Winston v. New Mexico State Police Bd.
Decision Date | 02 June 1969 |
Docket Number | No. 8655,8655 |
Citation | 80 N.M. 310,1969 NMSC 66,454 P.2d 967 |
Parties | A. P. WINSTON, Jr., Plaintiff-Appellee, v. The NEW MEXICO STATE POLICE BOARD and Irving E. Moore, I. D. Worrell, Clay Fultz, Henry Jaramillo and Pilar Sachs, Individually and as Members of the New Mexico State Police Board, Defendants-Appellants. |
Court | New Mexico Supreme Court |
Pursuant to a regulation adopted by the State Police Board April 26, 1967, effective June 1, 1967, A. P. Winston, then 57 years of age, was involuntarily retired as a state police officer because he had completed thirty years of service. In a declaratory judgment proceeding, the trial court declared the Board to be without lawful authority to require Winston's involuntary retirement prior to his attaining the statutory mandatory retirement age of 61, and permanently enjoined and restrained the Board from attempting to enforce the retirement order. The State Police Board has appealed.
The retirement order promulgated by the Board requires the involuntary retirement of police officers at age 61 or upon the completion of thirty years of service, whichever first occurs. The authority of the police board to promulgate rules and regulations must be found in and is limited by statute. Morrow v. Clayton, 326 F.2d 36 (10th Cir. 1963). See Federal Trade Comm'n v. Nat'l Lead Co., 352 U.S. 419, 77 S.Ct. 502, 1 L.Ed.2d 438. We, accordingly, examine the statutes to ascertain the authority of the police board and the limitation of its power to involuntarily retire police officers. See Pan American World Airways v. United States, 371 U.S. 296, 83 S.Ct. 476, 9 L.Ed.2d 325, and the statement of the rule in 1 Am.Jur.2d Administrative Law § 44, at 846. It is, of course, a fundamental principle of administrative law that the authority of the agency is not limited to those powers expressly granted by statute, but includes, also, all powers that may fairly be implied therefrom. Morrow v. Clayton, supra; United States v. Pennsylvania R.R.,323 U.S. 612, 65 S.Ct. 471, 89 L.Ed. 499.
The Board agrees that any power it has in this respect must be found in § 39-2-21, N.M.S.A. 1953, reading:
Legislative intent is to be determined primarily by the language of the act, State v. Shop Rite Foods, Inc., 74 N.M. 55, 390 P.2d 437; and words used in a statute are to be given their ordinary and usual meaning unless a different intent is clearly indicated. State ex rel. State Highway Commission v. Marquez, 67 N.M. 353, 355 P.2d 287. It is likewise a cardinal rule that in construing particular statutory provisions to determine legislative intent, an entire act is to be read together so that each provision may be considered in its relation to every...
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