People ex rel. Illinois Dept. of Human Rights v. Arlington Park Race Track Corp.

• Decision Date: 02 March 1984
• Docket Number: No. 83-1174,83-1174
• Citation: 461 N.E.2d 505,122 Ill.App.3d 517,77 Ill.Dec. 882
• Parties: , 77 Ill.Dec. 882 PEOPLE of the State of Illinois ex rel. ILLINOIS DEPARTMENT OF HUMAN RIGHTS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. ARLINGTON PARK RACE TRACK CORPORATION and John Mooney, Defendants-Appellants.
• Court: United States Appellate Court of Illinois

Page 505

461 N.E.2d 505

122 Ill.App.3d 517, 77 Ill.Dec. 882

PEOPLE of the State of Illinois ex rel. ILLINOIS DEPARTMENT

OF HUMAN RIGHTS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. ARLINGTON PARK RACE TRACK CORPORATION and John Mooney,

Defendants-Appellants.

No. 83-1174.

Appellate Court of Illinois,

First District, Fifth Division.

March 2, 1984.

[77 Ill.Dec. 883] LeMoine D. Stitt, Stitt, Moore & Lennon, Rolling Meadows, for defendants-appellants

Neil F. Hartigan, Atty. Gen., Chicago, for plaintiff-appellee; Kathryn A. Spalding, Asst. Atty. Gen., Chicago, of counsel.

SULLIVAN, Justice:

Defendants appeal from an order permanently enjoining them from implementing a policy of prohibiting children under the age of 14 from residing in the backstretch area of Arlington Park Race Track, in violation of section 3-104(A) of the Illinois Human Rights Act. (Ill.Rev.Stat.1981, ch. 68, par. 3-104(A).) They contend that (1) section 3-104(A) is inapplicable under the facts of this case; and (2) the policy in question is rationally related to legitimate health, safety, and welfare considerations.

Defendant Arlington Park Race Track Corporation (the Track) is licensed by the Illinois Racing Board to operate Arlington Park Race Track. During its 5-month race meeting, generally held from May through September each year, it has traditionally provided living facilities for certain employees of trainers who have been assigned stalls for horses accepted for racing. Currently, the Track owns nine facilities (hereinafter dormitories) in an area commonly known as the backstretch, providing over 600 rooms ranging in size from 80 to 206 square feet, with the larger rooms being designated for double occupancy and the smaller for single occupancy. Some of the rooms have individual washroom and shower facilities, but the majority of them are serviced by communal facilities, usually located in the same building. None of the rooms are equipped for cooking, which is prohibited under both Track rules and Illinois Racing Board rules because of the proximity of the dormitories to the stabling area. Nevertheless, a number of occupants, both those with children and those without, frequently breach those rules by using hot plates, and it appears that the Track has taken no steps to stop these violations.

Rooms in the dormitories are allocated to trainers on the basis of one space for each 2.5 horses accepted for racing. The trainers in turn assign the spaces to hot walkers, exercise persons, and grooms employed by them to care for the horses. A $75 refundable damage deposit is paid by the trainer for each space; no further charge is made to the trainer, and the trainers do not charge rent to their employees, who are among the lowest-paid workers in the industry. The employees may occupy the rooms so long as they are employed by a trainer who has horses stabled at the track, that trainer continues to give permission for such occupancy, and the employee is licensed by the Illinois Racing Board and observes its rules.

The Track also maintains 16 two-bedroom trailers in an area removed from the backstretch, ostensibly for rental to those employees who are accompanied by their families. The Track charges $300 per month for the rental units, but they are rented only during the race meeting, and the Track does not recover its costs through the rental charge.

For a number of years, some employees have brought their spouses and/or children to live with them in the dormitories, allegedly because either the cost of other housing was prohibitive or no space was available in the rental area maintained by On May 6, 1982, several employees affected by that policy filed charges with the Illinois Department of Human Rights (the Department), alleging violation of section 3-104(A) of the Illinois Human Rights Act (the Act), which provides:

[77 Ill.Dec. 884] the Track or in nearby communities. While exact figures apparently are not available, it seems that an average of 20 to 30 families live at the backstretch during each race meeting, and it is estimated that 30 to 40 children, the majority of whom are 6 years old or younger, are involved. The Track has been aware of the presence of these children since the early 1970's without taking action to exclude them. However, in April 1982, the Track notified trainers that no children would be permitted to reside at the backstretch during the 1982 race meeting.

"It is a civil rights violation for the owner or agent of any housing accommodation to: (A) Require, as a condition precedent to the rental of a housing accommodation, that the prospective tenant shall not have, at the time the application for rental is made, one or more children under the age of 14 years residing in his or her family * * *." (Ill.Rev.Stat.1981, ch. 68, par. 3-104(A).)

Shortly thereafter, the Department filed the instant action pursuant to section 7-104 of the Act, which provides in pertinent part:

"(1) At any time after a charge is filed, the Department may petition the appropriate court for temporary relief, pending final determination of the proceedings under this Act * * *.

* * *

* * *

(3) When the petition is based upon a civil rights violation as defined in Article 3 of this Act, the relief or restraining order entered by the court shall not exceed 5 days unless:

(a) A longer period is agreed to by the respondent, or

(b) The court finds that there is substantial evidence to demonstrate that the respondent has engaged in unlawful discrimination." (Ill.Rev.Stat.1981, ch. 68, par. 7-104(A).)

However, in its prayer for relief, the Department asked the court to grant a permanent injunction as well as a temporary restraining order and a preliminary injunction. A temporary restraining order was entered on May 14, 1982. No appeal was taken therefrom, and the parties subsequently agreed that the order should remain in effect until the trial court reached a final determination on the Department's request for a permanent injunction.

Defendants admitted in their answer that their policy is to prohibit children from living at the backstretch, but raised as affirmative defenses that section 3-104(A) was inapplicable to the dormitories because they are not "housing accommodations" as defined in section 3-101(C) of the Act (Ill.Rev.Stat.1981, ch. 68, par. 3-101(C)) and are not rented by the employees; that its action was required both by the rules of the Illinois Racing Board and by Village ordinances; and that it provided housing for families on a subsidized rental basis. After extensive hearings on these defenses, the trial court entered its final order permanently enjoining implementation of any policy prohibiting children under the age of 14 from residing at the backstretch on May 20, 1983 (the May 20 order), and the Track filed the instant appeal. The trial court supplemented that order with a written memorandum containing extensive findings of fact and conclusions of law on October 7, 1983 (the memorandum opinion) shortly after the Track filed its initial brief in this appeal.

OPINION

Prior to reaching the merits of this action, some further explanation is necessary regarding pertinent matters which have developed since the filing of this appeal from the May 20 order. Several months after that date, the parties realized that the trial court did not have the power to enter a permanent injunction. Section 8-111(D) of the Act states that "[e]xcept as otherwise provided by law, no court of this state shall have jurisdiction over the subject of an alleged civil rights violation other than as set forth in this Act." (Ill.Rev.Stat.1981, ch. 68, par. 8-111(D).) Thus, under the Act, the circuit court may only grant temporary relief during the pendency of administrative proceedings before the Illinois Department of Human Rights and the Illinois Human Rights Commission (Ill.Rev.Stat.1981, ch. 68, par. 7-104), or review an order of the Commission in accordance with the Administrative Review Act (Ill.Rev.Stat.1981, ch. 68, par. 8-111(A)). Since the complaint issued by the Department (apparently issued after the trial court's ruling and the parties' belated discovery that the order was improper) is still pending before the Commission, the court had power to act only for the purpose of granting temporary relief pursuant to section 7-104. In the instant case, such relief could be granted only for a maximum 5-day period unless the Track agreed to an extension thereof, or the court made a finding that there was substantial evidence of a civil rights violation; in effect, unless the court entered a preliminary injunction. In the instant case, the Track elected to consent to continuation of the temporary restraining order pending a final determination on the merits, and thus no preliminary injunction was entered.

It is settled that even if a court is one of general jurisdiction, when its power to act in a particular matter is controlled by statute, the court is governed by the rules of limited jurisdiction. (Brown v. VanKeuren (1930), 340 Ill. 118, 172 N.E. 1.) Subject matter jurisdiction includes not only the power to hear and determine a class of cases (Kemling v. Country Mutual Ins. Co. (1982), 107 Ill.App.3d 516, 63 Ill.Dec. 331, 437 N.E.2d 1253), but the power to grant the particular relief requested (J.L. Simmons Co. v. Capital Development Board (1981), 98 Ill.App.3d 445, 54 Ill.Dec. 71, 424 N.E.2d 821). Defects in subject matter jurisdiction cannot be waived (Volkmar v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Ins. Co. (1982), 104 Ill.App.3d 149, 60 Ill.Dec. 250, 432 N.E.2d 1149) nor can such jurisdiction be conferred on the court by the acquiescence or the stipulation of the parties (Talandis Construction Corp. v. Illinois Building Authority (1978), 60 Ill.App.3d 715, 18 Ill.Dec. 84, 377 N.E.2d 237). Thus, it was clear to the parties that, on appeal, it would be necessary for us to vacate the May 20 order, since the trial court did not have the power to grant a permanent...