Yerkes v. Ohio State Highway Patrol

• Decision Date: 17 April 2020
• Docket Number: Case No. 2:19-cv-2047
• Citation: 455 F.Supp.3d 523
• Parties: Stacey Arnold YERKES, Plaintiff, v. OHIO STATE HIGHWAY PATROL, et al., Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Southern District of Ohio

455 F.Supp.3d 523

Stacey Arnold YERKES, Plaintiff,

v.OHIO STATE HIGHWAY PATROL, et al., Defendants.

Case No. 2:19-cv-2047

United States District Court, S.D. Ohio, Eastern Division.

Signed April 17, 2020

Jason E. Starling, Willis, Spangler, Starling, Hilliard, OH, John C. Camillus, Law Offices of John C. Camillus, LLC, Columbus, OH, for Plaintiff.

Rory P. Callahan, Andrea C. Wiltrout, Anna M. Rouhana Seidensticker, Ohio Attorney General's Office, Columbus, OH, for Defendants.

OPINION AND ORDER

EDMUND A. SARGUS, JR., UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

This matter is before the Court for consideration of Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss (ECF No. 19), Plaintiff's Response in Opposition to Defendant's Motion (ECF No, 20), and Defendants’ Reply in Support of their Motion (ECF No. 21). For the reasons set forth below, the Court DENIES Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss.

I.

Plaintiff Stacey Arnold Yerkes was employed for nearly twenty-five years by the Ohio State Highway Patrol ("OSHP" or "Patrol"). She began as a cadet, became a state trooper, rose to level of sergeant, and passed her lieutenant's exam. Plaintiff filed the present lawsuit against the Patrol and four individually-named current Patrol employees who were her supervisors while she was employed: Major Gene Smith, Captain Michael Kemmer, Staff Lieutenant William Stidham, and Lieutenant Scott Wyckhouse ("Individual Defendants"). The two claims Plaintiff brought against the Individual Defendants are based on their alleged class-based discriminatory treatment of her in violation of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution. Specifically, Plaintiff alleges mat the Individual Defendants harassed and discriminated against her because she is a woman (Count V) and because she is gay (Count VI).

The Individual Defendants move for dismissal of Count V and Count VI for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. That motion is ripe for review.

II.

In evaluating a complaint to determine whether it states a claim upon which relief can be granted, the trial court must construe it in favor of the plaintiff, accept the factual allegations contained in the pleading as true, and determine whether the factual allegations present any plausible claim. Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly , 550 U.S. 544, 570, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 167 L.Ed.2d 929 (2007) ; Ashcroft v. Iqbal , 556 U.S. 662, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 173 L.Ed.2d 868 (2009) (clarifying the plausibility standard articulated in Twombly ). "A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged." Iqbal , 556 U.S. at 678, 129 S.Ct. 1937. The factual allegations of a pleading "must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level ...." Twombly , 550 U.S. at 555, 127 S.Ct. 1955.

III.

Plaintiff sets forth the following relevant facts in her Amended Complaint. (ECF No. 13.) To be clear, at this stage of the case, the Court must accept the claims made by the plaintiff as true. The Court must then decide whether such allegations are legally sufficient to state a valid claim. Thereafter in this case, Defendants may contest the factual allegations.

A. Plaintiff's Employment

Plaintiff began her career with Defendant OSHP as an entry level Cadet in 1994. Plaintiff completed her initial training and became a State Trooper. While a State Trooper, her annual performance reviews indicated that she met or exceeded expectations. (Am. Compl. ¶ 13.)

In 1998, OSHP promoted Plaintiff to Criminal Interdiction Officer. In this role, Plaintiff was part of a specialized unit with a competitive selection process. Criminal Interdiction Officers receive special training to identify potential criminal activity on Ohio's highways and to apprehend those responsible. While Plaintiff worked as a Criminal Interdiction Officer, her annual performance reviews indicated that she met or exceeded expectations. (Id. ¶¶ 15, 16.)

In 2014, the Patrol promoted Plaintiff to Criminal Interdiction Training Sergeant. This was a special role created for Plaintiff and Shaun Smart, her work partner. In this role, Plaintiff and her partner were tasked with representing the OSHP by training law enforcement officers in the State of Ohio and throughout the entire country on criminal interdiction. Plaintiff and Training Sergeant Smart were the highest-ranking instructors on criminal interdiction in the State of Ohio. While she worked as a Criminal Interdiction Training Sergeant, Plaintiff's annual performance reviews indicated that she met or exceeded expectations. (Id. ¶¶ 16–18.)

While Plaintiff worked for the OSHP, she received numerous awards for her job performance. Plaintiff set out the following specific examples in Paragraph 19 of the Amended Complaint:

a. The 2016-2017 Criminal Interdiction Officer of Year awarded by the U.S. Department of Justice, U.S. Drug Enforcement Administration, U.S. Department of Transportation, and the U.S. Federal Motor Carrier Safety Administration. Criminal interdiction law enforcement officers throughout the country are eligible for this award. Plaintiff was the first and is the only female officer to receive the award.

b. Prior to receiving the 2016-2017 Criminal Interdiction Officer of the Year award, Plaintiff was nominated for it twice. She was the first and is only female nominee for the award.

c. The 2011 Ohio State Highway Patrol State Trooper Recognition Award, which is considered the "State Trooper of the Year Award" for those assigned to specialty units like criminal interdiction.

d. The 2010 National Criminal Enforcement Association Director's Award, in recognition of individual achievements in criminal interdiction. Plaintiff was the first and is only female to receive the award.

e. The 2010 National Criminal Enforcement Association Robbie Bishop Award, in recognition of individual achievements in criminal interdiction. Plaintiff was the first and is only female to receive the award.

f. The 2002 Ohio State Highway Patrol Criminal Patrol Award, in recognition of being responsible for initiating the most felony cases for 2002. Plaintiff was the first and is only female to receive the award.

g. A 2002 Letter of Commendation from the Federal Bureau of Investigation, in recognition of apprehending a federal bank robber out of Austin, Texas.

h. Sixteen annual Ohio State Highway Patrol Criminal Patrol Recognition Awards, in recognition of initiating a minimum of five felony cases for the year.

B. Plaintiff's Sex and Sexual Orientation

Plaintiff is female and is gay. She does not conform to traditional stereotypes as to appearance and dress. Plaintiff made her sexual orientation known to the Individual Defendants and OSHP several times throughout her career. Defendants also knew that Plaintiff is married to a woman. (Am. Compl. ¶¶ 22–28.)

C. Allegations of Discriminatory and Hostile Work Environment

Plaintiff alleges that the work environment at the Patrol is hostile to women and to those who are gay and that she was subjected to harassment and discrimination because she is a woman and because she is gay. Plaintiff states that, on her first day, a male heterosexual co-worker told her "[t]here has only been one other female here before you, so try not to screw it up and make females look bad."¹ (Am. Compl. ¶¶ 29, 30.) Plaintiff further alleges that her male heterosexual supervisors consistently created a discriminatory work environment based upon sex, including the following specific examples set forth in Paragraph 32 of the Amended Complaint:

a. One of her male heterosexual supervisors once placed an envelope in her locker that contained a picture of the following: two naked women, embraced in a sexual position, with one woman having a snake protruding from her vagina. Plaintiff's supervisor later asked her, laughing, "did you get our envelope?"

b. One of her male heterosexual supervisors inquired about her sex life. He once asked about a party Plaintiff had attended with friends, asking if she had gone to a "back room" to "have sex together" with her female friends. Embarrassed, she adamantly replied, "no." Her supervisor then proceeded to ask her if she wore underwear.

c. One of Plaintiff's supervisors told her to move her "fat ass out of the way." This supervisor never spoke to men in this derogatory manner.

During the time Plaintiff worked with them, she alleges that Defendant Captain Kemmer, Defendant Staff Lieutenant Stidham, Defendant Lieutenant Wyckhouse, and/or other supervisors consistently made sexist comments about women, providing in Paragraph 32 the following specific examples:

a. They called women, among other things, "cunt," "fucking cunt," "bitch," "fucking bitch," and "broad."

b. They commented that "women are only promoted here because they are women, not because of merit."

c. They commented that "the only reason women are allowed to perform lower than men is because they are women."

d. They commented on the physical appearance of women in a derogatory manner by calling them names such as "fat bitch." They did not do the same for men.

Plaintiff further alleges that Defendants Captain Kemmer, Staff Lieutenant Stidham, Lieutenant Wyckhouse, and/or other supervisors consistently made sexist, gender stereotyping, and/or homophobic comments about Plaintiff. She sets forth the following specific examples in Paragraph 33 of the Amended Complaint:

a. When Plaintiff came to work with her hair cut short, they commented that her hair "looks stupid" and she "looks butch."

b. On one occasion, when Plaintiff wore make-up and earrings to work, they commented "what, is she trying to be a girl now?"

c. They commented that she was "emotional" and that "women are like that" and "bring that with them to the workplace."

d. Plaintiff requested leave under the Family and Medical Leave Act, 29 USCA § 2611, et seq. ("FMLA") for the birth her and her wife's son. She was denied this leave because she is

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