Schad v. Borough of Mount Ephraim

Decision Date01 June 1981
Docket NumberNo. 79-1640,79-1640
Citation101 S.Ct. 2176,68 L.Ed.2d 671,452 U.S. 61
PartiesJames F. SCHAD et al., Appellants, v. BOROUGH OF MOUNT EPHRAIM
CourtU.S. Supreme Court
Syllabus

Appellants operate an adult bookstore in the commercial zone of appellee borough, and the store contains licensed coin-operated devices that display adult films. When appellants added a coin-operated mechanism permitting a customer to watch a usually nude live dancer, complaints were filed against them charging that the exhibition of live dancing violated an ordinance that restricted uses permitted in a commercial zone, and they were convicted. Rejecting appellants' defense based on the First and Fourteenth Amendments, the trial court, while recognizing that live nude dancing is protected by the First Amendment, held that First Amendment guarantees were not involved, since the case involved solely a zoning ordinance under which live entertainment, whether a nude dance or some other form of live presentation, was not a permitted use in any establishment in the borough. The Appellate Division of the New Jersey Superior Court affirmed, and the New Jersey Supreme Court denied further review.

Held : Appellants' convictions are invalid under the First and Fourteenth Amendments for appellee failed to justify the exclusion of live entertainment from the broad range of commercial uses permitted in the borough. Pp. 65-77.

(a) The ordinance in question, as construed by the New Jersey courts to exclude live entertainment, including nude dancing, throughout the borough, prohibits a wide range of expression that has long been held to be within the protection of the First and Fourteenth Amendments. An entertainment program may not be prohibited solely because it displays a nude human figure, and nude dancing is not without its First Amendment protection from official regulation. P. 65-66.

(b) The First Amendment requires sufficient justification for the exclusion of a broad category of protected expression from the permitted commercial uses, and none of appellee's asserted justifications withstands scrutiny. Its asserted justification that permitting live entertainment would conflict with its plan to create a commercial area catering only to the residents' "immediate needs," is patently insufficient. As to its asserted justification that live entertainment may be selectively excluded from the permitted commercial uses to avoid problems associated with live entertainment, such as parking, trash, police protection and medical facilities, appellee has presented no evidence that live entertainment poses problems of this nature more significant than those associated with various permitted uses, or that its interests could not be met by restrictions that are less intrusive on protected forms of expression. And as to the claimed justification that the ordinance in question is a reasonable "time, place, and manner" restriction, appellee does not identify its interests making it reasonable to exclude all live entertainment but to allow a variety of other commercial uses, and has presented no evidence that live entertainment is incompatible with the permitted uses. Pp. 67-77.

Reversed and remanded.

Argued by Robert E. Levy, Ocean, N. J., for appellants.

Arnold N. Fishman, Camden, N. J., for appellee.

Justice WHITE delivered the opinion of the Court.

In 1973, appellants began operating an adult bookstore in the commercial zone in the Borough of Mount Ephraim in Camden County, N. J. The store sold adult books, magazines, and films. Amusement licenses shortly issued permitting the store to install coin-operated devices by virtue of which a customer could sit in a booth, insert a coin, and watch an adult film. In 1976, the store introduced an additional coin-operated mechanism permitting the customer to watch a live dancer, usually nude, performing behind a glass panel. Complaints were soon filed against appellants charging that the bookstore's exhibition of live dancing violated § 99-15B of Mount Ephraim's zoning ordinance, which described the permitted uses in a commercial zone,1 in which the store was located, as follows:

"B. Principal permitted uses on the land and in buildings.

"(1) Offices and banks; taverns; restaurants and luncheonettes for sit-down dinners only and with no drive-in facilities; automobile sales; retail stores, such as but not limited to food, wearing apparel, millinery, fabrics, hardware, lumber, jewelry, paint, wallpaper, appliances, flowers, gifts, books, stationery, pharmacy, liquors, cleaners, novelties, hobbies and toys; repair shops for shoes, jewels, clothes and appliances; barbershops and beauty salons; cleaners and laundries; pet stores; and nurseries. Offices may, in addition, be permitted to a group of four (4) stores or more without additional parking, provided the offices do not exceed the equivalent of twenty percent (20%) of the gross floor area of the stores.

"(2) Motels." Mount Ephraim Code § 99-15B(1), (2) (1979).2 Section 99-4 of the Borough's code provided that "[a]ll uses not expressly permitted in this chapter are prohibited."

Appellants were found guilty in the Municipal Court and fines were imposed. Appeal was taken to the Camden County Court, where a trial de novo was held on the record made in the Municipal Court and appellants were again found guilty. The County Court first rejected appellants' claim that the ordinance was being selectively and improperly enforced against them because other establishments offering live entertainment were permitted in the commercial zones.3 Those establishments, the court held, were permitted, nonconforming uses that had existed prior to the passage of the ordinance. In response to appellants' defense based on the First and Fourteenth Amendments, the court recognized that "live nude dancing is protected by the First Amendment" but was of the view that "First Amendment guarantees are not involved" since the case "involves solely a zoning ordinance" under which "[l]ive entertainment is simply not a permitted use in any establishment" whether the entertainment is a nude dance or some other form of live presentation. App. to Juris. Statement 8a, 12a. Reliance was placed on the statement in Young v. American Mini Theatres, Inc., 427 U.S. 50, 62, 96 S.Ct. 2440, 2448, 49 L.Ed.2d 310 (1976), that "[t]he mere fact that the commercial exploitation of material protected by the First Amendment is subject to zoning and other licensing requirements is not a sufficient reason for invalidating these ordinances." The Appellate Division of the Superior Court of New Jersey affirmed appellants' convictions in a per curiam opinion "essentially for the reasons" given by the County Court. App. to Juris. Statement 14a. The Supreme Court of New Jersey denied further review, 82 N.J. 287, 412 A.2d 793. Id., at 17a, 18a.

Appellants appealed to this Court. Their principal claim is that the imposition of criminal penalties under an ordinance prohibiting all live entertainment, including nonobscene, nude dancing, violated their rights of free expression guaranteed by the First and Fourteenth Amendments of the United States Constitution.4 We noted probable jurisdiction, 449 U.S. 897, 101 S.Ct. 264, 66 L.Ed.2d 127 (1980) and now set aside appellants' convictions.

I

As the Mount Ephraim Code has been construed by the New Jersey courts—a construction that is binding upon us"live entertainment," including nude dancing, is "not a permitted use in any establishment" in the Borough of Mount Ephraim. App. to Juris. Statement 12a. By excluding live entertainment throughout the Borough, the Mount Ephraim ordinance prohibits a wide range of expression that has long been held to be within the protections of the First and Fourteenth Amendments. Entertainment, as well as political and ideological speech, is protected; motion pictures, programs broadcast by radio and television, and live entertainment, such as musical and dramatic works fall within the First Amendment guarantee. Joseph Burstyn, Inc. v. Wilson, 343 U.S. 495, 72 S.Ct. 777, 96 L.Ed. 1098 (1952); Schacht v. United States, 398 U.S. 58, 90 S.Ct. 1555, 26 L.Ed.2d 44 (1970); Jenkins v. Georgia, 418 U.S. 153, 94 S.Ct. 2750, 41 L.Ed.2d 642 (1974); Southeastern Promotions, Ltd. v. Conrad, 420 U.S. 546, 95 S.Ct. 1239, 43 L.Ed.2d 448 (1975); Erznoznik v. City of Jacksonville, 422 U.S. 205, 95 S.Ct. 2268, 45 L.Ed.2d 125 (1975); Doran v. Salem Inn, Inc., 422 U.S. 922, 95 S.Ct. 2561, 45 L.Ed.2d 648 (1975). See also California v. LaRue, 409 U.S. 109, 118, 93 S.Ct. 390, 397, 34 L.Ed.2d 342 (1972); Young v. American Mini Theatres, Inc., supra, at 61, 62, 96 S.Ct., at 2447-2448. Nor may an entertainment program be prohibited solely because it displays the nude human figure. "[N]udity alone" does not place otherwise protected material outside the mantle of the First Amendment. Jenkins v. Georgia, supra, 418 U.S., at 161, 94 S.Ct., at 2755. Southeastern Promotions, Ltd. v. Conrad, supra; Erznoznik v. City of Jacksonville, supra, 422 U.S., at 211-212, 213, 95 S.Ct., at 2274. Furthermore, as the state courts in this case recognized, nude dancing is not without its First Amendment protections from official regulation. Doran v. Salem, Inn, Inc., supra; Southeastern Promotions, Ltd. v. Conrad, supra; California v. LaRue, supra.

Whatever First Amendment protection should be extended to nude dancing, live or on film, however, the Mount Ephraim ordinance prohibits all live entertainment in the Borough: no property in the Borough may be principally used for the commercial production of plays, concerts, musicals, dance, or any other form of live entertainment.5 Because appellants' claims are rooted in the First Amendment, they are entitled to rely on the impact of the ordinance on the expressive activities of others as well as their own. "Because overbroad laws, like vague ones, deter privileged activit[ies], our cases firmly establish appellant's standing to raise an...

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