Valle v. Secretary for Dept. of Corrections

• Decision Date: 11 August 2006
• Docket Number: No. 05-15724.,05-15724.
• Citation: 459 F.3d 1206
• Parties: Manuel VALLE, Petitioner-Appellant, v. SECRETARY FOR THE DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS, Florida Department of Corrections, Respondent-Appellee.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Eleventh Circuit

459 F.3d 1206

Manuel VALLE, Petitioner-Appellant, v. SECRETARY FOR THE DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS, Florida Department of Corrections, Respondent-Appellee.

No. 05-15724.

United States Court of Appeals, Eleventh Circuit.

August 11, 2006.

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Todd Gerald Scher (Court-Appointed), Miami Beach, FL, for Valle.

Scott Andrew Browne, Tampa, FL, Sandra Sue Jaggard, Miami, FL, for Respondent-Appellee.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Southern District of Florida.

Before CARNES, HULL and WILSON, Circuit Judges.

WILSON, Circuit Judge:

Manuel Valle appeals the district court's denial of his 28 U.S.C. § 2254 petition for writ of habeas corpus. We address the following issues: (1) whether Valle was denied the effective assistance of counsel at resentencing due to counsels' presentation of model prisoner evidence; (2) whether Valle's rights under Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 106 S.Ct. 1712, 90 L.Ed.2d 69 (1986), were violated; (3) whether Valle's rights under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments were violated when the trial court denied his motions to suppress incriminating statements; and (4) whether Valle was denied Due Process and Equal Protection based on the manner in which the jury was selected. After argument and consideration of the parties' briefs and the record, we affirm.

I. Facts and Procedural History

The facts of this case, as summarized by the Florida Supreme Court, are as follows:

On April 2, 1978, Officer Louis Pena of the Coral Gables Police Department was on patrol when he stopped appellant and a companion for a traffic violation. The events that followed were witnessed by Officer Gary Spell, also of the Coral Gables Police Department. Officer Spell testified that when he arrived at the scene, appellant was sitting in the patrol car with Officer Pena. Shortly thereafter, Spell heard Pena use his radio to run a license check on the car appellant was driving. According to Spell, appellant then walked back to his car and reached into it, approached Officer Pena and fired a single shot at him, which resulted in his death. Appellant also fired two shots at Spell and then fled. He was picked up two days later in Deerfield Beach.

Valle v. State, 474 So.2d 796, 798 (Fla. 1985) (Valle II).

On April 13, 1978, Valle was indicted for the first degree murder of Pena, the attempted first degree murder of Spell, and the possession of a firearm by a convicted felon. Valle v. State, 394 So.2d 1004, 1005 (Fla.1981) (per curiam) (Valle I). At trial, which began on May 8, 1978, the jury found Valle guilty of all crimes charged. Id. at 1006. The jury recommended a sentence of death, which the trial court followed. Id. Valle then appealed his convictions and death sentence, and the Florida Supreme Court reversed his convictions in 1981 after finding that Valle was denied his right to effective assistance of counsel when he was required to go to trial within 24 days after his arraignment. Id. at 1005.

After remand, Valle was again convicted of first degree murder, received a death sentence, and appealed. Valle II, 474 So.2d at 798. The Florida Supreme Court affirmed his convictions and sentence, id., but the United States Supreme Court subsequently vacated judgment and remanded the case to the Florida Supreme Court in light of Skipper v. South Carolina, 476 U.S. 1, 106 S.Ct. 1669, 90 L.Ed.2d 1 (1986).¹ Valle v. Florida, 476 U.S. 1102, 106 S.Ct. 1943, 90 L.Ed.2d 353 (1986) (Valle III).

On remand, the Florida Supreme Court determined that Valle was entitled to resentencing because he was previously precluded from putting on the expert testimony of a clinical psychologist and two corrections consultants to show that Valle would be a model prisoner in the future, in violation of Skipper. Valle v. State, 502 So.2d 1225, 1225-26 (Fla.1987) (per curiam) (Valle IV). At this resentencing, the jury recommended a sentence of death by eight to four, and the court imposed the death penalty, finding that: "(1) Valle had been previously convicted of another violent felony; (2) the murder was of a law enforcement officer; (3) the murder was for the purpose of preventing lawful arrest; (4) the murder hindered the enforcement of laws; and (5) the murder was cold, calculated and premeditated." Valle v. State, 581 So.2d 40, 43 (Fla. 1991) (per curiam) (Valle V). The judge merged factors two, three, and four, and treated them as one aggravating factor. Id. The court did not find any mitigation. Id.

After this sentencing, Valle again appealed to the Florida Supreme Court, raising a number of claims, including his claim that during jury selection, the judge failed to hold an adequate inquiry into the state's peremptory challenges of black venire members. Id. The Florida Supreme Court rejected his claims, and Valle again appealed to the United States Supreme Court, which denied certiorari. Valle v. Florida, 502 U.S. 986, 112 S.Ct. 597, 116 L.Ed.2d 621 (1991) (Valle VI).

He then filed a motion for post-conviction relief under Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.850. Valle v. State, 705 So.2d 1331, 1332 (Fla.1997) (per curiam) (Valle VII). The Florida Supreme Court remanded for an evidentiary hearing on his claim of ineffective assistance of counsel based on his assertion that his defense team unreasonably introduced model prisoner evidence. Id. at 1334. After remand, the Florida Supreme Court affirmed the trial court's conclusion that his ineffective assistance claim based on Skipper was without merit. Valle v. State, 778 So.2d 960, 966-67 (Fla.2001) (per curiam) (Valle VIII).

Valle then filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus in state court, which was denied. Valle v. Moore, 837 So.2d 905, 906 (Fla.2002) (per curiam) (Valle IX). He subsequently filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus in federal district court, which was also denied. Valle v. Crosby, 18 Fla. L. Weekly Fed. D. 1017 (2005) (Valle X). The district court granted a certificate of appealability with respect to the four issues outlined above, and this appeal followed.

II. Standard of Review

Valle filed his petition after the effective date of the Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 ("AEDPA"). Therefore, this case is governed by the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 2254 as modified by the Act. Lindh v. Murphy, 521 U.S. 320, 326, 117 S.Ct. 2059, 2063, 138 L.Ed.2d 481 (1997). With respect to claims adjudicated on the merits, § 2254(d)(1) restricts the issuance of habeas relief to those cases resulting in a decision that was contrary to, or involving an unreasonable application of, clearly established federal law, as determined by the United States Supreme Court. Section 2254(d)(2) provides for habeas relief where the state court determination "resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court proceeding."

The AEDPA also mandates deference to state court factual determinations. Under § 2254(e)(1), a state court's determination of a factual issue is presumed correct. One seeking habeas relief must rebut this presumption by clear and convincing evidence. § 2254(e)(1).

III. Discussion

A. Ineffective Assistance of Counsel

Valle argues that his 1988 resentencing counsel's performance was deficient because their decision to present model prisoner evidence was based on the mistaken belief that they were required to do so or the previous death sentence would be reinstated. Valle argues that as a result of the introduction of this evidence, the door was opened to the State's presentation of evidence that Valle had twice attempted to escape from prison and an instruction to the jury that Valle had been on death row for ten years. Moreover, Valle argues that he can show prejudice because considering the totality of the evidence, confidence is undermined in the jury's eight to four death recommendation. See Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 375, 120 S.Ct. 1495, 1503, 146 L.Ed.2d 389 (2000) ("[E]rrors that undermine confidence in the fundamental fairness of the state adjudication certainly justify the issuance of" the writ of habeas corpus.).

The State responds that the state courts found that counsel made a strategic decision to present prison behavior evidence because other mitigation evidence had previously failed to persuade the jury or trial court not to recommend death. According to the State, Valle has failed to rebut these factual findings by clear and convincing evidence. See § 2254(e)(1). Here, the State argues, there is ample support for the finding that the attorneys were not credible. Therefore, the state courts' application of Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984), was not unreasonable or contrary to clearly established federal law. See § 2254(d)(1).

To show that counsel was so ineffective as to require reversal of the conviction, a defendant must show that counsel's performance was deficient and that prejudice resulted therefrom. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687, 104 S.Ct. at 2064. To do so, a defendant must show that counsel committed errors that were so serious as to deprive the defendant of the counsel guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment as well as a fair trial whose result is reliable. Id.

Here, the trial court found that "despite their claim to the contrary, [counsel] did not believe that they were required . . . to introduce evidence that the defendant was, and in the future, would be a model prisoner," but rather they believed that "without additional mitigating evidence, . . . the result of the sentencing proceeding would be the same" as it was in 1981. Valle VIII, 778 So.2d at 966. Counsel's performance, therefore, was reasonable and not deficient under Strickland.

The Florida Supreme Court agreed with the trial court's conclusion that counsel's performance did not constitute deficient performance and that Valle was unable to show prejudice in...