U.S. v. Brown

Decision Date01 August 2006
Docket NumberNo. 05-20319.,05-20319.
Citation459 F.3d 509
PartiesUNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. James A. BROWN; Daniel Bayly; Robert S. Furst; William R. Fuhs, Defendants-Appellants.
CourtU.S. Court of Appeals — Fifth Circuit

Stephan Edward Oestreicher, Jr. (argued), Sangita Katikineni Rao, U.S. Dept. of Justice, Criminal Div., Washington, DC, James Lee Turner, Asst. U.S. Atty., Houston, TX, for Plaintiff-Appellee.

Sidney Katherine Powell (argued), Law Offices of Sidney Powell, Asheville, NC, Deborah Ann Pearce, Powell & Pearce, Austin, TX, for Brown.

Lawrence Saul Robbins (argued), Alice Wan-Ping Yao, Gregory Lawrence Poe, Robbins, Russell, Englert, Orsek & Untereiner, Washington, DC, for Bayly.

John Whitelaw Nields, Jr. (argued), William Lee Webber, Howrey, Simon, Arnold & White, Washington, DC, for Furst.

Seth Paul Waxman (argued), Wilmer, Cutler, Pickering, Hale & Dorr, Washington, DC, Paul A. Engelmayer, Wilmer, Cutler & Pickering, New York City, for Fuhs.

Appeals from the United States District Court for the Southern District of Texas.

Before REAVLEY, JOLLY and DeMOSS, Circuit Judges.

E. GRADY JOLLY, Circuit Judge:

This appeal arises from a six-week trial in which the Government charged that Enron and Merrill Lynch employees engaged in a conspiracy and scheme to defraud Enron and its shareholders by "parking" an Enron asset—an equity interest in three power-generating barges moored off the coast of Nigeria—with Merrill for six months for the purpose of artificially enhancing Enron's 1999 end-of-year earnings report. Merrill agreed to invest $7 million to purchase equity in the barges so that Enron could record $12 million in earnings and meet its forecasts. The Government contended, however, that the sale was a sham because Enron executives orally promised Merrill a flat fee of $250,000 and a guaranteed 15% annual rate of return over the six-month period of Merrill's investment; Enron executives allegedly promised that Enron or an affiliate would buyback Merrill's interest in the barges if no third party could be found. Such a buyback agreement, the Government contended, rendered Merrill's interest in the barges risk-free, meaning that Enron's accounting of the deal as a sale rather than a lease was false. The jury agreed and convicted the appellants of conspiracy and wire fraud. Additionally, appellant Brown was convicted of perjury and obstruction of justice. For the reasons stated below, we reverse the conspiracy and wire-fraud convictions of each of the Defendants on the legal ground that the government's theory of fraud relating to the deprivation of honest services—one of three theories of fraud charged in the Indictment—is flawed. We further vacate appellant Fuhs's conviction on the ground that the evidence is insufficient to support his conviction. Finally, we affirm appellant Brown's convictions of perjury and obstruction of justice.

I

The trial below involved six Defendants. Sheila Kahanek, an accountant by training and a Senior Director in Enron's Asia/Pacific/Africa/China ("APACHI") energy division, was acquitted of all charges against her. Daniel Boyle, an Enron Vice President of Global Finance, was convicted on all counts against him and does not appeal. The following four Merrill Lynch executives (the "Defendants") were convicted on all counts against them and appear before us on appeal: Jim Brown, the head of Merrill's Strategic Asset and Lease Finance Group in New York City; William Fuhs, a Vice President under Brown in the New York office; Daniel Bayly, the head of Merrill's Global Investment Banking division; and Robert Furst, a Merrill executive answering directly to Bayly, responsible for generating business from Enron.

A

The Nigerian barges at the heart of this case were held by Enron's APACHI energy division. At the close of 1999, APACHI was pressured to monetize or sell assets in order to show a gain and meet earnings targets that, in turn, would allow Enron as a whole to meet the company's forecasted earnings for the final quarter of 1999. Various attempts at selling APACHI's primary asset, the barges, to an industry buyer were made in the final months of 1999, but each prospective deal collapsed. In early December 1999, Enron executives discussed the need for an "emergency alternative." When executives were informed that the barges would not be sold by year's end, they responded that a "friend of Enron," Merrill Lynch, might be able to buy the barges and "help Enron out."

In late December, Enron approached Merrill about buying the barges. Boyle discussed the deal with Furst, Merrill's Enron relationship manager. Furst communicated with others at Merrill, including Bayly, Brown, and Schuyler Tilney, the head of banking in Merrill's Houston office. Furst explained that Enron's then-Treasurer, Jeff McMahon, "asked Merrill to purchase $7 [million] of equity in a special purpose vehicle that will allow Enron to book $10 [million] of earnings. The transaction must close by 12/31/99. Enron is viewing this transaction as a bridge to permanent equity and they believe [Merrill's] hold will be for less than six months. The investment would have a 22.5% return." Furst emphasized the importance of fostering an ongoing business relationship with Enron and that the deal offered Merrill a chance to differentiate itself from other investment banks. When Furst explained the deal to Katherine Zrike, chief counsel for Merrill's Global Investment Banking, Zrike noted her concern due to the year-end nature of the deal, its unique quality, and a lack of due diligence.1

Furst and Brown communicated by fax regarding the deal, and Brown noted his concerns: "Enron credit/performance risk," a lack of "repurchase oblig. from Enron," and the "reputational risk" of "aid[ing]/abet[ting] Enron income stmt. manipulation." Brown also communicated his concerns to Fuhs, who in turn communicated the risks, including the risk of aiding Enron with "income manipulation," to Tina Trinkle, an analyst. Due to these concerns, the short timeline, and a lack of information about the deal, some Merrill employees, including Trinkle, thought the deal would not go through.

According to the Government, the barge deal proceeded because Enron agreed that either it or an affiliate would repurchase the barges from Merrill if a third-party buyer could not be found and that Enron would pay a fixed rate of return for the duration of Merrill's hold of the interest in the barges. Ben Glisan, a colleague of Boyle's and a Government witness, testified that multiple sources informed him of Enron's oral guarantee that Merrill would be taken out of the transaction within six months for a set return on the investment.

On December 22, Bayly, Brown, Furst and others (excluding Fuhs and any lawyers) participated in a conference call about the deal (the "Trinkle call"). Furst and Tilney explained that Enron needed to sell the barges by year-end in order to book additional earnings in 1999 and that someone at Enron indicated that Enron would agree to take Merrill out at a fixed rate of return. Bayly asked for a written assurance to support Enron's promise, and someone responded that a writing was not possible because such an assurance would prevent Enron from receiving the accounting treatment it sought with the deal. But either Furst or Tilney responded that Enron had given its strongest verbal assurances that Merrill would not own the barges after June 30. That same day, Brown and Fuhs received an e-mail from Furst's office in Dallas, describing some of the material terms of the deal including that Bayly would confirm Enron's promise with senior Enron management. In a later meeting with Furst that day, Zrike warned that for Enron to show the sale as a profit on its books, Merrill would have to own the barges outright without any buyback agreement. Furst stated that the agreement contemplated only Enron's attempt to remarket the barges. Zrike restated her concerns in afternoon meetings with Bayly on December 22, where the Government alleges Bayly had a duty, under Merrill's policy, to disclose his awareness of Enron's buyback promise to Zrike but failed to do so. At the end of the day on December 22, Furst e-mailed Boyle to announce the conference call between Bayly and Enron management—Andrew Fastow, McMahon, and Boyle—for 9:30 the next morning.

According to Government witness Eric Boyt, an accountant for APACHI, both Fastow and Boyle said that during the conference call, Fastow promised that Merrill would not own the barges for longer than six months and that if Enron could not facilitate a buyer, it would "guarantee a 15 percent buyback within six months." In this vein, Boyle authored an e-mail explaining the transaction as follows: "[Merrill's] decision to purchase the equity was based solely on personal assurances by Enron senior management to [Merrill] that the transaction would not go beyond June 30, 2000." Although Brown was not on the December 23 conference call, the Government alleges that he understood Fastow's promise on Enron's behalf; this allegation is supported by Brown's later e-mail of March 2001, describing a similar, prospective deal: "I would support an unsecured deal provided we had total verbal assurances from [the company's C.E.O. or C.F.O.].... We had a similar precedent with Enron last year, and we had Fastow get on the phone with Bayly and lawyers and promise to pay us back no matter what. Deal was approved and all went well."

Following this call, the initial draft of the "engagement letter" for the deal, including reference to Enron's oral buyback promise, was circulated. On December 28, Boyle sent out a revised version of the engagement letter, with "strike-through" indicating proposed removal of the language about the annual rate of return and that Merrill's interest would be subsequently sold or...

To continue reading

Request your trial
47 cases
  • U.S. v. Black, No. 05 CR 727.
    • United States
    • U.S. District Court — Northern District of Illinois
    • 21 Diciembre 2006
    ...of the fiduciary duty described above' clearly alleges Hausmann's misuse of the fiduciary relationship"); see also United States v. Brown, 459 F.3d 509, 519 (5th Cir.2006) ("We have previously undertaken the task of considering the pre-McNally case law. Thus, we have written, `[h]onest serv......
  • U.S. v. Kincaid-Chauncey
    • United States
    • U.S. Court of Appeals — Ninth Circuit
    • 20 Febrero 2009
    ...resulting in personal gain." (internal quotation marks and citation omitted; second alteration in original)); United States v. Brown, 459 F.3d 509, 521 (5th Cir.2006) ("[C]ases upholding convictions arguably falling under the honest services rubric can be generally categorized in terms of e......
  • U.S. v. Geddings
    • United States
    • U.S. District Court — Eastern District of North Carolina
    • 2 Julio 2007
    ...United States v. Thompson, 484 F.3d 877 (7th Cir.2007) (reversing public sector honest services guilty verdict), and United States v. Brown, 459 F.3d 509 (5th Cir.2006) (reversing private sector honest services guilty verdict). The evidence described in all of the cases that defendant cites......
  • U.S. v. Milovanovic
    • United States
    • U.S. Court of Appeals — Ninth Circuit
    • 3 Diciembre 2010
    ...the intangible right of honest services, and used the United States mails to carry out that scheme or artifice."); United States v. Brown, 459 F.3d 509, 519 (5th Cir.2006) ("Honest services are services owed to an employer under state law, including fiduciary duties defined by the employer-......
  • Request a trial to view additional results
1 firm's commentaries
  • Context Matters: Emails In White-Collar Prosecutions
    • United States
    • Mondaq United States
    • 17 Julio 2013
    ...theory of innocence, then a reasonable jury must necessarily entertain reasonable doubt"). 556 F.3d 871, 879 (8th Cir. 2009). Id. at 879. 459 F.3d 509 (5th Cir. 2006), cert. denied, 550 U.S. 933 Id. at 523. Id. at 525. Reprinted with permission from the July 2, 2013 edition of the NEW YORK ......
16 books & journal articles
  • Mail and wire fraud.
    • United States
    • American Criminal Law Review Vol. 47 No. 2, March 2010
    • 22 Marzo 2010
    ...(5th Cir. 2007) (holding violation of the wire fraud statute requires "the specific intent to defraud" (quoting United States v. Brown, 459 F.3d 509, 518 (5th Cir. 2006)); United States v. Leahy, 464 F.3d 773, 786 (7th Cir. 2006) (stating that a requisite element for mail or wire fraud is "......
  • Is Vagueness Choking the White-collar Statute?
    • United States
    • University of Georgia School of Law Georgia Law Review (FC Access) No. 53-2, 2019
    • Invalid date
    ...proof of specific intent to defraud."). 219. United States v. Rybicki, 354 F.3d 124, 146 (2nd Cir. 2003); see also United States v. Brown, 459 F.3d 509, 519-23 (5th Cir. 2006) (finding that illegal fraud requires "sufficient detriment" to the deceived party).220. Sec. Life Ins. Co. of Am. v......
  • Obstruction of justice.
    • United States
    • American Criminal Law Review Vol. 45 No. 2, March 2008
    • 22 Marzo 2008
    ...of the administration of justice." (quoting United States v. Thomas, 916 F.2d 647, 652 (11th Cir. 1990))). But see United States v. Brown, 459 F.3d 509, 531 (5th Cir. 2006) (holding that perjurious testimony before a grand jury has the effect of "closing off entirely the avenues of inquiry ......
  • Obstruction of justice.
    • United States
    • American Criminal Law Review Vol. 44 No. 2, March 2007
    • 22 Marzo 2007
    ...of the administration of justice." (quoting United States v. Thomas, 916 F.2d 647, 652 (11th Cir. 1990))). But see United States v. Brown, 459 F.3d 509, 531 (5th Cir. 2006) (holding that perjurious testimony before a grand jury has the effect of "closing off entirely the avenues of inquiry ......
  • Request a trial to view additional results

VLEX uses login cookies to provide you with a better browsing experience. If you click on 'Accept' or continue browsing this site we consider that you accept our cookie policy. ACCEPT