E.E.O.C. v. Watkins Motor Lines, Inc.
Decision Date | 12 September 2006 |
Docket Number | No. 05-3218.,05-3218. |
Parties | EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. WATKINS MOTOR LINES, INC., Defendant-Appellee. |
Court | U.S. Court of Appeals — Sixth Circuit |
Daniel Travis Vail, Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, Washington, D.C., for Appellant. Katharine C. Weber, Cors & Bassett, Cincinnati, Ohio, for Appellee.
ON BRIEF:
Daniel Travis Vail, Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, Washington, D.C., for Appellant. Katharine C. Weber, Susan R. Bell, Cors & Bassett, Cincinnati, Ohio, for Appellee.
Before: KENNEDY and GIBBONS, Circuit Judges; DONALD, District Judge.*
GIBBONS, J. (pp. 443-45), delivered a separate concurring opinion.
The Equal Employment Commission ("EEOC") brought this employment discrimination action on behalf of Stephen Grindle, alleging the Defendant discharged Grindle because of his morbid obesity in violation of the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 ("ADA"). On appeal, the EEOC argues that the district court erred in granting the Defendant's summary judgment motion; specifically, the EEOC argues the court erred in finding that 1) morbid obesity, not related to any physiological cause, is not an impairment under the ADA and 2) the Defendant did not perceive Grindle as substantially limited in any major life activities. The Defendant, in addition to arguing we should uphold the district court's order, also argues that the EEOC is prevented from pursuing this action under the doctrine of laches. For the following reasons, we AFFIRM the district court's judgment.
In August 1990, Stephen Grindle ("Grindle") was hired by the defendant, Watkins Motor Lines ("Watkins"), as a Driver/Dock Worker. Approximately 65% of his time was spent performing dock work including loading, unloading, and arranging freight. The job description for this position notes that the job involves climbing, kneeling, bending, stooping, balancing, reaching, and repeated heavy lifting.
At the time of his hire, Grindle approximates that he weighed about 345 pounds. During the next five years, his weight ranged from 340 to 450 pounds. Grindle knows of no physiological or psychological cause for his weight.
In November 1995, Grindle sustained an on-the-job injury. He was climbing a ladder at the loading dock and a rung broke. He started to fall and caught himself but, in doing so, he injured his knee. The day after the incident Grindle returned to work and worked fifty to sixty hours a week throughout the month of December. However, on January 22, 1996, he commenced a leave of absence for injuries sustained during the November incident. Watkins informed Grindle that they had a policy that any employee who remains on leave of absence in excess of 180 days is terminated, that in order to come back to work he must have a release from his doctor, and that he may be asked to take a physical exam.
After taking his leave, Grindle started treatment for his knee injury with Dr. Zancan. After about 6 months on leave (when his 180 days of leave were almost up), Dr. Zancan gave Grindle a return to work release. Grindle gave the release to Watkins, but Watkins would not accept the return to work release from Dr. Zancan as valid because Dr. Zancan had not yet reviewed Grindle's job demands prior to signing it. Watkins then sent Dr. Zancan a list of Grindle's job demands and a return to work form. Dr. Zancan never responded to the list of demands sent by Watkins, and so Watkins did not accept Dr. Zankin's original release letter.
On June 26, 1996, Watkins ordered Grindle to see the industrial clinic doctor, Dr. Walter Lawrence. Dr. Lawrence found that Grindle had a limited range of motion and that he could duck and squat but he was short of breath after a few steps. Dr. Lawrence also noted that "[o]n physical examination, the most notable item is that the patient weighs 405 lbs." Dr. Lawrence concluded that, even though Grindle met Department of Transportation standards for truck drivers, he could not safely perform the requirements of his job.
Because of Dr. Lawrence's determination that Grindle could not safely perform his job, and because Watkins had not yet received the requested return to work job form from Dr. Zancan after they sent him a list of job demands, Grindle was placed on safety hold. Since he was on safety hold Grindle was eventually terminated as he was unable to return to work in 180 days.
Grindle believed he was discharged because of his weight and so on September 30, 1998, he registered a complaint with the EEOC. On October 30, 2002, the EEOC filed an action in the United States District Court claiming Watkins violated the ADA. On February 9, 2004, Watkins moved for summary judgment. The magistrate to whom this action was referred recommended denying the motion; however, the district court granted Watkins motion, finding that non-physiologically caused obesity is not an "impairment" under ADA. Grindle appeals the district court's judgment.
We review the grant and denial of summary judgment de novo. Summary judgment is appropriate, "[i]f the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." Fed. R.Civ.P. 56(c). In evaluating motions for summary judgment, the evidence must be viewed in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144, 157, 90 S.Ct. 1598, 1608, 26 L.Ed.2d 142 (1970). The nonmoving party must present "significant probative evidence" to show that there is more than "some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts." Moore v. Philip Morris Cos., 8 F.3d 335, 339-340 (6th Cir.1993).
Watkins argues that the EEOC's claims are barred by laches. Laches is the "negligent and unintentional failure to protect one's rights." Nartron Corp. v. STMicroelectronics, 305 F.3d 397, 408 (6th Cir.2002) (quoting Elvis Presley Enter., Inc. v. Elvisly Yours, Inc., 936 F.2d 889, 894 (6th Cir.1991)). Laches consists of two elements: "(1) unreasonable delay in asserting one's rights; and (2) a resulting prejudice to the defending party." Brown-Graves Co. v. Central States, Southeast & Southwest Areas Pension Fund, 206 F.3d 680, 684 (6th Cir.2000). The pertinent delay for purposes of a case like this is the time that elapsed between the end of the EEOC's conciliation efforts (required in ADA actions) and the filing of the suit. As laches is an affirmative defense, the burden of establishing both of these elements is on the party raising the defense, in this case, Watkins.
The EEOC first argues that the laches defense may not be applied against it as it is a government entity. As we find that Watkins has not met its burden in establishing a prejudicial delay, we decline to decide this issue.1
Watkins argues that it is prejudiced because most all of the witnesses memories have faded; however, a review of the witnesses deposition testimony reveals that their memories did not fade to the point where they were unable to answer many questions. Also, there is ample contemporaneous documentation of many of the relevant events in this case. Watkins also argues that its claims have been compromised by the loss of relevant documents. However, Watkins fails to establish that the cause of the loss of these documents was the EEOC's delay in filing suit. In fact, with respect to the "lost" computer data, that loss is attributable to Watkins, rather than the EEOC. Howard v. Roadway Express, Inc., 726 F.2d 1529, 1533-34 ( ). Further, it is unclear to this court whether some of the "lost" documents ever even existed, as Watkins itself admits they are speculating about the existence of some of the evidence. Thus, as Watkins is unable to prove that the EEOC's delay caused it prejudice, we find that Watkins' assertion of the doctrine of laches fails.
Under the ADA, employers are prohibited from discriminating against any qualified "individual with a disability" defined as a "physical or mental impairment that substantially limits one or more of the major life activities of the individual." 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2)(A). However, individuals who do not actually have a substantially limiting impairment are also covered under the statute if their employer "regards" them as being disabled. 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2)(C). In Sutton v. United Air Lines, Inc., the Supreme Court explained:
There are two apparent ways in which individuals may fall within this statutory definition: (1) a covered entity mistakenly believes that a person has a physical impairment that substantially limits one or more major life activities, or (2) a covered entity mistakenly believes that an actual, nonlimiting impairment substantially limits one or more major life activities. In both cases, it is necessary that a covered entity entertain misperceptions about the individual—it must believe either that one has a substantially limiting impairment that one does not have or that one has a substantially limiting impairment when, in fact, the impairment is not so limiting.
Sutton v. United Air Lines, Inc., 527 U.S. 471, 489, 119 S.Ct. 2139, 2149-2150, 144 L.Ed.2d 450 (1999). The EEOC advanced its case under the second prong and argued that Grindle had an actual impairment —morbid obesity—that was regarded, albeit erroneously, as affecting his ability to do his job. Thus, to be successful when...
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