Doggett v. Electronics Corp. of America, Combustion Control Division

• Decision Date: 07 May 1969
• Docket Number: No. 10179,10179
• Citation: 454 P.2d 63,93 Idaho 26
• Court: Idaho Supreme Court
• Parties: Cloyd DOGGETT, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. ELECTRONICS CORP. OF AMERICA, COMBUSTION CONTROL DIVISION, a Corp., and Optimum Controls Corp., a Corporation, Defendants-Respondents, and Boiler Engineering & Supply Co., Inc., Bradley Boiler Co., a Corp., Controls& Instruments Division of International Telephone and Telegraph Corporation, a Corporation, Edward Liversidge and James F. Williams, Defendants.

Page 63

454 P.2d 63

93 Idaho 26

Cloyd DOGGETT, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. ELECTRONICS CORP. OF AMERICA, COMBUSTION CONTROL DIVISION, a Corp., and Optimum Controls Corp., a Corporation, Defendants-Respondents, and Boiler Engineering & Supply Co., Inc., Bradley Boiler Co., a Corp., Controls& Instruments Division of International Telephone and Telegraph Corporation, a Corporation, Edward Liversidge and James F. Williams, Defendants.

No. 10179.

Supreme Court of Idaho.

May 7, 1969.

Church, Church & Snow, Burley, for appellant.

Merrill & Merrill, Pocatello, and Schwartz & Doerr, Twin Falls, for respondents.

SPEAR, Justice.

Since the respondents have conceded the other issues on this appeal, we are left with the identical facts, issues and law ruled on by the Illinois Supreme Court in the case of Gray v. American Radiator & Standard Sanitary Corporation, 22 Ill.2d 432, 176 N.E.2d 761 (1961). We reach the same conclusion as the Illinois Supreme Court.

The case at hand arises out of the purchase of an industrial steam boiler by Burley Processing Company of Burley, Idaho. The boiler was sold by defendant manufacturers Boiler Engineering & Supply Co. and Bradley Boiler Co., hereinafter referred to collectively as 'Manufacturers.'

The boiler exploded during installation and the plaintiff Cloyd Doggett, an employee of Bradley, was severely injured. Cause of the explosion has allegedly been traced to two component parts, each manufactured by separate companies and sold by 'Manufacturer' as part of one complete unit. Electronics Corporation of America (Electronics) manufactured the component described as a 'fire eye control' designed to monitor flame in burners. Optimum Controls Corp. (Optimum) manufactured a metering system designed to modulate the flow of fuel and combustion air to industrial burners. It is plaintiff's contention that the failure of either one or both of these components cause his injuries.

Alleging causes of action sounding in tort and breach of warranty, plaintiff sued 'Manufacturer,' Electronics, Optimum and two of 'Manufacturer's' representatives who were installing the boiler at the time of the explosion.

The trial court, after reviewing affidavits and interrogatories submitted by both sides, found that neither Optimum nor Electronics had established the necessary minimal contacts to constitute either doing business (I.C. § 5-514(a)) or the commission of a tort (I.C. § 5-514(b)) within the State of Idaho. The court therefore concluded that Idaho did not have jurisdiction over Optimum and Electronics and granted the motions made by them to quash service of summons.

Appellant has assigned error in the trial court's failure to find jurisdiction based on I.C. § 5-514(b). As in the Gray case, the issues presented are: (1) Was a 'tortious act' committed in Idaho within the meaning of I.C. § 5-514(b); and (2) If so, will the assertion of jurisdiction against respondents amount to a denial of due process?

As to the issue of whether a tort was committed in Idaho, respondents contend, and the trial court ruled, that the negligent act, as well as the injury, must occur in Idaho. The argument is made that to require only the injury to occur in Idaho would do violence to the language of the statute and in effect make the words 'tortious act' read 'commission of a tort in whole or in part.' With this argument we cannot agree. For the purpose of determining the state with jurisdiction as well as the substantive law which will govern, the state where the injury occurred and the cause of action thus accrued is generally the most logical state for adjustment of rights. This is particularly true where, as here, there are residents of at least four different states involved. The Illinois court's reasoning on this issue is most persuasive:

'To be tortious an act must cause injury. The concept of injury is an inseparable part of the phrase. In determining legislative intention courts will read words in their ordinary and popularly understood sense. (citations) We think the intent should be determined less from technicalities of definition than from considerations of general purpose and effect. To adopt the criteria urged by defendant would tend to promote litigation over extraneous issues concerning the elements of a tort and the territorial incidence of each, whereas the test should be concerned more with those substantial elements of convenience and justice presumably contemplated by the legislature.' 176 N.E.2d 761 at page 763.

The result we reach is virtually compelled by the fact that our statute ¹was based on the Illinois Act ². B. B. P. Association, Inc. v. Cessna Aircraft Company, 91 Idaho 259, 264, 420 P.2d 134 (1966). Even prior to the Gray case, the Illinois supreme court had held that the commission of an isolated tort was sufficient for Illinois courts to assert jurisdiction over non-resident defendants. Nelson v. Miller, 11 Ill.2d 378, 143 N.E.2d 673 (1957). We must assume the legislature of the State of Idaho was cognizant of the reasonable interpretations of the Illinois statute by the highest court in Illinois and intended our interpretations to be in acord therewith. Lawrence Warehouse Co. v. Rudio Lumber Co., 89 Idaho 389, 405 P.2d 634 (1965); Johnson v. Casper, 75 Idaho 256, 270 P.2d 1012 (1954); Services, Inc. v. Neill, 73 Idaho 330, 252 P.2d 190 (1953).

We are not persuaded to adopt the distinction made by some courts, such as the New York Court of Appeals in Feathers v. McLucas, discussed at page 76 of the case of Longines-Wittnauer W. Co. v. Barnes & Reinecke, Inc., 15 N.Y.2d 443, 261 N.Y.S.2d 8, 209 N.E.2d 68 (1965). Feathers construed the New York statute as it then existed ³, to require both the negligent act and the injury to occur in New York. Such an interpretation obviously did violence to the legislative intent, since the New York legislature promptly amended its statute to reach the result obtained in the Illinois case. ⁴ Finally, we are not persuaded to construe our statute as narrowly as respondent would have us do, in view of the nature of the statute here involved. I.C. §§ 5-514 through 5-517 are designed to provide a forum for Idaho residents. As such, the law is remedial legislation of the most fundamental nature. It, therefore, is to be liberally construed. B. B. P. Association, Inc. v. Cessna Aircraft Company, supra. Under the circumstances we believe that the legislature, in adopting I.C. §§ 5-514 through 5-517, intended to exercise all the jurisdiction available to the State of Idaho under the due process clause of the United States Constitution. Again, it must be borne in mind that our state legislature is presumed to have known the reasonable interpretations of the statutes it adopts. State v. Taylor, 59 Idaho 724, 87 P.2d 454 (1939). Prior to the enactment of our statute the Illinois Supreme Court had already declared that their statute exercised the full authority available under the due process clause. Nelson v. Miller, 11 Ill.2d 378, 143 N.E.2d 673, 679 (1957).

Respondents contend that due process is violated if Idaho courts assert jurisdiction over them. Here again, however, the issue is well disposed of by Gray. As in Gray, respondents' only contact with our state consisted of a product manufactured in one state, incorporated into the finished product in another state which in the regular course of business was sold to a consumer in the forum state. The supreme court of Illinois found no violation of American Radiator's right to due process and we, likewise, are not disposed to find a violation of the rights of 'Optimum' and 'Electronics.'

Respondents, however, contend that the isolated contact they have with Idaho is not sufficient to meet the standards of due process. On that basis they argue Gray is distinguishable because the court there assumed a substantial transaction of business in Illinois. Gray, 176 N.E.2d at p. 766. Respondents cite several cases to sustain their position, such as Mueller v. Steelcase, Inc., 172 F.Supp. 416 (D.Minn.1959); Mann v. Equitable Gas Company, 209 F.Supp. 571 (N.D.W.Va.1962); and DiMeo v. Minster Machine Co., 225 F.Supp. 569 (D.Conn.1963).

Although we do not consider the point which respondents attempt to distinguish as the ratio decidendi of the Gray case, we do consider helpful an independent review of those precedents which bind this court.

In International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 66 S.Ct. 154, 90 L.Ed. 95 (1945), the court held, at page 318 of 326 U.S., at page 159 of 66 S.Ct.:

'* * * the commission of some single or occasional acts * * * because of their nature and quality and the circumstances of their commission, may be deemed sufficient to render the corporation liable to suit. * * *'

In McGee v. International Life Ins. Co., 355 U.S. 220, 78 S.Ct. 199, 2 L.Ed.2d 223 (1957), the court quoted from International Shoe, supra, as follows:

'(D)ue process requires only that in order to subject a defendant to a judgment in personam, if he be not present within the territory of the forum, he have certain minimum contacts with it such that the maintenance of the suit does not offend 'traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice." 355 U.S. at p. 222, 78 S.Ct. at p. 201.

Mr. Justice Black, author of the McGee decision, then discussed why California had jurisdiction:

'* * * we think it apparent that the Due Process Clause did not preclude the California court from entering a judgment binding on respondent. It is sufficient for purposes of due process that the suit was based on a contract which had substantial connection with that State. (citations) The contract was delivered in California, the premiums were mailed from there and the insured was a resident of that State when he died. It cannot be denied that California has a manifest interest in providing effective means of redress for its residents when their insurers refuse to pay claims. These residents would be at a severe...