Wright v. Enomoto
Decision Date | 21 February 1978 |
Docket Number | No. C-73-1422 SAW.,C-73-1422 SAW. |
Parties | James C. WRIGHT, Jerry Lee Pena, Roberto Pablo Salas, Michael S. Guile, Louis X. Richardson, Roberto Frias, Individually and on behalf of all others similarly situated, Plaintiffs, v. Jiro J. ENOMOTO, Director of the Department of Corrections of the State of California, W. T. Stone, Superintendent of the California Training Facility at Soledad, Jacob Gunn, Warden of the California State Prison at Folsom, Robert Rees, Warden of the California State Prison at San Quentin, and L. N. Patterson, Superintendent of the Deuel Vocational Institution, Defendants. |
Court | U.S. District Court — Northern District of California |
B. E. Bergesen, III, Sidney M. Wolinsky, Vilma S. Martinez, Sanford J. Rosen, Mexican-American Legal Defense & Education Fund, William Bennett Turner, NAACP Legal Defense & Education Fund, Bernard Zimmerman, San Francisco, Cal., James F. Smith, Legal Aid Society of Sacramento County, Sacramento, Cal., for plaintiffs.
Evelle J. Younger, Atty. Gen. of the State of California, Jerome C. Utz, C. Michael Buzzell, Deputy Attys. Gen., San Francisco, Cal., for defendants.
Before DUNIWAY, Circuit Judge, and WOLLENBERG and WEIGEL, District Judges.*
Judgment Affirmed February 21, 1978. See 434 U.S. 1052, 98 S.Ct. 1223, 55 L.Ed.2d 756.
This action was brought by plaintiffs on behalf of themselves and the class of all male prisoners confined or subject to confinement in maximum security at four State of California prisons located, respectively, at San Quentin, Folsom, Soledad and Tracy. Defendants are the wardens of the prisons and the director of the Department of Corrections.1 The class, certified on February 25, 1976, is divided into three subclasses: (1) All prisoners confined and/or subject to being confined in maximum security units at the four institutions as a result of disciplinary procedures; (2) all prisoners so confined who have knowingly and voluntarily requested confinement in such units; and (3) all prisoners confined in such units or subject to being so confined who are not included in sub-class (1) or (2). This last sub-class includes those confined for so-called "administrative" reasons.
The complaint alleges two causes of action. The first challenges the procedures resulting in confinement of inmates in maximum security units for "administrative" reasons. The second challenges conditions of confinement in the units.
By the motions now before us, plaintiffs seek summary judgment and injunctive relief only on the first cause of action. They claim that defendants' applicable rules, practices and procedures violate the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.2
Plaintiffs claim that defendants act arbitrarily in purporting to conform to their own standards for administrative segregation, i. e., that the inmate constitutes a danger to himself, or to other inmates, or to the staff.3 The main thrust of plaintiffs' claims lies in their allegations that, in purporting to apply the relevant standards, defendants have denied plaintiffs: Written notice of the charges against them; an opportunity to present witnesses and documentary evidence; an opportunity to confront and cross-examine adverse witnesses; representation by counsel or counsel-substitute; and a written decision stating reasons for confinement in maximum security units. Plaintiffs seek injunctive relief requiring defendants to provide these procedural protections. They also seek expungement from their prison records of any reference to their confinement in maximum security units unless the decision leading to the confinement was made in accordance with the demanded procedures.
Plaintiffs have filed forty-seven affidavits from prisoners confined in maximum security segregation for administrative reasons. Those affidavits, which are not contradicted, establish the facts we now summarize.
Prisoners in the maximum security units are confined in cells approximately five feet wide by eight feet long. The cells are without fresh air or daylight, both ventilation and lighting being poor. The lights in some cells are controlled by guards. It is difficult for prisoners to get needed medical attention. They must eat in their cells or not at all. They are allowed very limited exercise and virtually no contact with other prisoners. They cannot participate in vocational programs. They are denied those entertainment privileges provided for the general prison population. Parole is usually denied to them until after release from maximum security segregation.4
It is clear, then, that a prisoner confined in a maximum security unit suffers a loss of liberty much more severe than that experienced by a prisoner in the general prison population. See Spain v. Procunier, 408 F.Supp. 534 (N.D.Cal.1976); Clutchette v. Procunier, 328 F.Supp. 767 (N.D.Cal.1971), aff'd, 497 F.2d 809 (9th Cir. 1974), modified, 510 F.2d 613 (9 Cir. 1975), rev'd in part on other grounds, Baxter v. Palmigiano, 425 U.S. 308, 96 S.Ct. 1551, 47 L.Ed.2d 810 (1976).
A so-called Classification Committee in each institution is empowered to order prisoners transferred from the general prison population to maximum security for administrative reasons. The Committee is composed of the warden, two associate wardens, the chief psychiatrist, a program administrator and a correctional counselor. Any three members constitute a quorum. The warden has discretion to designate other members of the staff as permanent or temporary members. Defendants' Exhibit A, Department of Corrections Rules and Regulations, Ch. 4, filed Feb. 1, 1976.
Defendants have consistently confined prisoners in maximum security segregation for administrative reasons without first giving them any meaningful hearing. Typically, the inmate is transferred to a maximum security unit before he is brought before the Classification Committee. In many cases, prisoners have been confined in solitary for days—sometimes for weeks—before any hearing. In some cases, inmates have been so confined and not told the reasons, even informally, until appearance before the Committee.
The vagaries and irregularities of defendants' practices are illustrated by the following excerpts from affidavits submitted by plaintiffs (all uncontradicted as noted earlier).
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