United States Postal Service Board of Governors v. Aikens 1737, 80-

• Decision Date: 29 June 1981
• Docket Number: No. 80-,80-
• Parties: UNITED STATES POSTAL SERVICE BOARD OF GOVERNORS v. Louis H. AIKENS 1737
• Court: U.S. Supreme Court

453 U.S. 902

101 S.Ct. 3135

69 L.Ed.2d 989

UNITED STATES POSTAL SERVICE BOARD OF GOVERNORS

v Louis H. AIKENS

No. 80- 1737

Supreme Court of the United States

June 29, 1981

On petition for writ of certiorari to the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit.

The petition for writ of certiorari is granted. The judgment, 642 F.2d 514, is vacated and the case is remanded to the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit for further consideration in light of Texas Department of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 101 S.Ct. 1089, 67 L.Ed.2d 207 (1981).

Justice MARSHALL, with whom Justice BRENNAN joins, dissenting.

At the behest of the Government, the Court today summarily vacates a judgment of the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit and remands the case to that court for reconsideration in light of our decision earlier this Term in Texas Dept. of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 101 S.Ct. 1089, 67 L.Ed.2d 207 (1981). Because I regard this disposition as wholly inappropriate and unnecessary, I dissent.

Respondent Aikens is a retired Negro employee of the United States Postal Service. He filed this suit alleging that the Postal Service Board of Governors, petitioner here, had violated Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq., by discriminating against him because of his race with respect to the awarding of promotions and work details. The District Court, in dismissing the action, concluded that respondent had failed to establish a prima facie case of discrimination because he had not shown "that he was as qualified or more qualified than the individuals who were promoted." The Court of Appeals reversed, concluding that the District Court's ruling was "[p]lainly . . . a misstatement of applicable law." 206 U.S.App.D.C. 109, 114, 642 F.2d 514, 519 (1980). The panel noted that even the petitioner had conceded that the District Court had mischaracterized the showing necessary to establish a prima facie case under Title VII. Ibid. The court concluded that this Court's controlling decision in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 93 S.Ct. 1817, 36 L.Ed.2d 668 (1973), required that a Title VII plaintiff, as part of his prima facie case, show only that "he applied and was qualified for a job for which the employer was seeking applicants." Id., at 802, 93 S.Ct., at 1824¹. Accordingly, the case was remanded to the District Court for further proceedings under the appropriate standard.

The petitioner, ignoring its earlier concession of error by the District Court, now asks this Court to vacate the judgment of the Court of Appeals on the ground that it is "inconsistent" with this Court's decision in Texas Dept. of Community Affairs v. Burdine, supra. While the majority without explanation today accepts this suggestion, I find it untenable. Simply put, our decision in Texas Dept. of Community Affairs has almost nothing to do with the issue raised in this case. That decision involved "[t]he narrow question . . . whether, after the plaintiff has proved a prima facie case of discriminatory treatment, the burden shifts to the [employer] to persuade the court by a preponderance of the evidence that legitimate, nondiscriminatory reasons for the challenged employment action existed." 450 U.S., at 250, 101 S.Ct., at 1092 (emphasis added). The exclusive focus of the case was on the sort of showing a Title VII defendant must make to rebut a prima facie case of discrimination. The dispute here, in contrast, involves only the threshold issue whether a Title VII plaintiff, in order to establish a prima facie case of discrimination, must show that he was qualified for the sought-after position or, as the District Court ruled and the petitioner now suggests, that he was as qualified as, or more qualified than, the person selected by the employer. In resolving this entirely different question, the Court of Appeals correctly turned to our decision in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, supra, and concluded that the decision of the District Court was "plainly at odds" with the express language of that decision.

This conclusion, in my view, is unassailable. McDonnell Douglas requires a Title VII plaintiff as part of his prima facie case to show that he "was qualified for a job for which the employer was seeking applicants," 411 U.S., at 802, 93 S.Ct., at 1824. Nothing in that decision or subsequent ones by this Court supports the District Court's view, now embraced by the petitioner, that the plaintiff at this threshold stage must also show that he was as qualified as, or more qualified than, the selected applicant. Indeed, our decision in Texas Dept. of Community Affairs expressly reaffirmed the McDonnell Douglas formulation of the prima facie case, 450 U.S., at 253-254, n.6, 101 S.Ct., at 1094, n.6, and specifically noted that the respondent in that case had established this segment of the prima facie case by simply showing that she was "a qualified woman who sought an available position." Ibid. See also Furnco Construction Corp. v. Waters, 438 U.S. 567, 575-576, 98 S.Ct. 2943, 2948-2949, 57 L.Ed.2d 957 (1978).

In asserting that our decision in Texas Dept. of Community Affairs may have altered the McDonnell Douglas test of a prima facie case, the petitioner relies on the statement in Texas Dept. of Community Affairs that a prima facie case is established when an applicant is "rejected under circumstances which give rise to an inference of unlawful discrimination." 450 U.S., at 253, 101 S.Ct., at 1094. In the promotion context, the petitioner asserts, such an inference of unlawful conduct does not arise simply because a qualified applicant is rejected for a job. Other persons may have also applied for the promotion, and the rejection of...