "the tolerable duration of police inquiries in the traffic-stop context is determined by the seizure's ‘mission’—to address the traffic violation that warranted the stop and attend to related safety concerns." Rodriguez v. United States , 575 U.S. 348, 135 S.Ct. 1609, 1614, 191 L.Ed.2d 492 (2015) (internal citation omitted). "Authority for the seizure thus ends when tasks tied to the traffic infraction are—or reasonably should have been—completed." Id . Given the many variable circumstances associated with traffic stops, this Court has been unwilling to impose rigid time limitations on the duration of traffic stops. See Seabolt , 2006 OK CR 50, ¶ 9, 152 P.3d at 238.

¶8 In determining whether the scope and duration of the traffic stop was related to the violation and lasted no longer than was necessary to investigate the traffic violation, the trial court considered both Officer Goins' testimony at the hearing and the lapel camera video recording of the stop. The video recording showed that Officer Goins stopped the semi-truck and made contact with Morgan at 6:21 p.m. He asked for, and received, Morgan's driver's license and proof of insurance. Officer Goins asked Morgan to step outside the vehicle and wait for him on the side of the road. By 6:23 p.m., Officer Goins was back in his patrol car. He requested a drug dog as well as a trooper to deal with the log book and size and weights because Morgan had admitted his log book was not properly filled out. When Officer Goins was finished with the computer check he waited in his patrol car for the backup officer to arrive. A backup officer arrived at 6:27 p.m. and he went with Officer Goins to the front of the semi-truck where Officer Goins administered sobriety tests on Morgan from 6:30 p.m. to 6:32 p.m. After this Officer Goins asked Morgan if he would open the back of the trailer and Morgan indicated he would do so. At 6:33 p.m., while they were walking to the back of the trailer, the backup officer told Goins that no troopers were available to come check the log book and Goins is heard to reply, "Hah, it's his lucky day." Morgan opened the trailer at 6:33 p.m. and Goins looked at the load. After the officers had examined the load and the back doors were closed, the canine unit officer, who had arrived earlier with the drug dog, brought it to the semi-truck and walked it around the vehicle. The dog alerted on the cab of the semi-truck at 6:38 p.m. This was seventeen minutes after the initial stop. Officer Goins had still not written a citation at this point.

¶9 Upon considering Officer Goins' testimony and especially the video of the lapel camera,³ the trial court found that after Goins administered the sobriety tests and checked the load in the back of the trailer he should have expeditiously issued a citation or a warning and allowed Morgan to leave. Instead, Officer Goins told Morgan that he was being detained longer because of the issue with his log book. This clearly was not the case. Officer Goins was, as the trial court noted, offering an excuse to detain Morgan longer so a drug dog could be walked around the truck.⁴ This case illustrates why simply using a stopwatch to time the length of detention in these cases is not dispositive. The seventeen minute detention prior to the dog alert may be reasonable in other cases, but here, at the point in time the dog handler commenced his work, there simply was not reasonable suspicion of drug activity to justify that continued detention. The district court found the situation similar to that in Seabolt where no circumstances existed to justify the extended detention. That ruling sustaining the motion to suppress is supported by the record and was not an abuse of discretion.

PROPOSITION 2: THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO CONCLUDE THAT MORGAN'S CONSENT TO A SEARCH OF HIS TRAILER ALTERED THE DURATIONAL REQUIREMENTS OF THE STOP.

¶10 The record reflects that Officer Goins asked Morgan for consent to search the back of the trailer and that Morgan opened the trailer for the officers to inspect the load. The State complains that consent to search during a traffic stop gives the police more to investigate but with less time to do so. It asks this Court to expand the length of time the police have to conduct traffic stops where consent to search is given. The State also argues that the trial court erred in failing to account for the time necessary to conduct the search when assessing the duration of the traffic stop.

¶11 Again, given the many variable circumstances associated with traffic stops, we decline to impose rigid time limitations on the duration of traffic stops. See Seabolt , 2006 OK CR 50, ¶ 9, 152 P.3d at 238. In the present case, the time the officers spent inspecting...