Federal Election Commission v. Democratic Senatorial Campaign Committee National Republican Senatorial Committee v. Democratic Senatorial Campaign Committee

Citation454 U.S. 27,70 L.Ed.2d 23,102 S.Ct. 38
Decision Date10 November 1981
Docket Number80-1129,Nos. 80-939,s. 80-939
PartiesFEDERAL ELECTION COMMISSION, Petitioner, v. DEMOCRATIC SENATORIAL CAMPAIGN COMMITTEE et al. NATIONAL REPUBLICAN SENATORIAL COMMITTEE, Petitioner, v. DEMOCRATIC SENATORIAL CAMPAIGN COMMITTEE et al
CourtUnited States Supreme Court
Syllabus

One provision of the Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971 (Act), 2 U.S.C. § 441a(d)(3), limits the amount that the national committee and state committees of a political party may spend in connection with the general election of a candidate for the United States Senate or House of Representatives. Petitioner National Republican Senatorial Committee (NRSC) is a political committee organized to support Republican candidates for the Senate. Although the Act authorizes the NRSC to contribute up to a certain amount to such candidates, it is not authorized to make expenditures on their behalf. The Federal Election Commission (FEC), however, has permitted the NRSC to act as agent of national and state party committees in making expenditures on their behalf. When certain state Republican Party committees designated the NRSC as their agent for § 441a(d)(3) expenditure purposes, the respondent Democratic Senatorial Campaign Committee filed a complaint with the FEC, asserting that the NRSC's agreements with the state committees were contrary to § 441a(d)(3). The FEC dismissed the complaint, concluding that there was "no reason to believe" that the agreements violated the Act. On review, the District Court granted the FEC's motion for summary judgment, holding that the FEC's decision was not "arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law." The Court of Appeals reversed on the ground that the "plain language" of § 441a(d)(3) precluded the agency agreements between state committees and the NRSC.

Held: Section 441a(d)(3) does not expressly or by necessary implication foreclose the use of agency agreements, such as are at issue here, and the FEC thus acted within the authority vested in it by Congress when it determined to permit such agreements. Pp. 31-43.

(a) While § 441a(d)(3) does not authorize the NRSC to make expenditures in its own right, it does not follow that it may not act as agent of a committee that is expressly authorized to make expenditures. Nothing in the statute suggests that a state committee may not designate another committee to be its alter ego and to act in its behalf for the purposes of § 441a(d)(3). Nor does the legislative history of the Act purport to disapprove agency arrangements. Pp. 31-36.

(b) Under the standard of whether the FEC's construction of the Act was "sufficiently reasonable" to be accepted by a reviewing court, the District Court was correct in accepting the FEC's judgment. The FEC's view that the agency agreements were logically consistent with § 441a(a)(4)—which authorizes the transfer of funds among national, state, and local committees of the same party—is acceptable. And the FEC's interpretation of § 441a(d)(3) is not inconsistent with any discernible purpose of the Act. Pp. 36-42.

212 U.S.App.D.C. 374, 660 F.2d 773, reversed.

Charles Nevett Steele, Washington, D. C., for Federal Election Commission.

Jan W. Baran, Washington, D. C., for National Republican Senatorial Committee.

Robert F. Bauer, Washington, D. C., for respondents.

Justice WHITE delivered the opinion of the Court.

The Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971, 86 Stat. 11, as amended, 2 U.S.C. § 431 et seq. (1976 ed. and Supp.IV), limits the contributions that may be made to candidates or political committees in an election for federal office. One provision of the Act, § 441a(d), authorizes limited expenditures by the national and state committees of a political party in connection with a general election campaign for federal office. After authorizing such expenditures, which otherwise would be impermissible,1 the section specifies the amount a national committee may spend in connection with a Presidential campaign, § 441a(d)(2), and limits the amount that national and state committees of a political party may spend in connection with the general election campaign of a candidate for the Senate or the House of Representatives, § 441a(d)(3). In this litigation we examine whether § 441a(d)(3) is violated when a state committee of a political party designates the national senatorial campaign committee of that party as its agent for the purpose of making expenditures allowed by the Act.

I

The National Republican Senatorial Committee (NRSC) is a political committee organized specifically to support Republican candidates in elections for the United States Senate. Although the NRSC is authorized by § 441a(h) to contribute up to $17,500 to a candidate for election to the Senate, it is not given authority by § 441a(d) to make expenditures on behalf of such candidates, and it is the position of the Federal Election Commission, the agency charged with enforcement of the Act, that the NRSC may not do so on its own account. The Commission, however, has permitted the NRSC to act as the agent of national and state party committees in making expenditures on their behalf.

In February 1977, in response to an inquiry submitted late in 1976, the Commission issued an Advisory Opinion, 1976-108, that it would be consistent with the Act for the NRSC to spend its own funds in support of congressional candidates as the designated agent of the Republican National Committee (RNC). In April 1977, the Commission issued a regulation, 11 CFR § 110.7(a)(4) (1981), which provides that the national party committees may make expenditures in the general election campaign for President "through any designated agent, including state and subordinate party committees." On the basis of this regulatory authority, the National Committee of the Democratic Party entered into an agreement specifying the Democratic Senatorial Campaign Committee (DSCC) as its agent for the expenditure of authorized funds in Senate campaigns. In 1978, certain state Republican Party committees designated the NRSC as their agent for § 441a(d)(3) expenditure purposes.2 Complaints were filed with the Commission challenging this practice as inconsistent with the Act. In dismissing these complaints, the Commission twice ruled by unanimous votes that the agency arrangements were not forbidden by the Act. In re National Republican Senatorial Committee, Federal Election Commission Matter Under Review (MUR) 780 (Jan. 19, 1979); In re National Republican Senatorial Committee, Federal Election Commission MUR 820 (June 17, 1979). In 1980, certain state committees again designated the NRSC as their agent, and on May 19, the DSCC filed its complaint with the Commission asserting that the NRSC's agreements with the state committees were contrary to § 441a(d)(3). The complaint did not challenge the contemporaneous agency agreement under which the NRSC acted as the agent of the RNC in connection with the latter's expenditures under § 441a(d). After considering the report of its General Counsel, the Commission unanimously dismissed the complaint, concluding that there was "no reason to believe" that the agreements violated the Act.

The DSCC petitioned for review in the District Court for the District of Columbia pursuant to § 437g(a)(8).3 That court granted the Commission's motion for summary judgment, concluding that the decision of the Commission was not "arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion or otherwise not in accordance with law." Democratic Senatorial Campaign Committee v. Federal Election Comm'n, No. 80-1903 (DC Aug. 28, 1980) (reprinted at App. to Pet. for Cert. of NRSC B4). On appeal, the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit granted the NRSC leave to intervene and reversed the judgment of the District Court after concluding that the "plain language of Section 441a(d)(3) precludes" the agency agreements between state committees and the NRSC. 212 U.S.App.D.C. 374, 383, 660 F.2d 773, 782. We granted the petitions for certiorari filed by the Commission and the NRSC, 450 U.S. 964, 101 S.Ct. 1479, 67 L.Ed.2d 612 (1981), and we now reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeals.

II

Although the Court of Appeals first addressed whether and to what extent it should defer to the Commission's construction of the Act, 212 U.S.App.D.C., at 377, 660 F.2d, at 776, this discussion and the conclusion that little or no deference was due the Commission were pointless if the court was correct that the agency agreements violated the plain language of the Act as well as the statutory purposes revealed by the legislative history. The interpretation put on the statute by the agency charged with administering it is entitled to deference, NLRB v. Bell Aerospace Co.,, 416 U.S. 267, 275, 94 S.Ct. 1757, 1762, 40 L.Ed.2d 134 (1974); Udall v. Tallman, 380 U.S. 1, 16, 85 S.Ct. 792, 801, 13 L.Ed.2d 616 (1965), but the courts are the final authorities on issues of statutory construction. They must reject administrative constructions of the statute, whether reached by adjudication or by rule-making, that are inconsistent with the statutory mandate or that frustrate the policy that Congress sought to implement. SEC v. Sloan, 436 U.S. 103, 118, 98 S.Ct. 1702, 1711, 56 L.Ed.2d 148 (1978); FMC v. Seatrain Lines, Inc., 411 U.S. 726, 745-746, 93 S.Ct. 1773, 1784-1785, 36 L.Ed.2d 620 (1973); Volkswagenwerk v. FMC, 390 U.S. 261, 272, 88 S.Ct. 929, 935, 19 L.Ed.2d 1090 (1968); NLRB v. Brown, 380 U.S. 278, 291, 85 S.Ct. 980, 988, 13 L.Ed.2d 839 (1965). Accordingly, the crucial issue at the outset is whether the Court of Appeals correctly construed the Act. For the reasons that follow, we disagree with the Court of Appeals. As we understand the Act and its legislative history, § 441a(d)(3) does not foreclose the use of agency agreements. The Commission thus acted within the authority vested in it by Congress when it determined to permit such...

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