Taylor v. Com.

Citation461 S.W.2d 920
PartiesArnold TAYLOR and Cline Brown, Appellants, v. COMMONWEALTH of Kentucky, Appellee.
Decision Date23 October 1970
CourtUnited States State Supreme Court (Kentucky)

Joseph J. Grace and Jim L. Lindbald, Paducah, for appellants.

John Breckinridge, Atty. Gen., Joseph Famularo, Asst. Atty. Gen., Frankfort, for appellee.

Joseph D. Harbaugh, University of Connecticut School of Law, West Hartford, Conn., amicus curiae.

CULLEN, Commissioner.

Arnold Taylor, Cline Brown and Frank Ross were indicted (Count No. 1) for murder and (Count No. 2) for armed robbery, growing out of the hold-up of a liquor store in McCracken County, Kentucky, in the course of which an employe of the store was killed. Taylor and Brown were jointly tried on the charges (Ross not having been apprehended) and, under instructions submitting the issue of their having aided and abetted Ross in the commission of the offenses, were found guilty on both charges. Judgment was entered fixing their punishments at two life sentences, one on each charge. Taylor and Brown have appealed, asserting various grounds of error.

The two appellants each signed a confession admitting having participated in the offenses, by planning them jointly with Ross and by acting as lookouts, and shooting and wounding a bystander, while Ross was engaged in holding up the liquor store and killing the employe. The confessions were held by the trial court to be admissible, after a hearing in chambers of the circumstances under which they were given, and they were used on the trial. The appellants' first contention on the appeal is that the trial court erred in admitting the confessions in evidence.

The evidence taken at the in-chambers hearing indicated that the confessions were made as part of a 'deal' in which certain felony charges pending against Taylor and Brown in Indiana were dismissed. The Commonwealth's Attorney for McCracken County told the two men that the Indiana authorities would dismiss the Indiana charges if the two would make confessions satisfactory to him. They made and signed the confessions and the Indiana charges were dismissed.

The appellants maintain that the confessions, having been induced by a promise, cannot be considered to have been free and voluntary and therefore were inadmissible. They rely on such cases as Shotwell Mfg. Co. v. United States, 371 U.S. 341, 83 S.Ct. 448, 9 L.Ed.2d 357, and Grades v. Boles, 398 F.2d 409 (C.A.4 July 8, 1968). It is our opinion, however, that the circumstances of the promise in the instant case were entirely compatible with the exercise by the appellants of a free volition in the giving of the confessions, and therefore the confessions were admissible. The evidence respecting the circumstances of the making of the confessions warranted the conclusion that the initial proposal for the 'deal' came from Taylor, who feared personal harm at the hands of a former acquaintance, then confined in the Indiana penitentiary, if he were convicted on one or more on the Indiana charges and sentenced to the Indiana penitentiary; that both Taylor and Brown were of the belief that they were in danger of conviction on the Indiana charges but could 'beat' the Kentucky charges; and that Brown obtained the advice of his counsel before agreeing to the confession deal.

In Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, the Supreme Court said (at page 478, 86 S.Ct. 1602, at page 1630, 16 L.Ed.2d 694):

'* * * Any statement given freely and voluntarily without any compelling influences is, of course, admissible in evidence. * * *'

We think it is obvious that the 'compelling influences' referred to are ones exerted by the public authorities in such a way as would be calculated to affect the accused's exercise of a free and voluntary choice of whether or not to confess. Here the promise was solicited by the accused, freely and voluntarily, so they cannot be heard to say that in accepting the promise they were the victims of compelling influences.

The appellants' next contention is that they were entitled to directed verdicts because their confessions were not corroborated as required by RCr 9.60. They concede that there was ample corroboration of the fact that an offense was committed, but they maintain that there was no corroboration of their criminal agency. The contention is without merit, because under the plain terms of RCr 9.60 corroboration is required only of the fact 'that such an offense was committed.' Corroboration of the accused's criminal agency is not required. See Caldwell v. Commonwealth, Ky., 351 S.W.2d 867; Commonwealth v. Harrison, 241 Ky. 88, 43 S.W.2d 354; Stallard v. Commonwealth, Ky., 432 S.W.2d 401.

As their third contention the appellants argue that the trial court erred in submitting the case to the jury on the issue of their having aided and abetted Frank Ross in the commission of the...

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  • Wright v. State, 61
    • United States
    • Court of Appeals of Maryland
    • September 1, 1984
    ...United States v. Stirling, 571 F.2d 708 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 824, 99 S.Ct. 93, 58 L.Ed.2d 116 (1978); Taylor v. Commonwealth, 461 S.W.2d 920 (Ky.1970), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 837, 92 S.Ct. 126, 30 L.Ed.2d 70 (1971); State v. Hutson, 537 S.W.2d 809 1 It is also clear to me that ......
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    ...as they find it and cannot introduce new issues into the case. State ex rel. Nesbitt v. Ford, 434 P.2d 934 (Okl.1967); Taylor v. Commonwealth, 461 S.W.2d 920 (Ky.1970), cert. den. Brown v. Kentucky,404 U.S. 837, 92 S.Ct. 126, 30 L.Ed.2d 70; State ex rel. Baxley v. Johnson,293 Ala. 69, 300 S......
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