452 U.S. 490 (1981), 79-1429, American Textile Mfrs. Inst., Inc. v. Donovan

Docket NºNo. 79-1429
Citation452 U.S. 490, 101 S.Ct. 2478, 69 L.Ed.2d 185
Party NameAmerican Textile Mfrs. Inst., Inc. v. Donovan
Case DateJune 17, 1981
CourtUnited States Supreme Court

Page 490

452 U.S. 490 (1981)

101 S.Ct. 2478, 69 L.Ed.2d 185

American Textile Mfrs. Inst., Inc.

v.

Donovan

No. 79-1429

United States Supreme Court

June 17, 1981

Argued January 21, 1981

CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

Syllabus

Section 6(b)(5) of the Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970 (Act) requires the Secretary of Labor (Secretary), in promulgating occupational safety and health standards dealing with toxic materials or harmful physical agents, to set the standard "which most adequately assures, to the extent feasible, on the basis of the best available evidence" that no employee will suffer material impairment of health. Section 3(8) of the Act defines the term "occupational safety and health standard" as meaning a standard which requires conditions, or the adoption or use of practices, means, methods, operations, or processes, "reasonably necessary or appropriate" to provide safe or healthful employment and places of employment. Section 6(f) of the Act provides that the Secretary's determinations "shall be conclusive if supported by substantial evidence in the record considered as a whole." The Secretary, acting through the Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA), promulgated the so-called Cotton Dust Standard limiting occupational exposure to cotton dust (an airborne particle byproduct of the preparation and manufacture of cotton products), exposure to which induces byssinosis, a serious and potentially disabling respiratory disease known in its more severe manifestations as "brown lung" disease. Estimates indicate that at least 35,000 employed and retired cotton mill workers, or 1 in 12, suffer from the most disabling form of byssinosis, and 100,000 employed and retired workers suffer from some form of the disease. The Standard sets permissible exposure levels to cotton dust for the different operations in the cotton industry. Implementation of the Standard depends primarily on a mix of engineering controls, such as installation of ventilation systems, and work practice controls, such as special floor-sweeping procedures. During the 4-year interim period permitted for full compliance with the Standard, employers are required to provide respirators to employees and to transfer employees

Page 491

unable to wear respirators to another position, if available, having a dust level that meets the Standard's permissible exposure limit, with no loss of earnings or other employment rights or benefits. OSHA estimated the total industrywide cost of compliance as $656.5 million. Petitioners, representing the cotton industry, challenged the validity of the Standard in the Court of Appeals, contending, inter alia, that the Act requires OSHA to demonstrate that the Standard reflects a reasonable relationship between the costs and benefits associated with the Standard, that OSHA's determination of the Standard's "economic feasibility" was not supported by substantial evidence, and that the wage guarantee requirement was beyond OSHA's authority. The Court of Appeals upheld the Standard in all major respects. It held that the Act did not require OSHA to compare costs and benefits; that Congress itself balanced the costs and benefits in its mandate to OSHA under § 6(b)(5) to adopt the most protective feasible standard; and that OSHA's determination of economic feasibility was supported by substantial evidence in the record as a whole. The court also held that OSHA had authority to require employers to guarantee employees' wage and employment benefits following transfer because of inability to wear a respirator.

Held:

1. Cost-benefit analysis by OSHA in promulgating a standard under 6(b)(5) is not required by the Act because feasibility analysis is. Pp. 506-522.

(a) The plain meaning of the word "feasible" is "capable of being done," and, thus, § 6(b)(5) directs the Secretary to issue the standard that most adequately assures that no employee will suffer material impairment of health, limited only by the extent to which this is "capable of being done." In effect then, as the Court of Appeals held, Congress itself defined the basic relationship between costs and benefits by placing the "benefit" of the worker's health above all other considerations save those making attainment of this "benefit" unachievable. Any standard based on a balancing of costs and benefits by the Secretary that strikes a different balance than that struck by Congress would be inconsistent with the command set forth in § 6(b)(5). Pp. 508-512.

(b) Section 3(8), either alone or in tandem with § 6(b)(5), does not incorporate a cost-benefit requirement for standards dealing with toxic materials or harmful physical agents. Even if the phrase "reasonably necessary or appropriate" in § 3(8) might be construed to contemplate some balancing of costs and benefits, Congress specifically chose in § 6(b)(5) to impose separate and additional requirements for issuance of standards dealing with such materials and agents: it required that those standards be issued to prevent material health impairment

Page 492

to the extent feasible. To interpret § 3(8) as imposing an additional and overriding cost-benefit analysis requirement on the issuance of § 6(b)(5) standards would eviscerate § 6(b)(5)'s "to the extent feasible" requirement. Pp. 512-513.

(c) The Act's legislative history supports the conclusion that Congress itself, in § 6(b)(5), balanced the costs and benefits. There is no indication whatsoever that Congress intended OSHA to conduct its own cost-benefit analysis before promulgating a "toxic material" or "harmful physical agent" standard. Rather, not only does the history confirm that Congress meant "feasible," rather than "cost-benefit," when it used the former term, but it also shows that Congress understood that the Act would create substantial costs for employers, yet intended to impose such costs when necessary to create a safe and healthful working environment. Pp. 514-522.

2. Whether or not, in the first instance, this Court would find OSHA's findings supported by substantial evidence, it cannot be said that the Court of Appeals, on the basis of the whole record, "misapprehended or grossly misapplied" the substantial evidence test when it upheld such findings. Pp. 522-536.

3. Whether or not OSHA has the underlying authority to promulgate a wage guarantee requirement with respect to employees who are transferred to another position when they are unable to wear a respirator, OSHA failed to make the necessary determination or statement of reasons that this requirement was related to achievement of health and safety goals. Pp. 536-540.

199 U.S. App.D.C. 54, 617 F.2d 636, affirmed in part, vacated in part, and remanded.

BRENNAN, .J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which WHITE, MARSHALL, BLACKMUN, and STEVENS, JJ., joined. STEWART, J., filed a dissenting opinion, post p 541. REHNQUIST, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which BURGER, C.J., joined, post, p. 543. POWELL, J., took no part in the decision of the cases.

Page 493

BRENNAN, J., lead opinion

JUSTICE BRENNAN delivered the opinion of the Court.

Congress enacted the Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970 (Act) "to assure so far as possible every working man and woman in the Nation safe and healthful working conditions. . . ." § 2(b), 84 Stat. 1590, 29 U.S.C. § 651(b). The Act authorizes the Secretary of Labor to establish, after notice and opportunity to comment, mandatory nationwide standards governing health and safety in the workplace. 29 U.S.C. §§ 655(a), (b). In 1978, the Secretary, acting through the Occupational Safety and Health Administration

Page 494

(OSHA,)1 [101 S.Ct. 2483] promulgated a standard limiting occupational exposure to cotton dust, an airborne particle byproduct of the preparation and manufacture of cotton products, exposure to which induces a "constellation of respiratory effects" known as "byssinosis." 43 Fed.Reg. 27352, col. 3 (1978). This disease was one of the expressly recognized health hazards that led to passage of the Act. S.Rep. No. 91-1282, p. 3 (1970), Legislative History of the Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970, p. 143 (Comm. Print 1971) (Leg.Hist.).

Petitioners in these consolidated cases, representing the interests of the cotton industry,2 challenged the validity of the "Cotton Dust Standard" in the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit pursuant to § 6(f) of the Act, 29 U.S.C. § 65(f). They contend in this Court, as they did below, that the Act requires OSHA to demonstrate that its Standard reflects a reasonable relationship between the costs and benefits associated with the Standard. Respondents, the Secretary of Labor and two labor organizations,3 counter that Congress balanced the costs and benefits in the Act itself, and that the Act should therefore be construed not to require

Page 495

OSHA to do so. They interpret the Act as mandating that OSHA enact the most protective standard possible to eliminate a significant risk of material health impairment, subject to the constraints of economic and technological feasibility. The Court of Appeals held that the Act did not require OSHA to compare costs and benefits. AFL-CIO v. Marshall, 199 U.S.App.D.C. 54, 617 F.2d 636 [101 S.Ct. 2479] (1979). We granted certiorari, 449 U.S. 817 (1980), to resolve this important question, which was presented but not decided in last Term's Industrial Union Dept. v. American Petroleum Institute, 448 U.S. 607 (1980),4 and to decide other issues related to the Cotton Dust Standard.5

I

Byssinosis, known in its more severe manifestations as "brown lung" disease, is a serious and potentially disabling respiratory disease primarily caused by the inhalation of cotton dust.6 See 43 Fed.Reg. 27352-27354 (1978); Exhibit

Page 496

6-16, App. 15-22.7 Byssinosis is a "continuum . . . disease," 43 Fed.Reg. 27354, col....

To continue reading

Request your trial
132 practice notes
  • Lowering Miners' Exposure to Respirable Coal Mine Dust, Including Continuous Personal Dust Monitors
    • United States
    • Federal Register May 01, 2014
    • May 1, 2014
    ...and Secretary of Labor, 476 F.3d 946, 957 (D.C. Cir. 2007) (citing American Textile Mfrs. Inst. v. Secretary of Labor (OSHA Cotton Dust), 452 U.S. 490, 508-09 (1981)). In order for an agency's rules to be deemed feasible, the agency must establish ``a reasonable possibility that the typical......
  • Part II
    • United States
    • Federal Register October 04, 2004
    • October 4, 2004
    ...technology, or can be created with technology that can reasonably be expected to be developed. American Textile Mfrs. Institute v. OSHA, 452 U.S. 490, 513 (1981)(``ATMI'') American Iron and Steel Institute v. OSHA, 939 F.2d 975, 980 (D.C. Cir. A standard is economically feasible if industry......
  • Part III
    • United States
    • Federal Register April 13, 2007
    • April 13, 2007
    ...technology, or can be created with technology that can reasonably be expected to be developed. American Textile Mfrs. Institute v. OSHA, 452 U.S. 490, 513 (1981) (ATMI); American Iron and Steel Institute v. OSHA, 939 F.2d 975, 980 (D.C. Cir. 1991) A standard is economically feasible if indu......
  • Revising the Beryllium Standard for General Industry
    • United States
    • Federal Register December 11, 2018
    • December 11, 2018
    ...(D.C. Cir. 1980) (``Lead I''). The Supreme Court has defined feasibility as ``capable of being done.'' Am. Textile Mfrs. Inst. v. Donovan, 452 U.S. 490, 509-10 (1981) (``Cotton Dust''). The courts have further clarified that a standard is technologically feasible if OSHA proves a reasonable......
  • Request a trial to view additional results
1 firm's commentaries
43 books & journal articles
49 provisions
  • Chemical Management and Permissible Exposure Limits (PELs)
    • United States
    • Federal Register October 10, 2014
    • October 10, 2014
    ...relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.'' American Textile Mfrs. Inst., Inc. v. Donovan, 452 U.S. 490, 522 (1981; Ex. #15) (quoting Universal Camera Corp. v. NLRB, 340 U.S. 474, 477 (1951); Ex. #16). The substantial evidence test does not req......
  • COVID-19 Vaccination and Testing; Emergency Temporary Standard
    • United States
    • Occupational Safety And Health Administration
    • Invalid date
    ...under section 3(8) and, by inference, ``necessary'' under section 6(c)(1)(B) of the Act. Cf. Am. Textile Mfrs. Inst., Inc. v. Donovan, 452 U.S. 490, 513 n.31 (1981) (noting ``any standard that was not economically or technologically feasible would a fortiori not be `reasonably necessary or ......
  • Part II
    • United States
    • Federal Register August 24, 2006
    • August 24, 2006
    ...be developed using technology that can reasonably be expected to be available (see American Textile Mfrs. Institute v. OSHA (Cotton Dust), 452 U.S. 490, 513 (1981); American Iron and Steel Institute v. OSHA (Lead II), 939 F.2d 975, 980 (DC Cir. 1991)). A standard is economically feasible wh......
  • Hazard Communication
    • United States
    • Federal Register March 26, 2012
    • March 26, 2012
    ...above all other considerations save those making attainment of this `benefit' unachievable.'' Am. Textile Mfrs. Inst. Inc. v. Donovan, 452 U.S. 490, 509 (1981) (``Cotton Dust''). Where, however, there are two equally effective methods of reducing significant risk to the most protective feas......
  • Request a trial to view additional results

VLEX uses login cookies to provide you with a better browsing experience. If you click on 'Accept' or continue browsing this site we consider that you accept our cookie policy. ACCEPT