Bangerter v. Orem City Corp., 92-4150

• Decision Date: 11 January 1995
• Docket Number: No. 92-4150,92-4150
• Citation: 46 F.3d 1491
• Parties: Brad BANGERTER, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. OREM CITY CORPORATION, a Utah Municipal Corporation, Defendant-Appellee.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Tenth Circuit

Page 1491

46 F.3d 1491

8 A.D.D. 1097

Brad BANGERTER, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. OREM CITY CORPORATION, a Utah Municipal Corporation Defendant-Appellee.

No. 92-4150.

United States Court of Appeals Tenth Circuit.

Jan. 11, 1995.

Robert B. Denton, Legal Center for People with Disabilities, Salt Lake City, UT, for plaintiff/appellant.

Jody K. Burnett of Williams & Hunt, Salt Lake City, UT, for defendant/appellee.

Before BRORBY, McWILLIAMS, and EBEL, Circuit Judges.

EBEL, Circuit Judge.

Plaintiff-Appellant Brad Bangerter ("Bangerter"), a mentally disabled adult, alleges that zoning actions taken by Defendant-Appellee, Orem City, Utah ("Orem"), violated the Fair Housing Act, codified as amended by the Fair Housing Act Amendments of 1988 ("FHAA") at 42 U.S.C. Sec. 3601 et seq. In particular, Bangerter claims that conditions placed by Orem on zoning approval for a group home for the mentally retarded in which Bangerter lived, and the Utah statute and local ordinance pursuant to which those conditions were imposed, discriminated against Bangerter because of his handicap in violation of the FHAA. The district court dismissed Bangerter's claims pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6), and he now appeals. We hold that the district court prematurely dismissed this action and incorrectly applied an equal protection analysis to Bangerter's statutory claims under the FHAA. Accordingly, we reverse and remand.

I. BACKGROUND

In late December 1989, Utah mental health officials discharged Bangerter from the Utah State Developmental Center to a group home in an Orem residential neighborhood zoned R-1-8, single family residential. Although technically designated as "single family," Orem allows a number of uses in its R-1-8 zone category, including nurses' homes, foster family care homes, convents, monasteries, rectories, and, pursuant to state law, group homes for the elderly. Appellee Supp.App. at 15-16, 19-21. In addition, Orem allows group homes for the mentally or physically handicapped to be located in areas zoned R-1-8 provided that the homes obtain a conditional use permit. ¹ Utah law expressly outlines special conditions that localities can impose on the granting of zoning permits for group homes for the handicapped. Utah Code Ann. Sec. 10-9-2.5. ² The group home into which Bangerter was placed was established pursuant to a contract between the home's operator, RLO, Inc. ("RLO"), ³ and the Division of Services for People With Disabilities of the Utah State Department of Human Services ("Division"). ⁴ However, RLO had not obtained a conditional use permit, as required by an Orem ordinance promulgated pursuant to Utah Code Ann. Sec. 10-9-2.5, ⁵ when Bangerter moved to the group home to live with three other mentally retarded men. At Orem's insistence, RLO subsequently applied for the permit, which the Orem City Council granted, subject to conditions permitted under Utah Code Ann. Sec. 10-9-2.5, after reviewing the application during public hearings held in February and March 1990.

In granting the permit on March 13, 1990, the Council imposed two conditions on the group home that Bangerter alleges violate the FHAA:

[the group home operator] had to ensure the City that the residents were properly supervised on a twenty-four-hour basis; [and]

[the group home operator] had to establish a community advisory committee through which all complaints and concerns of the neighbors could be addressed.

Appellant App. at 7, Complaint p 26. ⁶

On March 15, 1991, Bangerter was transferred to a different group home in Provo, and he has not since lived at the RLO-Chrysalis group home in question in the instant action. Bangerter filed this action on March 13, 1992 in federal district court asking for declaratory, injunctive, and monetary relief based on the following two alleged causes of action: (1) that the conditions allowed by Utah Code Ann. Sec. 10-9-2.5 and imposed by the Orem City Council in granting the conditional use permit were preempted by and in violation of the FHAA; ⁷ and (2) that the conditional use permit application process violated the FHAA because the public hearings held by the Council subjected Bangerter to threats and disparaging personal remarks and required him and the other residents of the group home--unlike residents of a group home without mental retardation--to ask the City's permission to live together, Appellant App. at 11-12, Complaint pp 38-43. ⁸

In response to Bangerter's complaint, Orem filed a motion to dismiss pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6), and the court dismissed both of Bangerter's causes of action. The court first addressed the issue of standing and concluded that Bangerter possessed standing to challenge the imposition of the 24-hour supervision requirement because Bangerter belongs to a protected class under the FHAA and alleged an actual injury in the form of the 24-hour supervision requirement's interference with his ability to live independently and his right of privacy. Bangerter v. Orem City Corp., 797 F.Supp. 918, 921 (D.Utah 1992). The court held that Bangerter lacked standing to challenge the imposition of the community advisory committee requirement, however, because that condition only affected the group home operator and did not present any threatened or actual injury to Bangerter. Id.

On the merits, the court held that Bangerter alleged a prima facie case that Orem's housing ordinance violates the FHAA because it treats handicapped individuals differently from non-handicapped residents. Id. at 922. ⁹ Nonetheless, the court concluded that the challenged ordinance and the 24- hour supervision requirement did not violate the FHAA because they were rationally related to the legitimate government interest of integrating the handicapped "into normal surroundings." Id. at 922-23. ¹⁰ The court also held that Orem could not be held liable for any statements made at the public hearings, and thus dismissed Bangerter's second cause of action. Id. at 923.

Bangerter does not appeal the district court's dismissal of his second claim, and thus we do not address it on appeal. However, as to Bangerter's appeal of the court's dismissal of his first cause of action, we hold that the district court incorrectly evaluated the challenged conduct under the FHAA and impermissibly relied on factual findings in dismissing Bangerter's complaint.

II. DISCUSSION

We first address the issue of standing and then proceed to the merits of Bangerter's claims to assess whether Bangerter has stated a legally sufficient claim upon which relief could be granted.

A. Standing

Orem has not appealed the district court's finding that Bangerter had standing to bring this action with respect to the 24-hour supervision requirement. Nevertheless, we must address the issue sua sponte because standing involves a constitutional limitation on a federal court's jurisdiction. Alexander v. Anheuser-Busch Cos., Inc., 990 F.2d 536, 538 (10th Cir.1993). We also review the district court's ruling, which Bangerter did timely appeal, that Bangerter did not have standing to challenge the condition that RLO establish a neighborhood advisory committee. We further review Bangerter's somewhat oblique claim that he was injured by the conditional permitting scheme in general apart from the public hearings which Bangerter did not challenge on appeal. ¹¹ We hold that Bangerter has adequately alleged standing to challenge the 24-hour supervision requirement and the neighborhood advisory committee requirement, but that he has not alleged standing to challenge the permitting process generally. On remand, the district court should conduct a factual inquiry to determine whether Bangerter can prove his allegations of personal injury.

Standing under the Fair Housing Act extends "to the full limits of Art. III." Havens Realty Corp. v. Coleman, 455 U.S. 363, 372, 102 S.Ct. 1114, 1121, 71 L.Ed.2d 214 (1982) (quoting Gladstone, Realtors v. Village of Bellwood, 441 U.S. 91, 103 n. 9, 99 S.Ct. 1601, 1609 n. 9, 60 L.Ed.2d 66 (1979)); Housing Authority of the Kaw Tribe of Indians v. City of Ponca City, 952 F.2d 1183, 1193 (10th Cir.1991), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 112 S.Ct. 1945, 118 L.Ed.2d 550 (1992). Courts thus lack authority to erect prudential barriers to restrict the standing of plaintiffs bringing suit under the FHAA beyond the constitutional parameters erected by Article III. Havens, 455 U.S. at 372, 102 S.Ct. at 1120-21. The Constitution requires three elements for standing: (1) actual or threatened injury; (2) a causal connection to the conduct complained of; and (3) redressability of the injury by the requested relief. Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, --- U.S. ----, ----, 112 S.Ct. 2130, 2136, 119 L.Ed.2d 351 (1992). ¹² We review de novo the district court's decision regarding Bangerter's standing under Article III. Hackford v. Babbitt, 14 F.3d 1457, 1465 (10th Cir.1994).

As a preliminary matter, we note that the district court correctly found that Bangerter, a mentally retarded adult, is within the class of persons protected by the FHAA. In amending the Fair Housing Act, or Title VIII of the Civil Rights Act of 1968, in 1988, one of Congress's explicit motivations was to extend federal protections against housing discrimination to individuals with physical or mental handicaps. See 42 U.S.C. Secs. 3602 & 3604.

Furthermore, the FHAA's prohibitions clearly extend to discriminatory zoning practices. The House Committee Report accompanying the FHAA states that the FHAA "is intended to prohibit the application of special requirements through land-use regulations, restrictive covenants, and conditional or special use permits that have the effect of limiting the ability of [the handicapped] to live in the residence of their choice in the community." H.R.Rep. No. 100-711, 100th Cong., 2d Sess. 24 (1988) U.S.Code Cong. & Admin.News 1988, pp. 2173, 2185. Prohibited practices include not only those that make the sale or rental of housing...