Rail-Transport Employees Assn. v. Union Pacific Motor Freight
Decision Date | 14 June 1996 |
Docket Number | RAIL-TRANSPORT,No. A070438,A070438 |
Citation | 46 Cal.App.4th 469,54 Cal.Rptr.2d 713 |
Court | California Court of Appeals Court of Appeals |
Parties | , 96 Cal. Daily Op. Serv. 4302, 96 Daily Journal D.A.R. 8406 EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION et al., Plaintiffs and Appellants, v. UNION PACIFIC MOTOR FREIGHT et al., Defendants and Respondents. |
Law Offices of Mark Carton, Mark Carton, San Francisco, Richard Schwartz & Associates Ltd., Richard E. Schwartz, St. Louis, MO, for Appellants.
Paul, Hastings, Janofsky & Walker, James A. Zapp, Rosemary M. Kirbach, John A. Makarewich, Los Angeles, Union Pacific Law Department, Michael L. Whitcomb, Los Angeles, Keck, Mahn & Cate, Patrick W. Jordan, Stephen N. Yang, San Francisco, for Respondents.
Plaintiffs Rail-Transport Employees Association (RTEA) et al., 2 and their out-of-state attorney Richard E. Schwartz appeal a March 3, 1995, order imposing $29,161.06 in discovery sanctions against them in favor of defendants and respondents Union Pacific Motor Freight (UPMF) et al. 3 (CODE CIV.PROC., §§ 20234 & 2025), and a February 17, 1995, order denying Schwartz's application for pro hac vice status. 5 Appellants contend the imposition of sanctions was unreasonable and an "unconstitutional penalty," and that denial of the pro hac vice application constituted an abuse of discretion. We affirm.
This appeal arises from discovery proceedings in a wrongful termination action. Sanctions were imposed as follows: $5,800 solely against Schwartz; $2,270 solely against RTEA; and $21,091.06 jointly and severally against RTEA and Schwartz.
The issue is whether discovery sanctions exceeding $5,000 are appealable under section 904.1, 6 subdivision (a)(11) and (12), amended effective January 1, 1994. (Stats.1993, ch. 456, § 12, No. 8 West's Cal.Legis. Service, p. 2107.)
Section 904.1(a) provides, in relevant part: (Italics added.)
Prior to legislation enacted in 1989, orders imposing discovery sanctions were not appealable. (Hanna v. BankAmerica Business Credit, Inc. (1993) 16 Cal.App.4th 913, 915 A split of authority occurred among the courts of appeal as to whether orders imposing discovery sanctions in excess of $750 were directly appealable under former section 904.1(k). Most cases concluded that discovery sanction orders, regardless of the amount, were not directly appealable, and were reviewable only on appeal from a final judgment in the action or, in the court's discretion, upon a petition for extraordinary writ. (See Green v. GTE California, Inc. (1994) 29 Cal.App.4th 407, 409-410, 34 Cal.Rptr.2d 517; Ballard v. Taylor (1993) 20 Cal.App.4th 1736, 1739, 25 Cal.Rptr.2d 384 (Ballard ); Peterson v. General Motors Corp. (1993) 19 Cal.App.4th 1330, 1333, 23 Cal.Rptr.2d 768; Hanna, supra, 16 Cal.App.4th at pp. 914-915, 20 Cal.Rptr.2d 430; Rao v. Campo (1991) 233 Cal.App.3d 1557, 1561, 285 Cal.Rptr. 691 (Rao ).)
20 Cal.Rptr.2d 430 (Hanna ) and cases cited therein.) In 1989 section 904.1(a) was amended by adding the provision that "[A]n appellate court may, in its discretion, review ... a judgment or order for the payment of monetary sanctions, upon petition for an extraordinary writ." (Italicized portion added by 1989 amendment.) Former section 904.1(k) was added to provide, in relevant part, that an appeal may be taken "From a superior court judgment directing payment of monetary sanctions by a party or an attorney for a party only if the amount exceeds seven hundred fifty dollars ($750). Lesser sanction judgments against a party or an attorney for a party may be reviewed on an appeal by that party after entry of final judgment in the main action, or, at the discretion of the court of appeal, may be reviewed upon petition for an extraordinary writ."
Rao was the cornerstone of the majority view. It focused on the fact that section 904.1(a) provided that any "judgment or order" imposing monetary sanctions was reviewable at the discretion of the appellate court upon petition for extraordinary writ, while former section 904.1(k) referred only to a "judgment." (Rao, supra, 233 Cal.App.3d at p. 1562, 285 Cal.Rptr. 691.) Rao concluded that the legislative intent behind the 1989 amendment to section 904.1 was to reduce the number of appeals from monetary sanctions, and the Legislature could not have intended to extend the right of appeal to include a category of order which had never been separately appealable. (Id. at p. 1563, 285 Cal.Rptr. 691.) Rao also reasoned that discovery sanctions are nonappealable under the collateral order doctrine. (Id. at pp. 1565-1566, 285 Cal.Rptr. 691.) Consequently, it held that orders imposing discovery sanctions in excess of $750 were not appealable.
The minority view of former section 904.1(k) concluded that orders imposing discovery sanctions above the $750 threshold are immediately appealable. (See Greene v. Amante (1992) 3 Cal.App.4th 684, 690, 4 Cal.Rptr.2d 571 (Greene ); Kohan v. Cohan (1991) 229 Cal.App.3d 967, 969-970, 280 Cal.Rptr. 474 (Kohan ).) The rationale for the minority view was that former section 904.1(k) did not distinguish between types of sanction orders, and "order" is synonymous with "judgment;" thus it was appealable. (Greene, supra, 3 Cal.App.4th at pp. 688-690, 4 Cal.Rptr.2d 571.) However, the minority view also recognized that in enacting former section 904.1(k), the Legislature intended to restrict, rather than expand, the category of appealable orders. (Kohan, supra, 229 Cal.App.3d at p. 970, 280 Cal.Rptr. 474.)
Courts expressly called upon the Legislature and the Supreme Court "to provide guidance on this issue in order to ensure uniformity throughout the state." (Hanna, supra, 16 Cal.App.4th at p. 918, 20 Cal.Rptr.2d 430; accord, Ballard, supra, 20 Cal.App.4th at p. 1739, 25 Cal.Rptr.2d 384.)
The 1993 amendment to section 904.1 increases the appealable threshold from $750 to $5,000 and expressly recognizes that the right of appeal lies from a sanctions "order" (§ 904.1(a)(12)), as well as from an "interlocutory judgment" (§ 904.1(a)(11)). However, like its predecessor, former section 904.1(k), the amended section 904.1 does not expressly refer to discovery sanction orders. Despite pleas for guidance, the Legislature's amendment of section 904.1 does not, on its face Given the uncertainty we must resort to rules of statutory interpretation to ascertain the Legislature's intent and give it effect. (Rao, supra, 233 Cal.App.3d at p. 1562, 285 Cal.Rptr. 691.) Statutory interpretation is a question of law which we decide de novo. (California Teachers Assn. v. San Diego Community College Dist. (1981) 28 Cal.3d 692, 699, 170 Cal.Rptr. 817, 621 P.2d 856; Schwetz v. Minnerly (1990) 220 Cal.App.3d 296, 302, 269 Cal.Rptr. 417.)
clarify whether discovery sanctions in excess of $5,000 are appealable.
Unfortunately, the legislative history of AB 58 (the bill to amend section 904.1) does not definitively reflect the Legislature's intent as to appeals from discovery sanctions. The May 19, 1993, Assembly Committee on Judiciary report states: (Assem.Com. on Judiciary Rep. on Assem. Bill No. 58 (May 19, 1993).)
The August 17, 1993, Senate Committee on Judiciary report states, in relevant part: (Sen. Com. on Judiciary Rep. on Assem. Bill No. 58 (Aug. 17, 1993), italics added.)
Although the Assembly Committee on Judiciary report states that the intent of AB 58 was to resolve a dispute among the appellate courts regarding the appealability of sanction orders exceeding $750, it does not state that the nature of the controversy involved discovery sanctions. However,...
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