Support Working Animals, Inc. v. Desantis

• Decision Date: 27 April 2020
• Docket Number: CASE NO.: 4:19cv570-MW/MAF
• Citation: 457 F.Supp.3d 1193
• Parties: SUPPORT WORKING ANIMALS, INC., et al., Plaintiffs, v. Ron DESANTIS, in his official capacity as Governor of the State of Florida, et al., Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Northern District of Florida

457 F.Supp.3d 1193

SUPPORT WORKING ANIMALS, INC., et al., Plaintiffs,

v.Ron DESANTIS, in his official capacity as Governor of the State of Florida, et al., Defendants.

CASE NO.: 4:19cv570-MW/MAF

United States District Court, N.D. Florida, Tallahassee Division.

Signed April 27, 2020

Dawn Marie Alba, Alba Law Office PA, West Palm Beach, FL, for Plaintiffs.

Nicholas Allen Primrose, Executive Office of the Governor, Ashley E. Davis, Bradley Robert McVay, Florida Department of State Office of General Counsel, Blaine H. Winship, Office of the Attorney General, Tallahassee, FL for Defendants.

ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANTS' MOTION TO DISMISS

Mark E. Walker, Chief United States District Judge

This is a constitutional challenge to a recent amendment to the Florida Constitution prohibiting commercial dog racing in connection with wagering. Plaintiffs allege that the amendment violates the Takings Clause (Count I), the Equal Protection Clause (Count II), the Contracts Clause (Count III), and the Due Process Clause (Count IV). ECF No. 24. Defendants move to dismiss Plaintiffs' Amended Complaint in its entirety. ECF No. 33.

Defendants argue Plaintiffs' claims should be dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction and for failure to state a claim. For the reasons stated below, this Court finds that it has jurisdiction over some, but not all, of Plaintiffs' claims but finds Plaintiffs have failed to plausibly allege the amendment is unconstitutional. Accordingly, Defendants' motion to dismiss is GRANTED .

I. Legal Standard

This Court accepts the allegations in the Amended Complaint as true and construes them in the light most favorable to Plaintiffs. See Hunt v. Aimco Props., L.P. , 814 F.3d 1213, 1221 (11th Cir. 2016). "To withstand a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), a complaint must include ‘enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’ " Id. (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly , 550 U.S. 544, 570, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 167 L.Ed.2d 929 (2007) ). "A ‘claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.’ " Id. (quoting Ashcroft v. Iqbal , 556 U.S. 662, 678, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 173 L.Ed.2d 868 (2009) ). "Plaintiff's allegations must amount to ‘more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do.’ " Id. (quoting Twombly , 550 U.S. at 555, 127 S.Ct. 1955 ). This Court limits its "consideration to the well-pleaded factual allegations, documents central to or referenced in the complaint, and matters judicially noticed." La Grasta v. First Union Sec., Inc. , 358 F.3d 840, 845 (11th Cir. 2004) (citations omitted).

A Rule 12(b)(1) motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction "can be asserted on either facial or factual grounds." Carmichael v. Kellogg, Brown & Root Servs., Inc. , 572 F.3d 1271, 1279 (11th Cir. 2009) (citation omitted). A facial challenge occurs when, as here, Defendants base their challenge to subject matter jurisdiction solely on the allegations in the Amended Complaint. Id. In considering Defendants' facial challenge, this Court must take Plaintiffs' allegations as true. Id.

II. Factual Background

The pertinent facts, accepted as true and construed in the light most favorable to Plaintiffs, are as follows. Dog racing is part of Florida's pari-mutuel industry. See Am. Compl. [ECF No. 24] ¶ 35. The pari-mutuel industry mainly consists of venues conducting pari-mutuel sports such as horse racing and greyhound racing. See id. ¶ 60. Greyhound racing has been a legal and thriving industry in Florida since the state legislature legalized gambling on dog races in 1931. Id. ¶ 9. Today, a web of state statutes and regulations form a comprehensive regulatory regime governing the industry. See id. ¶¶ 9, 35

In the lead-up to the November 2018 General Election, the "stars aligned against the greyhound industry with conservatives and liberals alike using their united political war-chests to deprive the greyhound industry of their livelihoods ...." Id. ¶ 42. Prominent political figures, the Humane Society of the United States, and the Animal Law Section of the Florida Bar lobbied successfully during the Constitutional Revision Commission process to have an amendment ("Amendment 13") placed on the ballot in the November 2018 General Election. Id. ¶¶ 39–45. On November 6, 2018, 69.1% of Florida voters approved Amendment 13.¹ See id. ¶ 23.

Amendment 13 is now codified as article X, section 32 of the Florida Constitution. It states:

The humane treatment of animals is a fundamental value of the people of the State of Florida. After December 31, 2020, a person authorized to conduct gaming or pari-mutuel operations may not race greyhounds or any member of the Canis Familiaris subspecies in connection with any wager for money or any other thing of value in this state, and persons in this state may not wager money or any other thing of value on the outcome of a live dog race occurring in this state. The failure to conduct greyhound racing or wagering on greyhound racing after December 31, 2018, does not constitute grounds to revoke or deny renewal of other related gaming licenses held by a person who is a licensed greyhound permitholder on January 1, 2018, and does not affect the eligibility of such permitholder, or such permitholder's facility, to conduct other pari-mutuel activities authorized by general law. By general law, the legislature shall specify civil or criminal penalties for violations of this section and for activities that aid or abet violations of this section.

Consequently, as of January 1, 2021, licensed Florida pari-mutuel operators will be forbidden from racing any dog in Florida in connection with a wager and all persons in Florida will be prohibited from wagering on live dog races which occur in Florida.

Plaintiffs, owners of businesses in Florida's greyhound racing industry and an organization dedicated to protecting the rights of owners of working animals, assert claims against Defendants Ron DeSantis, in his official capacity as Florida Governor ("the Governor"), Laurel Lee, in her official capacity as Florida Secretary of State ("the Secretary"), and Ashley Moody, in her official capacity as Florida Attorney General ("the Attorney General").

III. Jurisdictional Issues

This Court will first explain why this case need not be dismissed for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction. As explained below, Plaintiffs have standing, their claims are ripe for review, and the Eleventh Amendment does not bar Plaintiffs' claims against the Attorney General.²

A. Standing

"Standing ‘is the threshold question in every federal case, determining the power of the court to entertain the suit.’ " CAMP Legal Def. Fund, Inc. v. City of Atlanta , 451 F.3d 1257, 1269 (11th Cir. 2006) (quoting Warth v. Seldin , 422 U.S. 490, 499, 95 S.Ct. 2197, 45 L.Ed.2d 343 (1975) ). A party has standing to sue if they have suffered an injury in fact which is fairly traceable to the defendant's conduct and which is likely to be redressed by a decision in their favor. Lujan v. Defs. of Wildlife , 504 U.S. 555, 560–61, 112 S.Ct. 2130, 119 L.Ed.2d 351 (1992). Defendants claim Plaintiffs have failed to allege any of the three elements of this rule—that is, they contend Plaintiffs have not alleged an injury in fact, have not alleged a causal connection to Defendants' conduct, and have not alleged their claims are redressable. Defendants are incorrect on each point.³

Plaintiffs make numerous allegations in the Amended Complaint that demonstrate an injury in fact—namely, the economic loss resulting from their impending inability to operate businesses in the pari-mutuel dog racing industry. See Adinolfe v. United Techs. Corp. , 768 F.3d 1161, 1172 (11th Cir. 2014) ("Economic harm ... [is] a well-established injur[y]-in-fact under federal standing jurisprudence."); Ford v. Strange , 580 F. App'x 701, 710 (11th Cir. 2014) (inferring economic harm to employees and associated businesses caused by state law eliminating gambling operations). Plaintiffs' injury is certainly imminent. Amendment 13 sets a date certain—January 1, 2021—on which Plaintiffs will be forbidden from carrying on with their businesses and will face civil or criminal penalties if they fail to comply. See ACLU of Fla., Inc. v. Miami–Dade Cty. Sch. Bd. , 557 F.3d 1177, 1194 (11th Cir. 2009) (standing shown in pre-enforcement challenge where the claimed injury was "pegged to a sufficiently fixed period of time"); see also Virginia v. Am. Booksellers Ass'n, Inc. , 484 U.S. 383, 393, 108 S.Ct. 636, 98 L.Ed.2d 782 (1988) ("We are not troubled by the pre-enforcement nature of this suit. The State has not suggested that the newly enacted law will not be enforced, and we see no reason to assume otherwise. We conclude that the plaintiffs have alleged an actual and well-founded fear that the law will be enforced against them."). Moreover, Plaintiffs are already experiencing the effects of this impending deadline, as their employees have started to leave, presumably in search of jobs in industries that are not scheduled to become illegal within a year. See Am. Compl. ¶ 20. Accordingly, Plaintiffs have established "a realistic danger of sustaining a direct injury as a result of [Amendment 13]'s operation or enforcement that is reasonably pegged to a sufficiently fixed period of time and which is not merely hypothetical or conjectural." See Fla. ex rel. McCollum v. U.S. Dep't of Health & Human Servs. , 716 F. Supp. 2d 1120, 1147 (N.D. Fla. 2010) (citation and quotation omitted); Ga. Latino All. for Human Rights v. Governor of Ga. , 691 F.3d 1250, 1257–58 (11th Cir. 2012) ("When, as here, plaintiffs file a pre-enforcement, constitutional challenge to a state statute, the injury requirement may be satisfied by establishing a realistic danger of sustaining direct injury as a result of the statute's operation...