Blum v. Bacon

Citation102 S.Ct. 2355,72 L.Ed.2d 728,457 U.S. 132
Decision Date14 June 1982
Docket NumberNo. 81-770,81-770
PartiesBarbara BLUM, etc., Appellant v. Jeanne BACON, etc., et al
CourtUnited States Supreme Court
Syllabus

New York's Emergency Assistance (EA) Program, which is federally funded under the Social Security Act (SSA), precludes the furnishing of EA cash to persons receiving or eligible for Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC) or of EA in any form to replace a lost or stolen AFDC grant. Appellees, who had been denied EA under these state provisions, brought a class action in Federal District Court to enjoin enforcement of the provisions, alleging that they conflicted with the SSA and violated equal protection. Ultimately, on remand after its decision invalidating the state provisions under the Supremacy Clause had been vacated by the Court of Appeals, the District Court invalidated the no-cash provision as a violation of equal protection but upheld the loss-or-theft provision. On A Second Appeal, The Court of appeals held that both provisions violated the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.

Held : Because the New York provisions conflict with a valid federal regulation promulgated by the Secretary of Health, Education, and Welfare (Secretary) which proscribes inequitable treatment of individuals or groups under an EA program, they are invalid under the Supremacy Clause. Pp. 2359-2364.

(a) Reliance on the SSA to find the New York provisions invalid is not foreclosed by Quern v. Mandley, 436 U.S. 725. While Quern emphasized that a State retains considerable flexibility in determining which emergencies to cover under its EA plan, it was not suggested that the Secretary was stripped of all authority to review a plan that arbitrarily or inequitably excluded a class of recipients. P. 2360.

(b) The Secretary's decision to apply the "equitable treatment" regulation so as to forbid a State to exclude AFDC recipients from its EA program is eminently reasonable and deserves judicial deference, especially where the legislative history leaves no doubt that AFDC recipients were expected to be included in a state EA program. Pp. 2360-2363.

2nd Cir., 648 F.2d 801, affirmed.

Robert S. Hammer, New York City, for appellant.

Martin A. Schwartz, New York City, for appellees.

Justice MARSHALL delivered the opinion of the Court.

New York has established an Emergency Assistance Program that receives substantial federal funding under Title IV-A of the Social Security Act (Act), 42 U.S.C. § 603(a)(5). The program excludes recipients of Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC) from emergency assistance in the form of cash. It also excludes public assistance recipients (including AFDC recipients) from reimbursement for lost or stolen grants, even though it provides such reimbursement to other public benefit recipients. The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit held that New York's treatment of AFDC recipients is not inconsistent with the federal Act and regulations but violates the Equal Protection Clause. Because we conclude that the New York law is invalid under the Act, we affirm without reaching the equal protection issue.

I

Appellee Jeanne Bacon has two minor children and depends entirely on an AFDC grant to support her family. On June 1, 1977, while she was shopping, her wallet and food stamps were stolen. She promptly reported the theft to the police and to the New York Department of Social Services (DSS). She requested emergency assistance (EA) under the State's federally funded Emergency Assistance Program, explaining that she had no money to purchase food and other essential items for her household for the month. DSS denied her request on the basis of a recent state law which precludes the furnishing of any cash EA to persons receiving or eligible for AFDC, N.Y.Soc.Serv.Law §§ 350-j(2)(c) and (3) (McKinney Supp.1981) (the "no-cash" provision), or of EA in any form to replace a lost or stolen public assistance grant, including an AFDC grant. § 350-j(2)(e) (the "loss-or-theft" provision).1 Appellee Gertrude Parrish suffered a similar fate. An AFDC mother, she lost her food and AFDC funds when her apartment was broken into and ransacked. She applied for EA, and DSS denied her request on the same basis as it denied relief to appellee Bacon. The other named appellees, Linda Selders and Freddie Mae Goodwine, also were denied EA after they cashed their AFDC checks and suffered the loss of their money.2

Appellees brought this class action to enjoin enforcement of the state law insofar as it denies EA pursuant to the no-cash provision and the loss-or-theft provision.3 Appellees argued that the law conflicts with the Act and violates equal protection because it arbitrarily discriminates against AFDC recipients: it provides cash EA to all eligible recipients other than AFDC recipients, and provides EA for lost or stolen public benefit grants to all public benefit recipients (such as recipients of social security and Supplemental Security In- come) other than those on public assistance (including AFDC recipients).

The United States District Court for the Southern District of New York granted summary judgment in favor of appellees on the ground that the state provisions impermissibly narrowed the eligibility standards imposed on state EA programs by § 406(e) of the Act, 42 U.S.C. § 606(e),4 and were invalid under the Supremacy Clause. Bacon v. Toia, 437 F.Supp. 1371 (1977). The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed. Bacon v. Toia, 580 F.2d 1044 (1978). Shortly thereafter, this Court decided Quern v. Mandley, 436 U.S. 725, 98 S.Ct. 2068, 56 L.Ed.2d 658 (1978), in which we held that § 406(e) imposes permissive, not mandatory, standards on participating States. The Court of Appeals granted a motion for rehearing, vacated the judgment of the District Court, and remanded the case for further consideration in light of Quern. On remand, the District Court changed its prior decision and held that the New York law was not inconsistent with the federal Act. In a subsequent opinion, the District Court invalidated the no-cash provision as a violation of equal protection but upheld the loss-or-theft provision. Bacon v. Toia, 493 F.Supp. 865 (1980). On the second appeal, the Court of Appeals agreed with the District Court that our decision in Quern foreclosed a finding that the law violates the Supremacy Clause. The Court of Appeals concluded, however, that both the no-cash and loss-or-theft provisions violate equal protection. 648 F.2d 801 (1981). We noted probable jurisdiction. 1122 U.S. 454, 102 S.Ct. 969, 71 L.Ed.2d 109.

II

Where a party raises both statutory and constitutional arguments in support of a judgment, ordinarily we first address the statutory argument in order to avoid unnecessary resolution of the constitutional issue. See Califano v. Yamasaki, 442 U.S. 682, 692-693, 99 S.Ct. 2545, 2553, 61 L.Ed.2d 176 (1979); Hagans v. Lavine, 415 U.S. 528, 543, 94 S.Ct. 1372, 1382, 39 L.Ed.2d 577 (1974).5 We conclude that this case may be resolved on statutory grounds. As we explain below, the New York no-cash and loss-or-theft rules conflict with valid federal regulations promulgated by the Secretary of Health, Education, and Welfare (Secretary) (now the Secretary of Health and Human Services) which proscribe inequitable treatment under the EA program. Thus, New York's rules are invalid under the Supremacy Clause.

Before reviewing the federal regulations that we find to be dispositive of this case, we first address appellant's claim that reliance on the Act is foreclosed by our decision in Quern v. Mandley, supra. In that case, we carefully reviewed the nature and scope of the EA program and examined one aspect of its relationship to the AFDC program.6 Under Title IV-A of the Act, state public assistance plans approved by the Secretary are eligible for federal financial assistance. AFDC is a major categorical aid program funded under the Act—indeed, it is "the core of the Title IV-A system." Id., at 728, 98 S.Ct., at 2071. States are required, as a condition of federal funding under the AFDC program, to make assistance available to all persons who meet statutory eligibility criteria. Id., at 740, 98 S.Ct., at 2077; 42 U.S.C. §§ 602(a)(10), 606(a). The EA program is a supplement to such categorical assistance programs as AFDC. It permits federal reimbursement to States which choose to provide for temporary emergency assistance in their Title IV-A plans. 42 U.S.C. § 603(a)(5). In contrast to AFDC, the EA program establishes much broader eligibility standards and is not limited to persons eligible for AFDC. 42 U.S.C. § 606(e).

Plaintiffs in Quern made the broad claim that a State participating in the federal EA program may not limit eligibility for EA more narrowly than the federal eligibility standards in § 406(e). The state plan at issue provided emergency as- sistance only to certain AFDC families who were without shelter and to applicants presumptively eligible for AFDC who were in immediate need of clothing or household furnishings. We rejected the plaintiffs' broad claim and held that unlike the AFDC program, § 406(e) establishes only permissive, not mandatory, eligibility standards.

Quern did not address the statutory issue before us today whether the complete and automatic exclusion of AFDC recipients from a State's EA program is inconsistent with the Act and applicable regulations. The Court had no occasion to consider the question, since the EA program in that case included only AFDC recipients. In addition, the only pertinent federal regulations in Quern undermined the plaintiffs' claims and supported the State's rules. See 436 U.S., at 743-744, n. 19, 98 S.Ct., at 2078-2079, n. 19; 45 CFR § 233.120 (1981). Here, on the other hand, the Secretary has promulgated a regulation inconsistent with New York's no-cash and loss-or-theft rules. See 45 CFR § 233.10 (1981); infra, at 2360-2362.7 In...

To continue reading

Request your trial
240 cases
  • Murdock v. Gutierrez
    • United States
    • U.S. District Court — Northern District of West Virginia
    • July 24, 2007
    ...Id. at 844, 104 S.Ct. 2778. The agency's construction of the statute is given "substantial deference," Blum v. Bacon, 457 U.S. 132, 141-142, 102 S.Ct. 2355, 72 L.Ed.2d 728, and will be upheld unless it is "arbitrary, capricious, or manifestly contrary to the statute." Chevron at 844, 104 S.......
  • The City Of N.Y. v. The Permanent Mission Of India To The United Nations
    • United States
    • U.S. Court of Appeals — Second Circuit
    • August 17, 2010
    ...cannot coexist with the State Department's Notice, and so, if the latter is valid, it must prevail. See Blum v. Bacon, 457 U.S. 132, 145-46, 102 S.Ct. 2355, 72 L.Ed.2d 728 (1982); see also Wyeth v. Levine, --- U.S. ----, 129 S.Ct. 1187, 1200-01, 173 L.Ed.2d 51 (2009) (recognizing that an ag......
  • Maryland Dept. of Human Resources v. United States
    • United States
    • U.S. District Court — District of Maryland
    • May 20, 1986
    ...U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, 467 U.S. 837, 104 S.Ct. 2778, 81 L.Ed.2d 694 (1984); Blum v. Bacon, 457 U.S. 132, 141-42, 102 S.Ct. 2355, 2361, 72 L.Ed.2d 728 (1982). If the interpretation of the secretary of an agency is reasonable, the courts must respect it. Udall v. Ta......
  • Niece v. Fitzner
    • United States
    • U.S. District Court — Eastern District of Michigan
    • October 10, 1996
    ...are entitled to substantial deference." Helen L. v. DiDario, 46 F.3d 325, 331 (3d Cir.) (citing Blum v. Bacon, 457 U.S. 132, 141, 102 S.Ct. 2355, 2361, 72 L.Ed.2d 728 (1982)), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 116 S.Ct. 64, 133 L.Ed.2d 26 (1995). Accordingly, the Court should conclude that sectio......
  • Request a trial to view additional results

VLEX uses login cookies to provide you with a better browsing experience. If you click on 'Accept' or continue browsing this site we consider that you accept our cookie policy. ACCEPT