United States v. Simpson
Decision Date | 04 May 1972 |
Docket Number | No. 71-1790.,71-1790. |
Citation | 460 F.2d 515 |
Parties | UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. John William SIMPSON, aka Brother John Simpson, Defendant-Appellant. |
Court | U.S. Court of Appeals — Ninth Circuit |
Norton Tooby, Menlo Park, Cal., for defendant-appellant.
James Bruen, Asst. U.S. Atty., James L. Browning, Jr., U.S. Atty., San Francisco, Cal., for plaintiff-appellee.
Before KOELSCH, BROWNING, and ELY, Circuit Judges.
On December 24, 1970, Simpson took a container of gasoline to the offices of the Local Board of the Selective Service System in San Jose, California. He intended—despite his knowledge that such acts were illegal—to burn some of the Board's records in an effort to move the United States toward terminating the conflict in Southeast Asia.
After surreptitiously gaining access to the Board's file room, he opened one of the file drawers, doused the contents with his gasoline, ignited a match, and set the files ablaze. When the heat from the fire became unbearable, Simpson retreated from the room. He remained in the building, however, and thus was, within moments, arrested.
For his vandalism, Simpson was subsequently indicted on three charges. He was charged with having destroyed government property valued in excess of $100,1 with having mutilated and destroyed records deposited in a government office,2 and with having interfered with the administration of the Selective Service System.3 A jury convicted him of all three charges, and this appeal followed.
Simpson bases his appeal on asserted errors in the trial court's instructions to the jury and in its refusal to admit certain evidence offered by Simpson. Specifically, Simpson contends that the court (1) should have allowed evidence and given jury instructions regarding Simpson's claimed common law defense of "justification," (2) gave erroneous instructions on the meaning of "wilfully" as used in the pertinent statutes, and (3) was wrong in refusing to give instructions, proffered by Simpson, informing the jury of its power to acquit a defendant regardless of the evidence of his guilt. We conclude that none of the arguments has merit.
It has been acknowledged that otherwise criminal conduct may be justifiable, and thereby legally excused, when exigent circumstances have induced a defendant to act as he did. See, e. g., ALI Model Penal Code §§ 3.01 et seq. (1958 Tent.Draft No. 8). Actions taken in self-defense, in defense of property or other persons, or to avert a public disaster or a crime may be held non-criminal under this "justification" doctrine.4
During the trial, Simpson, pointing to the carnage and destruction in Indochina, sought to introduce evidence which, he argued, demonstrated that his actions hindering the Selective Service System were justifiably done to avert criminal acts and to defend property and persons in the war zone. He also urged the court to instruct the jury that it might find that his acts were non-criminal (i. e., justifiable) upon the application of such a theory. The trial judge, noting the absence of authority supporting application of the "justification defense" in this context, rejected the proffered evidence and the requested instructions.
While Simpson's first contention is somewhat novel,5 we think it is easily resolved. The theoretical basis of the justification defenses is the proposition that, in many instances, society benefits when one acts to prevent another from intentionally or negligently causing injury to people or property. That benefit is lost, however, and the theory fails when the person seeking to avert the anticipated harm does not act reasonably. Thus, it is commonly held, for example, that a person may not use excessive force in repelling an attacker or any force when the necessity therefor disappears. See, e. g., Hopper v. Ross, 123 F.Supp. 371 (D.La.1954), aff'd, 228 F.2d 622 (5th Cir. 1956); State v. Weber, 246 Or. 312, 423 P.2d 767, cert. den. sub nom. Weber v. Oregon, 389 U.S. 863, 88 S.Ct. 121, 19 L.Ed.2d 131 (1967); Peaseley v. Puget Sound Tug & Barge Co., 13 Wash.2d 485, 125 P.2d 681 (1942).
Here, it is apparent that Simpson's reckless, dangerous acts were not reasonable. An essential element of the so-called justification defenses is that a direct causal relationship be reasonably anticipated to exist between the defender's action and the avoidance of harm. See generally 6 C.J.S. Assault and Battery §§ 92-95 (1937), 87 C.J.S. Trespass § 156 (1954), and the cases cited therein. It was unreasonable for Simpson to assume that any violent action he initiated might have any significant effect upon the supposed ills6 that he hoped to remedy.7
Since Simpson is guilty of the offenses charged only if he acted with the required criminal intent, the prosecution was required to prove that he acted "willfully and knowingly" (18 U.S.C. § 1361, 50 U.S.C. App. § 462) and "willfully and unlawfully" (18 U.S.C. § 2071). Simpson argues that "willfully" means "in good faith and without evil motive" and that, hence, the trial judge erred in instructing the jury that "the motive of the defendant is irrelevant." The law is otherwise. As to these statutes, "the statutory requirement of willfulness is satisfied if the accused acted intentionally, with knowledge that he was breaching the statute." United States v. Moylan, 417 F.2d 1002, 1004-1005 (4th Cir. 1969). See also United States v. Boardman, 419 F.2d 110 (1st Cir. 1969).
None of the cases cited by Simpson convinces us that the Moylan court incorrectly decided this point. To the contrary, that decision fully demonstrates that Simpson's arguments are without authoritative support.8 See Moylan, supra, 417 F.2d at 1004-1005.
Simpson's final contention is that the trial judge erred in refusing to instruct the jury, as Simpson requested,9 that it had the power to acquit him regardless of the evidence of his guilt. The basis of this argument is the suggestion, now gaining some currency, see, e. g., Scheflin, Jury Nullification: The Right to Say No, 45 S.Cal.L.Rev. 168 (1971); Sax, Rex v. Dean of St. Asaph's, Conscience and Anarchy: The Prosecution of War Resisters, 57 Yale Review 481 (1968), that juries should be given more freedom to grant acquittals against the law. It is argued that this freedom—which is assertedly necessary to a jury's proper functioning in our constitutional democracy—is attained by advising jurors of their "power to bring in a verdict in the teeth of both law and facts." Horning v. District of Columbia, 254 U.S. 135, 138, 41 S.Ct. 53, 54, 65 L.Ed. 185, 187 (1920).
The "conscience verdicts" which result from exercise of this power often involve juries in the task of judging both law and fact. Even though facts may logically compel conviction under the law, we suspect that acquittal has nevertheless occasionally followed a jury's rejection of stated legal principles. This is a disturbing recognition, for in most courts,10 including those in the federal system, such decisions conflict with the principle that "it is the duty of juries in criminal cases to take the law from the court and apply that law to the facts as they find them to be from the evidence." Sparf and Hanson v. United States, 156 U.S. 51, 102, 15 S.Ct. 273, 293, 39 L.Ed. 343, 361 (1895); see Moylan, supra, 417 F.2d at 1005-1007.
However, as long as general verdicts are rendered in criminal cases, certain verdicts that may be reasonably thought to rest upon the juror's rejection of the law will occur. They cannot be detected, since the courts "cannot search the minds of the jurors to find the basis upon which they judge." Moylan, supra, at 1006. See, also United States v. Sisson, 294 F.Supp. 511 (D.Mass. 1968). We acknowledge the truth that all such verdicts, especially when viewed in hindsight, cannot reasonably be said to have been undesirable.11
In a similar vein, Judge Rifkind has remarked:
13
The jury occupies, and should continue to occupy, an independent role in our judicial system. It is recognized that jurors often reach "conscience" verdicts without being instructed that they have the power to do so. See H. Kalven & H. Zeisel: The American Jury 286-97 (1966). Equally important, American judges have generally avoided such interference as would divest juries of their power to acquit an accused, even though the...
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