Green v. State
| Decision Date | 06 March 1995 |
| Docket Number | No. S94G1295,S94G1295 |
| Parties | GREEN v. The STATE. |
| Court | Georgia Supreme Court |
Michael M. White, Lawrenceville, for Green.
Lindsay A. Tise, Jr., Dist. Atty., John H. Bailey, Jr., Kathleen R. Johnson, Asst. Dist. Attys., Hartwell, for State.
Ray Green pled guilty to charges of arson and secreting property to defraud another. The trial court denied Green's motion, filed after sentencing, to withdraw his plea. Green appealed, contending that it was error for the trial court to refuse to set aside his guilty plea because it was not entered voluntarily and because no factual basis for the plea was established on the record. The Court of Appeals affirmed, Green v. State, 213 Ga.App. 134, 444 S.E.2d 573 (1994), and we granted Green's petition for certiorari.
1. Where voluntariness of a guilty plea is challenged, there must be "a record of the guilty plea hearing adequate for the reviewing court to determine whether (1) the defendant has freely and voluntarily entered the plea with (2) an understanding of the nature of the charges against him and (3) an understanding of the consequences of his plea." Goodman v. Davis, 249 Ga. 11, 13, 287 S.E.2d 26 (1982) ( Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238, 89 S.Ct. 1709, 23 L.Ed.2d 274 (1969)). In this case, the transcript of the plea hearing reveals that the trial court read aloud the indictment which described the offenses with which Green was charged, enumerated and explained in detail the rights which Green would be giving up if he pled guilty and the other consequences of such a plea, and carefully inquired into whether Green understood the consequences set forth. Green consistently declared that he wished to plead guilty to the charges, although he did not in fact commit the unlawful acts. The trial court accepted the plea under the provisions of North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25, 91 S.Ct. 160, 27 L.Ed.2d 162 (1970) 1 We hold that the trial court adequately resolved on the record that Green entered his pleas voluntarily and with an understanding of the nature of the charges and the consequences of the pleas.
2. Green also contends that his plea should have been set aside because no factual basis for the plea was established on the record, as required by Uniform Superior Court Rule (USCR) 33.9. We recently considered USCR 33.9 and held (1) that the rule is mandatory as opposed to permissive, (2) that the purpose of the rule is to insure that the conduct to which an individual admits actually constitutes the crime to which the individual pleads guilty, and (3) that this purpose may be achieved through a determination by the trial court that a factual basis exists, but that the record of the plea hearing must reveal the factual basis relied on so that a reviewing court may determine whether an abuse of discretion occurred. State v. Evans, 265 Ga. 332, 454 S.E.2d 468 (1995).
In this case, the Court of Appeals found that a sufficient factual basis for the plea was established because
[a] valid and probing plea petition was filed by Green prior to the plea hearing, and the hearing itself confirmed that Green was well aware of the evidence against him when he entered the plea. Indeed, the court confirmed that Green understood that an Alford plea was only appropriate when the evidence indicates guilt, and the court initially accepted his plea on that basis. Subsequently a trial was held at which Green apparently was called as a State's witness against a co-defendant. Only then was Green sentenced.
Green, 213 Ga.App. at 136-37, 444 S.E.2d 573. We find that neither the "valid and probing plea petition" nor Green's testimony against his co-defendant provided a sufficient factual basis for the plea. Not only did the trial court not state at the plea hearing that it was relying for a factual basis on the plea petition, see Evans, 265 Ga. at 334, 454 S.E.2d 468, but the plea petition in this...
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