Lehman v. Nakshian

Decision Date26 June 1981
Docket NumberNo. 81-242,81-242
PartiesJohn F. LEHMAN, Secretary of the Navy, Petitioner, v. Alice NAKSHIAN
CourtU.S. Supreme Court
Syllabus

The Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967 (ADEA or Act) was amended in 1974 to extend to federal employees the Act's protection of older workers against discrimination in the workplace based on age. Section 15(c) of the Act provides that any aggrieved federal employee "may bring a civil action in any Federal district court of competent jurisdiction for such legal or equitable relief as will effectuate the purposes" of the Act. Respondent federal employee brought suit in Federal District Court against the Secretary of the Navy under § 15(c), alleging violations of the Act and demanding a jury trial. The District Court ruled, over the Secretary's objection, that respondent was entitled to a jury trial. On an interlocutory appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed.

Held : Respondent was not entitled to a jury trial. Pp. 160-169.

(a) Where Congress waives the Government's immunity from suit, as it has in the ADEA, the plaintiff has a right to a trial by jury only where Congress has affirmatively and unambiguously granted that right by statute. Pp. 160-161.

(b) Congress has not done so here. Neither the provision in § 15(c) for federal employer cases to be brought in Federal district courts rather than the Court of Claims, nor the use of the word "legal" in that section, evinces a congressional intent that ADEA plaintiffs who proceed to trial against the Federal Government may do so before a jury. Lorillard v. Pons, 434 U.S. 575, 98 S.Ct. 866, 55 L.Ed.2d 40, distinguished. Section 15(c) contrasts with § 7(c) of the Act, which expressly provides for jury trials in actions against private employers and state and local governments. Moreover, in extending the Act to cover federal employees, Congress based the provision not on the Fair Labor Standards Act as was § 7, but on Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, where, unlike the FLSA, there was no right to trial by jury. Pp. 162-165.

(c) The legislative history no more supports a holding that respondent has a right to a jury trial than does the statutory language itself. Pp. 165-168.

202 U.S.App.D.C. 59, 628 F.2d 59, reversed.

Edwin S. Kneedler, Washington, D.C., for petitioner.

Patricia J. Barry, Washington, D.C., for respondent.

Justice STEWART delivered the opinion of the Court.

The question presented by this case is whether a plaintiff in an action against the United States under § 15(c) of the Age Discrimination in Employment Act is entitled to trial by jury.

I

The 1974 amendments to the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967 1 added a new § 15,2 which brought the Federal Government within the scope of the Act for the first time. Section 15(a)3 prohibits the Federal Government from discrimination based on age in most of its civilian employment decisions concerning persons over 40 years of age. Section 15(b)4 provides that enforcement of § 15(a) in most agencies, including military departments, is the responsibility of the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission. The Commission is directed to "issue such rules, regulations, orders and instructions as [the Commission] deems necessary and appropriate" to carry out that responsibility. Section 15(c)5 provides:

"Any person aggrieved may bring a civil action in any Federal district court of competent jurisdiction for such legal or equitable relief as will effectuate the purposes of this Act." 88 Stat. 75.

In 1978, respondent Alice Nakshian, who was then a 62-year-old civilian employee of the United States Department of the Navy, brought an age discrimination suit against the Navy under § 15(c). She requested a jury trial. The defendant moved to strike the request, and the District Court denied the motion. Nakshian v. Claytor, 481 F.Supp. 159 (DC). The court stressed that the "legal or equitable relief" language used by Congress to establish a right to sue the Federal Government for age discrimination was identical to the language Congress had previously used in § 7(c) of the Act 6 to authorize private ADEA suits. That language the District Court said, was an important basis for this Court's holding in Lorillard v. Pons, 434 U.S. 575, 98 S.Ct. 866, 55 L.Ed.2d 40, that § 7(c) permits jury trials in private suits under the Act. The court stated that "if Congress had intended its consent to ADEA suits [against the Government] to be limited to non-jury trials, it could have easily said as much." 481 F.Supp., at 161. Recognizing that as a result of 1978 amendments to the ADEA § 7(c)(2) expressly confers a right to jury trial, whereas no such language exists in § 15,7 481 F.Supp., at 161, the court found no "explicit refusal" by Congress to grant the right to jury trial against the Government, and noted that the legislative history of the 1978 amendments spoke in general terms about a right to jury trial in ADEA suits.

On interlocutory appeal under 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b), a divided panel of the Court of Appeals affirmed, Nakshian v. Claytor, 202 U.S.App.D.C. 59, 628 F.2d 59. The appellate court rejected the Secretary's argument that a plaintiff is entitled to trial by jury in a suit against the United States only when such a trial has been expressly authorized. Instead, the court viewed the question as "an ordinary question of statutory interpretation," and found sufficient evidence of legislative intent to provide for trial by jury in cases such as this. Noting that Congress had conferred jurisdiction over ADEA suits upon the federal district courts, rather than the Court of Claims, the Court of Appeals concluded that " 'absent a provision as to the method of trial, a grant of jurisdiction to a district court as a court of law carries with it a right of jury trial.' " Id., at 63, 628 F.2d, at 63 (quoting 5 J. Moore, J. Lucas, & J. Wicker, Moore's Federal Practice ¶ 38.32[2], p. 38-236 (1979) (footnotes omitted). The Court of Appeals also adopted the District Court's view of the "legal . . . relief" language in § 15(c). Further, it was the court's view that the existence of the explicit statutory right to jury trial in suits against private employers does not negate the existence of a right to jury trial in suits against the Government, since the provision for jury trials in private suits was added only to resolve a conflict in the Court of Appeals on that issue and to confirm the correctness of this Court's decision in the Lorillard case.

We granted certiorari to consider the issue presented. Sub nom. Hidalgo v. Nakshian, 449 U.S. 1009, 101 S.Ct. 563, 66 L.Ed.2d 467.

II

It has long been settled that the Seventh Amendment right to trial by jury does not apply in actions against the Federal Government. In Galloway v. United States, 319 U.S. 372, 388-389, 63 S.Ct. 1077, 1086, 87 L.Ed. 1458, the Court observed (footnotes omitted):

"The suit is one to enforce a monetary claim against the United States. It hardly can be maintained that under the common law in 1791 jury trial was a matter of right for persons asserting claims against the sovereign. Whatever force the Amendment has therefore is derived because Congress, in the legislation cited, has made it applicable."

See also Glidden Co. v. Zdanok, 370 U.S. 530, 572, 82 S.Ct. 1459, 1484, 8 L.Ed.2d 671, McElrath v. United States, 102 U.S. 426, 440, 26 L.Ed. 189. Moreover, the Court has recognized the general principle that "the United States, as sovereign, 'is immune from suit save as it consents to be sued . . . and the terms of its consent to be sued in any court define that court's jurisdiction to entertain the suit.' " United States v. Testan, 424 U.S. 392, 399, 96 S.Ct. 948, 953, 47 L.Ed.2d 114; quoting United States v. Sherwood, 312 U.S. 584, 586, 61 S.Ct. 767, 769, 85 L.Ed. 1058. See also United States v. Mitchell, 445 U.S. 535, 538, 100 S.Ct. 1349, 1352, 63 L.Ed.2d 607. Thus, if Congress waives the Government's immunity from suit, as it has in the ADEA, 29 U.S.C. § 633a (1976 ed. and Supp. III), the plaintiff has a right to a trial by jury only where that right is one of "the terms of [the Government's] consent to be sued." Testan, supra, at 399, 96 S.Ct., at 953. Like a waiver of immunity itself, which must be "unequivocally expressed." United States v. Mitchell, supra, at 538, 100 S.Ct., at 1352, quoting United States v. King, 395 U.S. 1, 4, 89 S.Ct. 1501, 1502, 23 L.Ed.2d 52, "this Court has long decided that limitations and conditions upon which the Government consents to be sued must be strictly observed and exceptions thereto are not to be implied." Soriano v. United States, 352 U.S. 270, 276, 77 S.Ct. 269, 273, 1 L.Ed.2d 306. See also United States v. Kubrick, 444 U.S. 111, 117-118, 100 S.Ct. 352, 357, 62 L.Ed.2d 259; United States v. Sherwood, supra, at 590-591, 61 S.Ct., at 771-772.

When Congress has waived the sovereign immunity of the United States, it has almost always conditioned that waiver upon a plaintiff's relinquishing any claim to a jury trial. Jury trials, for example, have not been made available in the Court of Claims for the broad range of cases within its jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1491i. e., all claims against the united stateS "foUnded either upon the Constitution, or any Act of Congress, . . . or upon any express or implied contract with the United States, or for liquidated or unliquidated damages in cases not sounding in tort." See Glidden Co., supra. And there is no jury trial right in this same range of cases when the federal district courts have concurrent jurisdiction. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1346(a)(2) and 2402. Finally, in tort actions against the United States, see 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b), Congress has similarly provided that trials shall be to the court without a jury. 28 U.S.C. § 2402.8 The appropriate inquiry, therefore, is whether Congress clearly and unequivocally departed from its usual practice in this area, and granted a...

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