Gleason v. Treasurer of Mo.

Decision Date03 March 2015
Docket NumberWD 77607
Citation455 S.W.3d 494
PartiesEdward Gleason, Sr., Appellant, v. Treasurer of the State of Missouri–Custodian of the Second Injury Fund, Respondent.
CourtMissouri Court of Appeals

Edward Gleason Sr., Pro Se, for Appellant.

Kimberley Cox Fournier, Kansas City, MO, for respondent.

Before Division One: Cynthia L. Martin, Presiding Judge, Thomas H. Newton, Judge and Mark D. Pfeiffer, Judge.

Opinion

Cynthia L. Martin, Judge

Edward Gleason, Sr. (Gleason), who appears pro se, appeals from the Labor and Industrial Relations Commission's (“Commission”) decision denying his claim for permanent disability benefits from the Second Injury Fund following Gleason's 20– to 25–foot fall from the top of a railcar he was inspecting. The Commission concluded that Gleason's inability to explain why he fell was “fatal to [his] claim,” negating, as a matter of law, his ability to prove that his injuries did not come from a hazard or risk unrelated to his employment and as to which he was equally exposed in normal nonemployment life. Because the Commission erroneously declared and applied the law, we reverse and remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

Factual and Procedural History

Ceva Logistics employed Gleason as a transportation coordinator. Ceva Logistics works with Ford Motor Company to deliver new vehicles throughout the United States and Mexico. Gleason worked in a supervisory position over a crew of five to seven employees. He testified:

We would load [the vehicles] on trains and secure them down.... [I]t could be five railroad cars or ten railroad cars of trains which would generally be 75, 80 or 100 some new cars.... [T]hen I would go up [onto the railcars] and inspect and make sure everything was right and then we would ship it off.

Gleason was employed in that capacity from February 2007 to November 2007.

On August 5, 2007, Gleason was walking atop one of the railcars conducting an inspection when he fell approximately 20 to 25 feet to the ground. Gleason sustained injuries to his head

, neck, right shoulder, clavicle, and ribs. Gleason has no memory of the circumstances leading up to the fall, the fall itself, or the three days after the fall when he was hospitalized. Accordingly, Gleason cannot explain why he fell. No one testified to having seen the fall.

Gleason filed a claim for workers' compensation against Ceva Logistics. Gleason also asserted that he was entitled to permanent total disability benefits from the Second Injury Fund.

Ceva Logistics and Gleason entered into a compromise settlement that was approved by an Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”). The Stipulation for Compromise Settlement stated that Gleason and Ceva Logistics agreed that [Gleason], while in the employment of [Ceva Logistics], sustained an accidental injury/occupational disease arising out of and in the course of [Gleason's] employment and that an accidental injury/occupational disease resulted in injury to [Gleason].” Ceva Logistics agreed to pay Gleason a lump sum of $34,000 in exchange for a release based on a determination that Gleason sustained a permanent disability of 15 percent at the 232 week level on the right side, as well as 13 percent body as a whole referable to the cervical region.1 Gleason's claim against the Second Injury Fund remained pending.

An ALJ held a hearing on Gleason's claim against the Second Injury Fund. Gleason and the Second Injury Fund entered into various stipulations prior to the hearing leaving three issues to be determined: (1) “whether [Gleason] sustained an accident arising out of and in the course and scope of his employment”; (2) “whether [Gleason] suffered any disability either permanent partial or permanent total”; and (3) “whether the Second Injury Fund is liable to [Gleason] for any disability compensation.”

After considering the evidence presented at the hearing, the ALJ issued its written decision denying Gleason's claim for benefits from the Second Injury Fund. The ALJ concluded that Gleason did not meet his burden of proving that he suffered a work injury on August 5, 2007, in that there was no evidence presented regarding the cause of Gleason's fall. The ALJ also concluded that Gleason was employable on the open labor market after his fall from the railcar, and that his inability to find work resulted from a worsening cardiac condition and the effects of a stroke

that occurred after Gleason's fall from the railcar.

Gleason filed an application for review with the Commission. The Commission issued its Final Award Denying Compensation, with one member dissenting. The Final Award did not incorporate the findings of the ALJ. The majority of the Commission concluded that because Gleason was unable to explain why he fell, Gleason had not met his burden to prove that “his injury did not come from a hazard or risk unrelated to his employment to which workers would be equally exposed outside of and unrelated to employment in their normal nonemployment lives.” Thus, the majority concluded that Gleason failed to show that his injury arose out of and in the course of his employment with Ceva Logistics. The Commission did not address whether Gleason would otherwise have been entitled to benefits from the Second Injury Fund.

Gleason appeals.

Standard of Review

We review the findings of the Commission, not the findings of the ALJ. Smith v. Capital Region Med. Ctr., 412 S.W.3d 252, 258 (Mo.App.W.D.2013). We may modify, reverse, remand for rehearing, or set aside the award of the Commission only if we determine that the Commission acted without or in excess of its powers, that the award was procured by fraud, that the facts found by the Commission do not support the award, or that there was not sufficient competent evidence to warrant making the award. Section 287.495.1.2

We review the whole record to determine whether there is sufficient competent and substantial evidence to support the award or if the award is contrary to the overwhelming weight of the evidence.” Smith , 412 S.W.3d at 258. “The Commission is free to believe or disbelieve any evidence, and we defer to the Commission's credibility determinations.” Id. The Commission's determinations of law, however, are reviewed independently. Id.

Analysis

Although Gleason's Brief sets forth four points on appeal, the limited argument in his Brief primarily claims that the Commission erred in concluding that this fall from a great height while performing the duties of his work did not result in a compensable injury.3

‘The Second Injury Fund compensates injured workers who are permanently ... disabled by a combination of past disabilities and a primary work injury.’ Second Injury Fund v. Cook, 323 S.W.3d 105, 110 (Mo.App.W.D.2010) (quoting Concepcion v. Lear Corp., 173 S.W.3d 368, 371 (Mo.App.W.D.2005) ). [A] claimant's preexisting disabilities are irrelevant until employer's liability for the last injury is determined.” Lewis v. Second Injury Fund, 435 S.W.3d 144, 157 (Mo.App.E.D.2014). Here, the employer, Ceva Logistics, stipulated its liability for Gleason's 2007 injury and, relevant to this case, stipulated that Gleason's injury arose out of and in the course of Gleason's employment. The Second Injury Fund did not join in this stipulation, however, and remained free to litigate the issue conceded by Gleason's employer. Hoven v. Second Injury Fund, 414 S.W.3d 676, 680 (Mo.App.E.D.2013) (“The [Second Injury Fund] is not bound by terms of settlement agreements to which it is not a party. Nor is the [Second Injury Fund] collaterally estopped by a settlement agreement to which it is not a party.” (citations omitted)). At most, Gleason's settlement with his employer was evidence that the Commission could consider. Id. Gleason thus remained obligated to prove all of the essential elements of his workers' compensation claim against the Second Injury Fund. See Angus v. Second Injury Fund, 328 S.W.3d 294, 299 (Mo.App.W.D.2010) (“The claimant in a workers' compensation case has the burden to prove all essential elements of her claim....”).

As the employer, Ceva Logistics was responsible to furnish Gleason “compensation under the provisions of [Chapter 287] for personal injury ... by accident ... arising out of and in the course of the employee's employment .” Section 287.120 (emphasis added). “Accident” is statutorily defined as “an unexpected traumatic event or unusual strain identifiable by time and place of occurrence and producing at the time objective symptoms of an injury caused by a specific event during a single work shift.” Section 287.020.2. The Commission found that Gleason suffered an “accident” when he fell from the railcar.

However, not every “injury ... by accident” is compensable. “Injury” is statutorily defined as “an injury which has arisen out of and in the course of employment.” Section 287.020.3(1). “The express terms of the workers' compensation statutes as revised in 2005 instruct that section 287.020.3(2) must control any determination of whether [a claimant's] injury shall be deemed to have arisen out of and in the course of [his or] her employment.” Johme v. St. John's Mercy Healthcare, 366 S.W.3d 504, 509 (Mo. banc 2012). Section 287.020.3(2) provides:4

An injury shall be deemed to arise out of and in the course of the employment only if:
(a) It is reasonably apparent, upon consideration of all the circumstances, that the accident is the prevailing factor in causing the injury; and
(b) It does not come from a hazard or risk unrelated to the employment to which workers would have been equally exposed outside of and unrelated to the employment in normal nonemployment life.

The Commission found that Gleason's accident was the prevailing factor in causing his injuries as required by section 287.020.3(2)(a). The Commission concluded, however, that Gleason did not prove the second factor required by section 287.020.3(2)(b). The Commission concluded as a matter of law that because Gleason could not explain why ...

To continue reading

Request your trial
19 cases
  • Hazeltine v. Second Injury Fund
    • United States
    • Missouri Court of Appeals
    • 22 Octubre 2019
    ...are irrelevant until [the] employer’s liability for the last injury is determined." Gleason v. Treasurer of State of Missouri-Custodian of Second Injury Fund , 455 S.W.3d 494, 498 (Mo. App. W.D. 2015) (quoting Lewis , 435 S.W.3d at 157 ).Point I In her first point relied on, Claimant argues......
  • Marks v. Mo. Dep't of Corr.
    • United States
    • Missouri Court of Appeals
    • 14 Abril 2020
    ...at the time of an injury and the relative risk of injury in the employee's normal nonemployment life. See Gleason v. SIF , 455 S.W.3d 494, 499 (Mo. App. W.D. 2015) ; Wright v. SIF , 484 S.W.3d 56, 63 (Mo. App. E.D. 2015) ; Dorris v. Stoddard County , 436 S.W.3d 586, 592-93 (Mo. App. S.D. 20......
  • Halsey v. Townsend Tree Serv. Co.
    • United States
    • Missouri Court of Appeals
    • 20 Abril 2021
    ...causes is in the nature of an affirmative defense to the employer and is not the employee's burden to prove. Gleason v. Treasurer of the State , 455 S.W.3d 494, 502 (Mo. App. 2015).We affirm the administrative law judge's finding that employee's heat stroke and death arose out of and in the......
  • Surety v. Woods of Somerset, LLC
    • United States
    • Missouri Court of Appeals
    • 3 Marzo 2015
  • Request a trial to view additional results
1 books & journal articles

VLEX uses login cookies to provide you with a better browsing experience. If you click on 'Accept' or continue browsing this site we consider that you accept our cookie policy. ACCEPT