United States v. Flagler County School District, 71-2323.

• Decision Date: 29 March 1972
• Docket Number: No. 71-2323.,71-2323.
• Citation: 457 F.2d 1402
• Parties: UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. FLAGLER COUNTY SCHOOL DISTRICT et al., Defendants, James O. Craig, Supt. of Schools, School Board of Flagler County, Defendant-Appellant.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Fifth Circuit

457 F.2d 1402 (1972)

UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. FLAGLER COUNTY SCHOOL DISTRICT et al., Defendants, James O. Craig, Supt. of Schools, School Board of Flagler County, Defendant-Appellant.

No. 71-2323.

United States Court of Appeals, Fifth Circuit.

March 29, 1972.

Stanley D. Kupiszewski, Jr., DeLand, Fla., for defendant-appellant; James O. Craig, pro se.

Jerris Leonard, Asst. Atty. Gen., Brian K. Landsberg, Atty., U. S. Dept. of Justice, Washington, D. C., John L. Briggs, U. S. Atty., John D. Roberts, Asst. U. S. Atty., Jacksonville, Fla., David L. Norman, Asst. Atty. Gen., Roderick N. McAulay, Atty. Dept. of Justice, Washington, D. C., for plaintiff-appellee.

Before JOHN R. BROWN, Chief Judge, and INGRAHAM and RONEY, Circuit Judges.

JOHN R. BROWN, Chief Judge:

As a last gasp in the struggle against desegregation in the Flagler County (Florida) School District, Superintendent James O. Craig, now alone and unaided by the school board, appeals pro se from the District Court's order enjoining the operation of racially segregated public educational facilities and requiring the immediate implementation of a unitary school system, including compliance with the semi-annual reporting provision of Singleton v. Jackson Municipal Separate School District, 5 Cir., 1970, 426 F.2d 1364.¹

In the long march from Mansfield² this Court has seen, heard, or heard of everything³—everything, that is, until today.

Here the District Court, after finding that Flagler County was operating a dual school system, ordered the immediate implementation of a unitary school system on August 7, 1970. The School District resisted, arguing that it did not know what the term "race" or "ethnic origin" contemplated. It contended that it could not assure that Negro students were not being discriminated against because it did not have a Congressional definition of the term "Negro." What began as an ingenius quandry soon became disingenuous when HEW offered these definitions:

Negro:

persons considered by themselves, by the school or by the community to be of African or Negro origin.

Oriental:

persons considered by themselves, by the school or by the community to be of Asian origin.

Similar guidelines were announced for identifying American Indians, Spanish Surnamed Americans and All Others. Thereupon, the School District blithely filed a Supplemental Report identifying all teachers and students in the District as "Orientals," since they were so "considered by the school." Therefore, it reasoned, there was no discrimination, since there was only one race in the entire school district (i. e., "Orientals") and it could not be found to be in noncompliance with Constitutional standards.

With no surprise to anyone the District Court summarily rejected this absurdity and to the credit of the School District and the good sense of its members, the Board consented to a decree, avoiding any further embarrassment by urging that contention in this Court. The School Superintendent, who was named as a party-defendant in the suit below as a matter of form, appeals singly pro se from the District Court's order.

His argument is that he cannot enforce the District Court's order because it contains no definition of what is a Negro and therefore, ...