State v. Brockman

• Decision Date: 31 October 1870
• Citation: 46 Mo. 566
• Parties: THE STATE OF MISSOURI, Respondent, v. WM. T. BROCKMAN, Appellant.
• Court: Missouri Supreme Court

46 Mo. 566

THE STATE OF MISSOURI, Respondent,

v.WM. T. BROCKMAN, Appellant.

Supreme Court of Missouri.

October Term, 1870.

Appeal from St. Louis Criminal Court.

R. S. McDonald, for appellant.

I. The court erred in permitting the confession of the defendant to go to the jury. (1 Greenl. Ev. 263-66, §§ 219-22; 1 Phil. Ev. 449, and authorities cited; Rex v. Gibbon, 1 C. & P. 97; Rex v. Enoch & Mary Pullen, 5 C. & P. 539; 8 C. & P. 734; Hector v. The State, 2 Mo. 135; 1 Arch. Crim. Pl. 125-6; Roberts' Case, 1 Dev, 259-64; Roscoe's Crim. Ev. 34; Rex v. Cooper, 5 C. & P. 535; 15 Wend. 231.)

II. The law declares that the inducements, to make the confession of a prisoner inadmissible, must be held out by a person in authority. A constable, magistrate, or prosecutor, are considered as persons in authority. (1 Greenl. Ev. 367, § 222; Thompson's Case, 1 Leach Crim. Cas. 325; Eng. L. & Eq. 586; Chabbock's Case, 1 Mass. 144; Joy on Confessions, 59-61; Rex v. Parratt, 4 C. & P. 570; Rex v. Enoch, supra.)

III. The case of State v. Hawkins, 7 Mo. 190, is not in point. There the words used did not cause the confession, but the declarations or admissions were caused bv the altercation and not by the words of the sheriff.

Charles P. Johnson, Circuit Attorney, and H. B. Johnson, Attorney-General, for respondent.

The confession was not rendered inadmissible by reason of the prosecutor telling him, the defendant, that it would be better for him to tell all about it--the prosecutor distinctly informing the defendant at the time that he had no promises to make. (Hawkins v. State, 7 Mo. 190; 1 Greenl. Ev., § 229; 1 Phil. Ev. 547-50.)

WAGNER, Judge, delivered the opinion of the court.

That confessions induced by the flattery of hope, or terror of punishment, are not admissible in evidence, is a principle well settled in our jurisprudence. (Hester v. State, 2 Mo. 166.) In the case of Hawkins v. State, 7 Mo. 190, where the confession was received, it does not appear that any influence was exerted over the accused by the person who had her in charge. In that case the defendant was indicted and convicted for poisoning her husband; and whilst she and a negro woman, who was also arrested as a participant in the crime, were in charge of the sheriff and another person, a conversation grew up between the defendant and the negro woman, who she evidently thought had betrayed her and divulged the whole transaction; upon hearing which the sheriff remarked that it would be better in the long run to tell the truth about the matter, but did not give any reason why it would be better to do so. The defendant made no answer to this; but a number of minutes afterward, when they were at the sheriff's house, the defendant and the negro woman continued their criminations and recriminations, and finally the whole matter was disclosed. To the objection to the admissibility of this confession, the court very properly says: “She (the defendant) seems to have been laboring under the impression that the negro had betrayed her, and her language was dictated by a sense of disapprobation of her conduct. Laboring under the same impression, she afterward commences an expostulation with the negro, and in the course of their altercation their guilt is disclosed; it is impossible to say that these disclosures were caused by anything said by the witness.”

But before any confession can be received in evidence in a criminal case, it must be shown that it was voluntary. “A free and voluntary confession,” said Eyre, C. B., “is deserving of the highest credit because it is presumed to flow from the strongest sense of guilt, and therefore it is admitted as proof of the crime to which it refers; but a confession forced from the mind by the flattery of hope or the torture of fear, comes in so questionable a shape, when it is to be considered as evidence of guilt, that no credit ought to be given to it; and therefore it is rejected.” (Warrickshall's Case, 1 Leach's Crim. Cas. 299.)

Phillips states the rule as follows: “A promise of benefit or favor, or threat of intimidation or disfavor, connected with the subject of the charge, held out by a person having authority in the matter, will be sufficient to exclude a confession made in consequence of such inducement, either of hope or fear. The prosecutor or prosecutor's wife, or attorney, or the prisoner's master or mistress, or a constable, or a person assisting him in the apprehension or custody, or a magistrate acting in the business, or other magistrate, has been respectively looked upon as having authority in the matter.” (1 Phil. Ev. 544, and cases cited.)

As an illustration of the rule, a few cases may be referred to. Thus, where the prosecutor said to the prisoner, “Unless you give me a more satisfactory account I will take you before a magistrate,” evidence of the confession thereupon made was rejected. (Thompson's Case, 1 Leach's Crim. Cas. 325; see also Commonwealth v. Harmon, 4 Barr, 269; State v. Cowen, 7 Ired. 239.) It was also rejected where the language used by the prosecutor was, “If you will tell me where my goods are I will be favorable to you” (Cass's Case, 1 Leach, 328; Boyd v. State,...