Robinson v. Hartzell Propeller, Inc.

• Citation: 454 F.3d 163
• Decision Date: 06 July 2006
• Docket Number: No. 04-3379.,04-3379.
• Parties: Michael ROBINSON, Individually, and as Parent and Natural Guardian of Jennifer Robinson and Matthew Robinson; Wendy Robinson, Individually, and as Parent and Natural Guardian of Sarah Kelley and Samantha Kelley v. HARTZELL PROPELLER, INC.; New England Propeller Service, Inc.; Columbia Aircraft Service, Inc.; Textron Lycoming Reciprocating Engine Division, A Division of AVCO Corporation; Textron, Inc.; AVCO Corporation Hartzell Propeller, Inc., Appellant.
• Court: United States Courts of Appeals. United States Court of Appeals (3rd Circuit)

454 F.3d 163

Michael ROBINSON, Individually, and as Parent and Natural Guardian of Jennifer Robinson and Matthew Robinson; Wendy Robinson, Individually, and as Parent and Natural Guardian of Sarah Kelley and Samantha Kelley v. HARTZELL PROPELLER, INC.; New England Propeller Service, Inc.; Columbia Aircraft Service, Inc.; Textron Lycoming Reciprocating Engine Division, A Division of AVCO Corporation; Textron, Inc.; AVCO Corporation Hartzell Propeller, Inc., Appellant.

No. 04-3379.

United States Court of Appeals, Third Circuit.

Submitted Under Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) June 12, 2006.

Filed July 6, 2006.

Patrick J. O'Connor, Ann T. Field, Cozen & O'Connor, Philadelphia, PA, Attorneys for Appellant.

Bradley J. Stoll, The Wolk Law Firm, Philadelphia, PA, Attorney for Appellees, Michael Robinson and Wendy Robinson.

J. Bruce McKissock, McKissock & Hoffman, Philadelphia, PA, Attorney for Appellee, New England Propeller Service, Inc.

Before FISHER, GREENBERG and LOURIE,^* Circuit Judges.

FISHER, Circuit Judge.

In this complex products liability case involving the tragic crash of a small passenger aircraft, we consider primarily the following issue of law: whether we may exercise appellate jurisdiction under the collateral order doctrine to review the denial of a motion for summary judgment on the basis that a statute of repose was inapplicable. We conclude that the District Court's order does not fall under the collateral order doctrine and will accordingly dismiss the appeal for lack of appellate jurisdiction.

I.

On August 8, 1974, Hartzell manufactured the "Y"-shank aluminum propeller that eventually made its way onto a Mooney M20E aircraft. That aircraft was subsequently purchased by Wendy and Michael Robinson. Twenty-five years later, on August 15, 1999, the propeller fractured mid-flight, causing the aircraft to crash. Both Wendy and Michael suffered extensive injuries: Wendy suffered a broken back, breast bone, and left foot, while Michael fractured his spine, rendering him a paraplegic. The Robinsons thereafter brought suit against Hartzell under theories of negligence and products liability.¹

The General Aviation Revitalization Act ("GARA")² contains a statute of repose that generally bars suits against airplane manufacturers brought more than eighteen years after the delivery date to an initial purchaser of the aircraft. See 49 U.S.C. § 40101 note.³ The Robinsons, however, allege that they are entitled to bring their suit under an exception to the GARA statute of repose because Hartzell made several material misrepresentations in connection with obtaining a type certificate for the propeller at issue from the Federal Aviation Administration ("FAA").⁴ Id.

Federal law requires propeller manufacturers to obtain a type certificate from the FAA. See id. § 44704. The purpose of that process is to ensure that the propeller has been designed and manufactured properly, performs properly, and meets FAA minimum standards. See id. Some manufacturers are able to grant themselves a type certificate through the FAA's Delegated Opinion Authority ("DOA") process. DOA status grants to a designated engineering representative ("DER") the ability to "assume the FAA's role and certify a part." (App.16-17, 373.) Following certification, an entity with DOA also "is responsible to ensure that the product design is in accordance with the regulations and has no characteristics which may detract from flight safety." Service difficulties, such as a failure, malfunction, or defect in any part, including "propeller blade. . . structural failure," are to be "reviewed, reported, and resolved." 14 C.F.R. § 21.3(c)(5).

In 1963, Hartzell submitted an application for type certification to the FAA for the propeller and aircraft combination at issue—the HC-C2YK-1/7666-2 Hartzell propeller installed on the Lycoming IO-360-AIA powered Mooney M20E airplane.⁵ In connection with its initial application, Hartzell conducted a vibration test of the propeller/engine/aircraft combination the week of July 8, 1963. That test measured the stresses (measured in pounds per square inch (psi)) placed on the propeller at different speeds (measured in revolutions per minute (rpm)) at four different flight conditions: (1) take-off/climb at full throttle; (2) level flight at full throttle; (3) level flight with throttle set at 24-inch manifold pressure; and (4) static flight at full throttle. (App.247-48.) With regard to these tests, the report stated the following:

The peak stress at 2230 RPM reached a value of 4800 psi for the 24 inch Hg manifold setting, which is approximately the allowable value. Since this engine has no dampers which can wear and cause higher stresses, the probability of this value being reached or exceeded in service seems remote. There appears to be no necessity to placard against operation in the 2200-2300 RPM range.

* * * *

The HC-C2YK/7666-2 propeller is considered satisfactory vibrationwise when installed on the IO-360 Lycoming engine without restrictions.

(App.244-45.)

The Robinsons contend that this statement in the report contains three misrepresentations. First, the Robinsons contend that the peak stress was not approximately equivalent to the allowable value, but rather exceeded the allowable value. The Robinsons cite to a set of graphs that were contained in Engineering Report No. 213 that demonstrate that allowable vibratory stress limits were exceeded at three different points.⁶ Second, the Robinsons contend that the lack of vibration dampers on the Lycoming engine would increase, rather than decrease, the stress on the propeller. They point to a 1972 engineering report in which Hartzell recommended "the use of [a] dampered engine" to decrease the chances of propeller failure. (App.553-54.)⁷ Finally, the Robinsons argue that there was a necessity to placard against operation at certain speeds because vibratory peak stresses exceeded FAA permissible limits. When the type certification was first issued, the type certification data sheet included a note requiring owners of the Mooney M20E to mark their tachometers between 2000 and 2350 rpm. Because of some early propeller tip failures, the FAA issued Airworthiness Directive ("AD") 65-12-13,⁸ which placed further rpm restrictions on the propeller/engine combination and required an addendum to the airplane flight manual. (App.559.) In addition, the FAA issued another AD in 1977, which required additional rpm restrictions.

The Robinsons also assert that Hartzell continued to make knowing misrepresentations and omissions regarding the propeller at issue following FAA certification of the propeller/undamped engine combination. As noted above, Hartzell had a continuing obligation under its DOA status to comply with the reporting requirements of 14 C.F.R. § 21.3. According to the Robinsons, "Hartzell's continuing airworthiness measures, approved through its DOA, did not resolve the illegal vibratory stresses disclosed by report 213 and did not disclose the excessive vibrations to the FAA." (Appellee's Br. at 7.) In fact, there have been approximately forty prior blade failures involving the same propeller/engine combinations as the one at issue. (See App. 18-19.) The Robinsons essentially argue that Hartzell on several occasions blamed other factors—particularly pilot error—instead of disclosing that there was a propeller/engine vibration problem. (See App. 596, 621, 625, 629.)

Following the completion of discovery, Hartzell brought a motion for summary judgment contending that the suit was barred by the eighteen-year statute of repose enacted under GARA, 49 U.S.C. § 40101 note § 2(a). The District Court agreed with the Robinsons that material issues of fact existed as to whether the GARA exception applied and denied Hartzell's motion. Hartzell filed a timely appeal and urges us to reach the merits of the District Court's decision under the collateral order doctrine.

II.

Our jurisdiction as an appellate court extends under 28 U.S.C. § 1291 over a "final order" of a district court. An order is "final" when it "terminates the litigation between the parties on the merits of the case and leaves nothing to be done but to enforce by execution what has been determined." Richerson v. Jones, 551 F.2d 918, 922 (3d Cir.1977) (quoting St. Louis, Iron Mountain and S. Ry. Co. v. S. Express Co., 108 U.S. 24, 28-29, 2 S.Ct. 6, 27 L.Ed. 638 (1883)). In most cases, a denial of a motion for summary judgment does not qualify as a final order because, "far from finally deciding a case, it is a decision to permit litigation to continue." Hamilton v. Leavy, 322 F.3d 776, 782 (3d Cir.2003) (citation omitted).

In Cohen v. Beneficial Loan Corp., 337 U.S. 541, 69 S.Ct. 1221, 93 L.Ed. 1528 (1949), however, the Supreme Court explained that § 1291 is to be given a "practical rather than a technical construction," and that there is a "small class" of non-final orders "which finally determine claims of right separable from, and collateral to, rights asserted in the action, too important to be denied review and too independent of the cause itself to require that appellate consideration be deferred until the whole case is adjudicated." Id. at 546, 69 S.Ct. 1221; see also Dotzel v. Ashbridge, 438 F.3d 320, 323 (3d Cir.2006); Bell Atlantic-Pa., Inc. v. Pa. Pub. Util. Comm.'n, 273 F.3d 337, 342 (3d Cir.2001); In re Ford Motor Co., 110 F.3d 954, 958 (3d Cir.1997). Cohen and its progeny have been interpreted to permit the immediate appeal of an otherwise non-final collateral order if the order: (1) conclusively determines a disputed legal question, (2) resolves an important issue completely separable from the merits of the action, and (3) is effectively unreviewable on appeal from a final judgment. Bell Atlantic-Pa., 273 F.3d at 342.

The Supreme Court has referred to the collateral order doctrine as a "narrow exception" that contains "stringent" requirements. Digital Equip. Corp. v. Desktop Direct, Inc., ...