Rubenstein Lumber Co. v. Aetna Life and Cas. Co.

• Decision Date: 21 March 1984
• Docket Number: No. 82-3096,82-3096
• Parties: , 78 Ill.Dec. 541 RUBENSTEIN LUMBER COMPANY, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. AETNA LIFE AND CASUALTY COMPANY, Defendant-Appellee.
• Court: United States Appellate Court of Illinois

Page 660

462 N.E.2d 660

122 Ill.App.3d 717, 78 Ill.Dec. 541

RUBENSTEIN LUMBER COMPANY, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. AETNA LIFE AND CASUALTY COMPANY, Defendant-Appellee.

No. 82-3096.

Appellate Court of Illinois,

First District, Third Division.

March 21, 1984.

Frank Glazer, Ltd., Chicago, for plaintiff-appellant.

Galliani & Kuzel, Ltd., Chicago, for defendant-appellee.

RIZZI, Presiding Justice:

Plaintiff, Rubenstein Lumber Co., sought a declaratory judgment that defendant, Aetna Life and Casualty Co., must defend and indemnify plaintiff in an action for retaliatory discharge brought against plaintiff by a former employee who had filed a claim under the Illinois Workers' Compensation Act (Ill.Rev.Stat.1983, ch. 48, pars. 138.1 et seq.). The court entered summary judgment in favor of defendant, and plaintiff appeals. We affirm.

The facts of this case are undisputed. On March 23, 1979, one of plaintiff's employees, who sustained accidental injuries arising out of and in the course of his employment, filed an Application for Adjustment of Claim with the Industrial Commission. This employee subsequently filed a complaint against plaintiff alleging that he was discharged in retaliation for filing a workers' compensation claim. Retaliatory terminations are prohibited by the Workers' Compensation Act, which provides that "[i]t shall be unlawful for any employer * * * to discharge or to threaten to discharge, or to refuse to rehire or recall to active service in a suitable capacity an employee because of the exercise of his rights or remedies granted to him by this Act." Ill.Rev.Stat.1979, ch. 48, par. 138.4(h).

From July 1, 1978, to July 1, 1980, plaintiff paid premiums to defendant for a "Workmen's Compensation and Employers' Liability Policy." Under the policy, defendant agreed "[t]o pay promptly when due all compensation and other benefits required of the Insured by the workmen's compensation law" and to "defend any proceeding against the Insured seeking such benefits * * *."

The issue here is whether, under the terms of the insurance policy, defendant is required to defend and indemnify plaintiff in the retaliatory discharge action. Plaintiff contends that the retaliatory discharge action, though a common law action, arises out of the Workers' Compensation Act and is therefore a proceeding within the meaning of the policy. Plaintiff further contends that the retaliatory discharge action seeks compensatory damages which constitute compensation within the meaning of the policy. We reject plaintiff's arguments.

The policy in this case does not require defendant to defend plaintiff in any proceeding, for the pertinent provision in the policy does not end with the word "proceeding." Rather, the provision requires defendant to defend plaintiff in "any proceeding against the Insured seeking such benefits * * *." The benefits to which this provision refers are those described in the earlier "Coverage A--Workmen's Compensation" provision as "all compensation and other benefits required of the Insured by the workmen's compensation law." Thus, defendant agreed to defend plaintiff in any proceeding seeking compensation and other benefits required of the insured by the Workers' Compensation Act. We must therefore refer to the Act itself. Though the Act expressly prohibits retaliatory discharges (Ill.Rev.Stat.1979, ch. 48, par. 138.4(h)), the Act does not provide for any compensation or benefits to an employee in the event that his employer violates the Act by discharging the employee in...