Wilbur v. United States
Decision Date | 01 December 1930 |
Docket Number | No. 5241.,5241. |
Citation | 60 App. DC 11,46 F.2d 217 |
Parties | WILBUR, Secretary of the Interior, v. UNITED STATES ex rel. BARTON. |
Court | U.S. Court of Appeals — District of Columbia Circuit |
O. H. Graves and E. C. Finney, both of Washington, D. C., for appellant.
James Conlon, of Washington, D. C., for appellee.
Before MARTIN, Chief Justice, and ROBB and VAN ORSDEL, Associate Justices.
Appeal from a judgment in the Supreme Court of the District directing the issuance of a writ of mandamus to compel the Secretary of the Interior "to reinstate the application of the petitioner, Roy G. Barton, * * * and to proceed thereon according to law."
Should the judgment be affirmed, it probably would result in the reinstatement of "more than 5,000 applications for oil and gas permits on public lands pending in the General Land Office in Washington and an unknown number in the field offices."
The cause was heard on petition and answer. There is no dispute as to the facts, which are substantially as follows: On June 6, 1928, Barton filed an application in the Land Office at Las Cruces, N. M., for a permit to prospect for oil and gas in a certain described tract of public land of the United States (Act of February 25, 1920, 41 Stat. 437).
On March 13, 1929, the Department of the Interior released a "Memorandum for the Press," reading in part as follows:
On the same day a telegram was forwarded by the Department to the various United States land offices, including the land office at Las Cruces, N. M., reading in part as follows:
On March 16, 1929, Departmental Order No. 337 was issued, reading in part as follows: This order also was incorporated in a "Memorandum for the Press" issued by the Department on the same day.
On March 26, 1929, the Commissioner of the General Land Office, "pursuant to instructions approved by the Secretary of the Interior March 13, 1929, and in accordance with the policy announced in Departmental Order No. 337 of March 16, 1929, rejected" Barton's application. An appeal was taken, and the order of rejection was sustained by the Department in a decision dated September 4, 1929.
In his petition Barton avers "that there is nothing in or under the provisions of the Act of February 25, 1920 (41 Stat. 437), * * * which requires your relator to make any substantial expenditures for reliable geological surveys upon the lands embraced in his oil and gas application * * * in order to entitle him to a permit for the lands described in said application;" and that "the Secretary of the Interior is without authority of law to reject his application upon any ground, and especially upon the ground alleged that no applications for permits will be allowed after March 12, 1929, because of the adoption of a new policy as set out in said press notices of March 13, 1929, hereinabove quoted, and March 16, 1929, also identified as Departmental Order No. 337."
The answer admits, for the purposes of this suit, that Barton "was duly qualified under the law to receive the permit for which he applied; that at all times relator (Barton) was and is now ready, able, and willing to comply with all regulations made pursuant to the said act of Congress respecting the duties and obligations of permittee."
Did the orders of the Secretary of the Interior amount to a temporary withdrawal of the public land from location, entry, and exploration for the purpose of discovering oil or gas; and, assuming the withdrawal, did the mere filing of an application for a prospecting permit initiate a right in the applicant that could not be affected by the withdrawal?
The Act of June 25, 1910 (36 Stat. 847), "to authorize the President of the United States to make withdrawals of public lands in certain cases," reads in part as follows: "Be it enacted * * * That the President may, at any time in his discretion, temporarily withdraw from settlement, location, sale, or entry any of the public lands of the United States including the District of Alaska and reserve the same for water-power sites, irrigation, classification of lands, or other public purposes to be specified in the orders of withdrawals, and such withdrawals or reservations shall remain in force until revoked by him or by an Act of Congress." Section 1 (43 USCA § 141).
Prior to 1910 the President had acted in scores of cases without express statutory authority, and in United States v. Midwest Oil Co., 236 U. S. 459, 35 S. Ct. 309, 59 L. Ed. 673, his authority to make such withdrawals was expressly sustained.
There can be no doubt that the effect of the orders issued by the Secretary was to withdraw from further location, entry, and exploration for the discovery of oil and gas all public land, and that the purpose of such withdrawal was to meet conditions due to great overproduction and to conserve oil and gas in the public interest. That such was the intent of the Secretary and the understanding of the public is equally plain. It is immaterial that the orders were not limited as to time, for the act of 1910 provides that such withdrawals or reservations shall remain in force until revoked by the President or by an act of Congress.
The next question to be determined is whether the withdrawal of the Secretary was the withdrawal of the President. It is settled law that "the president speaks and acts through the heads of the several departments in relation to subjects which appertain to their respective duties" (Wilcox v. Jackson, 13 Pet. 498, 513, 10 L. Ed. 264), and that "the acts of the heads of departments, within the scope of their powers, are in law the acts of the President" (Wolsey v. Chapman, 101 U. S. 755, 769, 25 L. Ed. 915). In the case last mentioned it was held that the order of the Secretary of the Interior, directing that the lands on the Des Moines river above the Racoon fork be reserved from sale, was in contemplation of law the order of the President and had the same effect as the proclamation mentioned in the Act of September 4, 1841 (5 Stat. 453). The court said: See, also, United States v. Morrison, 240 U. S. 192, 36 S. Ct. 326, 60 L. Ed. 599; Northern Pacific Railway Co. v. Wismer, 246 U. S. 283, 38 S. Ct. 240, 62 L. Ed. 716; Relation of the President to the Executive Departments, 7 Op. Attys. Gen. 453.
In the present case the orders of the Secretary gave...
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